📚 Year 13 WJEC Philosophy: Case Study Practical Drills | 13年级 WJEC 哲学：案例分析实战演练
Mastering WJEC Year 13 Philosophy means moving beyond textbook summaries – you must learn to apply abstract theories to concrete, often challenging scenarios. This article presents eight practical case studies drawn from ethics, philosophy of mind, personal identity, and philosophy of religion, each paired with a structured drill. By working through these examples, you will sharpen your ability to reconstruct arguments, evaluate objections, and write high‑band answers under exam conditions.
掌握 WJEC 13 年级哲学意味着超越课本摘要——你必须学会将抽象理论应用到具体、往往具有挑战性的场景中。本文提供八个来自伦理学、心灵哲学、人格同一性和宗教哲学的实战案例，每个案例都配有结构化演练。通过练习这些例子，你将提高重建论证、评估反驳以及在考试条件下写出高分答案的能力。
1. Case 1: The Trolley Problem – Utilitarianism vs Deontology | 案例一：电车难题 – 功利主义与义务论对决
Imagine a runaway trolley heading towards five workers who will be killed if it continues. You can pull a lever to divert the trolley onto a side track, where only one worker is standing. Would you pull the lever? Utilitarianism, as developed by Bentham and Mill, evaluates the morality of an action by its consequences – specifically the maximisation of happiness or preference satisfaction. Since pulling the lever saves five lives at the cost of one, a utilitarian would argue that it is not only permissible but obligatory. The hedonic calculus weighs the quantity and quality of pleasure over pain, clearly favouring intervention.
想象一辆失控的电车冲向五名工人，如果继续行驶他们将丧生。你可以扳动拉杆，将电车转到侧线，那里只有一名工人。你会扳动拉杆吗？由边沁和密尔发展的功利主义根据后果来判断行为的道德性——具体而言，是幸福或偏好的最大化。因为扳动拉杆以牺牲一人为代价拯救五人，功利主义者会认为这不仅允许，而且是义务。快乐计算法权衡快乐与痛苦的数量和质量，明显支持干预。
Deontologists like Kant, however, would reject this reasoning. For Kant, moral worth depends on acting from duty according to the categorical imperative, not on outcomes. One formulation of the categorical imperative requires that we treat humanity, whether in our own person or in others, always as an end and never merely as a means. Deliberately pulling the lever uses the single worker as a mere means to save the five, violating his rational autonomy. Moreover, the formula of universal law asks whether we could consistently will that everyone in a similar situation should sacrifice an innocent for the greater good; Kant argues such a maxim cannot be universalised without contradiction. Thus, for a deontologist, pulling the lever is categorically wrong.
然而，像康德这样的义务论者会拒绝这种推理。对康德来说，道德价值取决于出于义务并按绝对命令行动，而不是结果。绝对命令的一种表述要求我们永远将人性——无论是自己还是他人——视为目的，而不仅仅是手段。故意扳动拉杆把那个无辜的工人仅仅当作拯救五人的手段，侵犯了他的理性自律。此外，普遍法则公式询问我们能否一贯地意愿每个人在类似情况下为了更大的善而牺牲无辜者；康德认为这种准则不能无矛盾地普遍化。因此，对义务论者而言，扳动拉杆绝对是错误的。
In an exam question presenting a trolley‑style dilemma, you should first identify which normative theory is being invoked, then carefully explain the steps of the argument. Show how the same facts can generate opposing moral verdicts, and introduce a critical perspective – for instance, noting how rule‑utilitarianism might forbid pushing an innocent person off a footbridge even if act‑utilitarianism would permit it, or how Ross’s prima facie duties could be used to mediate between the duty to save lives and the duty not to harm. Structured comparison is key to a top‑band answer.
在呈现电车难题的考试问题中，你应首先识别所援引的规范性理论，然后仔细解释论证步骤。展示相同事实如何产生对立的道德裁决，并引入批判性视角——例如，指出规则功利主义可能禁止把人从桥上推下去，即便行为功利主义允许这样做，或者如何使用罗斯的初定义务来调解拯救生命的义务与不伤害的义务。结构化的比较是获得高分的关键。
2. Case 2: Lying to a Murderer – Kant’s Categorical Imperative | 案例二：向凶手撒谎 – 康德的绝对命令
Consider the classic scenario: a would‑be murderer arrives at your door asking whether your friend, whom he intends to kill, is inside. Kant’s moral philosophy, famously expressed in his essay ‘On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropic Motives’, insists that you must not lie, even to a murderer. Lying, for Kant, is always wrong because it violates the categorical imperative. If you lie, you use the murderer as a mere means to the end of protecting your friend, and you fail to respect his rationality. More fundamentally, the maxim ‘it is permissible to lie to achieve a good outcome’ cannot be universalised: if everyone lied whenever it seemed beneficial, the institution of truth‑telling would collapse, and promises would become meaningless.
考虑这个经典场景：一个预谋杀人者来到你家门口，询问你那位他打算杀害的朋友是否在里面。康德的道德哲学——著名地表达于其论文《论出自博爱动机而说谎的所谓权利》——坚持你绝不能撒谎，即使是对一个杀人犯。对康德来说，说谎总是错误的，因为它违反了绝对命令。如果你撒谎，你把杀人犯仅仅当作保护朋友这一目的的手段，并且没有尊重他的理性。更根本的是，“为了达到好结果而撒谎是可允许的”这一准则无法普遍化：如果每个人在看起来有利时就撒谎，诚实的制度就会崩溃，承诺将变得毫无意义。
This conclusion strikes many as deeply counter‑intuitive. Critics, including Benjamin Constant, have argued that Kant’s absolutism leads to moral absurdity. From a consequentialist perspective, lying to save an innocent life clearly produces the best outcome. A sophisticated Kantian might reply by distinguishing between a direct lie and a misleading but truthful statement, or by arguing that the murderer, through his wicked intention, forfeits the right to full truth. However, Kant himself rejected such evasion, holding that any intentional falsehood is impermissible. The case therefore becomes a litmus test for the coherence of deontological ethics under extreme pressure.
这一结论被许多人认为极度违背直觉。包括邦雅曼·贡斯当在内的批评者指出，康德的绝对主义会导致道德荒谬。从后果主义视角看，为拯救无辜生命而撒谎显然产生最佳结果。一个精致的康德主义者可能回应说，要区分直接撒谎与误导但真实的陈述，或者主张杀人犯因其邪恶意图而丧失了获得完整真相的权利。然而，康德本人拒绝这种规避，坚持任何故意的虚假陈述都是不允许的。因此，这个案例成为了检验义务论伦理学在极端压力下是否自洽的试金石。
When tackling a WJEC question on this case, you must show awareness of both the textual Kant and the secondary literature. Outline the categorical imperative test in detail, apply it to the lying‑to‑a‑murderer scenario, then engage with the strongest objections: the conflict of duties (protecting life vs telling the truth), the role of consequences, and the possibility that Kant’s insistence on truthfulness undermines his own principle of treating humanity as an end. Use this case to demonstrate your ability to evaluate whether Kant’s ethics is too rigid to be a plausible guide to moral life.
在处理 WJEC 关于这个案例的问题时，你必须展示对康德文本和二手文献的了解。详细概述绝对命令的检验，将其应用于向凶手撒谎的场景，然后讨论最有力的反驳：义务的冲突（保护生命与说真话）、后果的角色，以及康德坚持诚实可能损害其自身人性原则的可能性。利用此案例展示你评估康德伦理学是否过于僵化而不能成为可靠的道德生活指引的能力。
3. Case 3: The Friendship Test – Virtue Ethics in Action | 案例三：友谊考验 – 美德伦理学的实践
Imagine that your best friend has secretly revealed to you that she has been embezzling small amounts of money from her part‑time job to help her struggling family. You must decide whether to persuade her to confess, report her yourself, or remain silent out of loyalty. Virtue ethics, especially in its Aristotelian form, would not ask ‘What is my duty?’ or ‘What consequences will result?’ but rather ‘What would a virtuous person do?’ A virtuous person exercises practical wisdom (phronēsis) to find the mean between extremes. In this case, the vice of excess might be a disloyal betrayal of trust by immediately reporting the friend, while the vice of deficiency might be an indulgent complicity that ignores the wrongfulness of theft. The virtuous mean would be a compassionate yet honest confrontation, encouraging the friend to make restitution while preserving the friendship.
想象你最好的朋友秘密告诉你，她一直在从兼职工作中挪用少量金钱来帮助她陷入困境的家庭。你必须决定是劝她坦白、自己举报她，还是出于忠诚保持沉默。美德伦理学，特别是亚里士多德式的形式，不会问“我的义务是什么？”或“会产生什么后果？”，而是问“有德之人会怎样做？”有德之人运用实践智慧（phronēsis）在两极之间寻取中庸。在本案例中，过度之恶可能是立即举报朋友，不忠地背叛信任；不及之恶则可能是放任自流，无视偷窃的错误。德性的中庸将是一种富有同情心但诚实的对峙，鼓励朋友归还财产同时维护友谊。
Rosalind Hursthouse argues that virtue ethics can provide genuine action‑guidance through the concept of ‘acting in character’. We can ask: ‘What would a wise, courageous, and just person do?’ The courageous person would face the awkwardness of the conversation; the just person would insist on righting the wrong; and the compassionate person would understand the friend’s desperate circumstances. Together, these virtues point toward a nuanced response that neither ignores wrongdoing nor destroys a valuable relationship. This contrasts with an impartialist utilitarian calculation, which might demand reporting to preserve the company’s overall welfare, and with a Kantian duty‑based approach, which might see the act as an unconditional breach of the moral law.
罗莎琳德·赫斯特豪斯认为，美德伦理学通过“合品性行动”的概念能够提供真正的行动指引。我们可以问：“一个有智慧、勇敢和公正的人会做什么？”勇敢的人会面对谈话的尴尬；公正的人会坚持纠正错误；富有同情心的人会理解朋友的绝望处境。这些美德共同指向一个既不容忍错误行为也不摧毁宝贵关系的细致回应。这与非偏私的功利主义计算形成对比——后者可能要求举报以保全公司的整体福利——也与以义务为基础的康德进路形成对比——后者可能将此行为视为对道德法则的无条件违背。
In your exam answer, avoid simply describing the scenario; use it to test the explanatory power of virtue ethics. Address the objection that virtue ethics gives vague or conflicting advice (the “multiple virtues” problem). Show how a virtue ethicist can adjudicate by ranking the relevant virtues or by appealing to the unity of the virtues thesis. This case also allows you to discuss the role of moral emotions and the importance of motivation, which are often sidelined by other normative theories.
在考试答案中，避免仅仅描述场景；要用它来检验美德伦理学的解释力。处理美德伦理学给出的建议模糊或冲突（“多重美德”问题）的反对意见。展示美德伦理学家如何通过排列相关美德的顺序或诉诸美德统一论来做出裁决。这个案例还可以让你讨论道德情感的角色以及动机的重要性，这些往往被其他规范性理论所忽视。
4. Case 4: Mary the Colour Scientist – The Knowledge Argument | 案例四：色彩科学家玛丽 – 知识论证
Mary is a brilliant neuroscientist who has spent her entire life in a black‑and‑white room, learning everything physical there is to know about colour vision. She knows all the facts about wavelengths, retinal cones, and neural processing. Yet she has never experienced colour. One day she steps out of the room and sees a red rose for the first time. The knowledge argument, advanced by Frank Jackson, claims that Mary learns something new – what it is like to see red. If Mary learned all the physical facts beforehand but still gained new knowledge upon experiencing colour, then physicalism (the view that everything is physical) is false, because there are non‑physical facts about conscious experience.
玛丽是一位杰出的神经科学家，她一生都待在一个黑白房间里，学到了关于色彩视觉的所有物理知识。她了解波长、视网膜视锥细胞和神经处理的所有事实，但她从未体验过颜色。有一天，她走出房间，第一次看到一朵红玫瑰。弗兰克·杰克逊提出的知识论证声称，玛丽学到了新东西——看到红色是什么样的体验。如果玛丽事先学会了所有物理事实，但在体验色彩时仍然获得了新知识，那么物理主义（一切皆为物理的观点）就是错误的，因为存在着关于意识体验的非物理事实。
Physicalists have responded vigorously. The ability hypothesis, defended by David Lewis and Laurence Nemirow, argues that Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but only new abilities – she gains the ability to imagine, recognise, and remember red. Thus, knowing‑how is not the same as knowing‑that, and physicalism can accommodate this without admitting non‑physical facts. The phenomenal concept strategy, associated with Brian Loar, holds that Mary acquires a new phenomenal concept of red, but this concept still refers to a physical property; the explanatory gap arises from the distinct nature of phenomenal concepts, not from ontological dualism. The debate therefore hinges on whether subjective experience can be fully captured by third‑personal, physical descriptions.
物理主义者给予了有力回应。大卫·刘易斯和劳伦斯·内米罗夫捍卫的能力假说认为，玛丽并未获得新的命题性知识，而只是获得了新能力——她获得了想象、识别和记住红色的能力。因此，如何做的知识与命题知识不同，物理主义可以在不承认非物理事实的情况下容纳这一点。与布莱恩·洛尔相关的现象概念策略主张，玛丽获得了关于红色的新现象概念，但这一概念仍指称物理属性；解释鸿沟源于现象概念的特殊性质，而非本体论上的二元论。因此，争论的关键在于主观体验是否能完全被第三人称的物理描述所涵盖。
When handling this case study in a WJEC exam, map out the logical structure of the knowledge argument clearly: premise 1 – before release, Mary knows all the physical facts about colour; premise 2 – after release, Mary learns something new (what it is like to see red); conclusion – not all facts are physical facts. Evaluate the strength of the physicalist replies, asking whether ability knowledge can be plausibly reduced to propositional knowledge or whether the phenomenological character of experience really constitutes a fact. Discussing Jackson’s own later conversion to physicalism adds depth and shows awareness of scholarly development.
在 WJEC 考试中处理这个案例研究时，要清晰地描绘知识论证的逻辑结构：前提一——离开前，玛丽已知所有关于颜色的物理事实；前提二——离开后，玛丽学到了新东西（看到红色是什么样的）；结论——并非所有事实都是物理事实。评估物理主义者回应的力度，追问能力知识是否能被合理地还原为命题知识，以及经验的现象性质是否真地构成一个事实。讨论杰克逊本人后来转向物理主义会增加深度并展示对学术发展的了解。
5. Case 5: The Philosophical Zombie – Conceivability and Possibility | 案例五：哲学僵尸 – 可设想性与可能性
A philosophical zombie is a being physically identical to a normal human in every respect – same brain states, same behaviour, same functional organisation – yet completely lacking conscious experience. There is nothing it is like to be a zombie; the lights are off inside. David Chalmers uses the zombie thought experiment to argue against physicalism. If a zombie world is conceivable, Chalmers claims it is metaphysically possible. And if it is metaphysically possible that a being could be physically identical to us but not conscious, then consciousness cannot be identical to or supervenient on physical properties in the actual world. Consciousness must therefore be a fundamental, non‑physical feature of reality.
哲学僵尸是一种在每一个物理方面都与正常人类完全相同的存在——相同的大脑状态、相同的行为、相同的功能组织——但却完全缺乏意识体验。成为僵尸是什么样的？没有任何主观感受，内在之灯是熄灭的。大卫·查尔莫斯利用僵尸思想实验反对物理主义。查尔莫斯主张，如果僵尸世界是可设想的，那么它在形而上学上就是可能的。而如果在形而上学上可能存在一个在物理上与我们完全相同却没有意识的存在，那么意识就不能等同于或随附于物理属性。因此，意识必须是实在的一个基本的、非物理的特征。
The key move in this argument is the conceivability‑to‑possibility inference. Physicalists often reject this link. Block argues that we might mistake a genuine metaphysical impossibility for a merely epistemic one; we can conceive of water not being H₂O only when we lack full scientific understanding. Similarly, we might conceive of zombies because we lack the conceptual clarity to see that the physical facts necessitate consciousness. The type‑B materialist, for example, holds that while zombies are conceivable, they are not genuinely possible – our concepts of consciousness and physical states are distinct, but the properties they pick out are necessarily identical. This creates an epistemic gap but not an ontological gap.
这个论证的关键一步是可设想性到可能性的推论。物理主义者常常拒绝这种联系。布洛克认为，我们可能把真正的形而上学的不可能性误认为仅仅是认识论上的不可能性；只有在我们缺乏充分的科学理解时，我们才能设想水不是 H₂O。类似地，我们能够设想僵尸，可能是因为我们缺乏清晰的概念去看清物理事实必然导致意识。例如，B 型唯物主义者认为，尽管僵尸是可设想的，但它们并非真正可能——我们对意识和物理状态的概念是不同的，但它们指称的属性却是必然同一的。这造成了一个认识论的鸿沟，而非本体论鸿沟。
For a high‑level WJEC response, you need to dissect the zombie argument into premises and critically evaluate each. Discuss whether conceivability is a reliable guide to possibility, referencing familiar counterexamples from Kripke (the necessity of identity statements) and the difference between primary and secondary conceivability. Consider whether the physicalist can accept the conceivability of zombies while denying their possibility without begging the question. Finally, explore the broader implications: if the zombie argument succeeds, it opens the door to property dualism or panpsychism, radically challenging the scientific image of the world.
为获得 WJEC 高水平的回答，你需要将僵尸论证分解为各个前提，并批判性地评估每一个。讨论可设想性是否是通往可能性的可靠指南，引用克里普克熟悉的相反例证（同一性陈述的必然性）以及初级可设想性与次级可设想性的区别。考虑物理主义者能否在接受僵尸的可设想性同时否定其可能性而不陷入乞题。最后，探讨更广泛的意涵：如果僵尸论证成功，它将为属性二元论或泛心论打开大门，从根本上挑战世界的科学图景。
6. Case 6: The Ship of Theseus – Personal Identity Over Time | 案例六：忒修斯之船 – 跨时间的人格同一性
According to legend, the Athenians preserved the Ship of Theseus by replacing each decaying plank with a new one, until no original material remained. Is the fully renovated vessel still the same ship? Now imagine that someone collects all the original planks and reassembles them into a ship. Which, if either, is the true Ship of Theseus? This ancient puzzle illuminates the problem of personal identity over time. If our bodies gradually replace their physical constituents – as indeed they do through metabolism – what ensures that we remain the same person from childhood to old age?
根据传说，雅典人通过用新木板替换每一块腐烂的木板来保存忒修斯之船，直到最初的物料荡然无存。完全翻新后的船还是同一条船吗？现在想象有人收集了所有原始木板并将它们重新组装成一艘船。那么哪一艘才是真正的忒修斯之船——如果有的话？这个古老的谜题揭示了跨时间的人格同一性问题。如果我们的身体在不断地更换其物理成分——正如新陈代谢确实如此——那么是什么保证了我们从童年到老年仍是同一个人呢？
Philosophers have proposed several criteria of personal identity. The psychological continuity theory, defended by John Locke and later by Derek Parfit, suggests that identity is a matter of overlapping psychological connections: memories, intentions, beliefs, and character traits. On this view, the renovated Theseus is like a person whose body changes but whose psychological life is continuous; the mere physical reconstruction, like the plank‑reassembly, lacks the right kind of psychological history. The biological approach, advocated by Eric Olsen, argues that identity consists in the continuous functioning of the human organism; so the renovated ship (if a ship could be an organism) might still be the original, while the reassembled one would merely be a replica. A third view, substance dualism, holds that personal identity resides in an immaterial soul or ego that persists through all material change.
哲学家们提出了几种关于人格同一性的标准。由约翰·洛克提出、后由德里克·帕菲特辩护的心理连续性理论认为，同一性取决于重叠的心理联结：记忆、意图、信念和性格特征。按照这种观点，翻新后的忒修斯就像一个身体改变但心理生活连续不断的人；而仅仅是对木板的物理重组（像重新组装）缺乏应有的心理历史。由埃里克·奥尔森倡导的生物学进路主张，同一性在于人类有机体的连续功能；因此，翻新后的船（如果船可以是一个有机体）可能仍是原来的那个，而重新组装的那艘只是一个复制品。第三种观点，实体二元论，认为人格同一性寓于一个非物质的灵魂或自我中，它在所有物质变化中持续存在。
A top‑tier essay will apply these theories directly to the case. Use Parfit’s teletransporter and fission cases to test psychological continuity. Does the reassembled ship have a better claim if psychological continuity can branch? Discuss the problem of duplication: if psychological continuity can be split (as in Parfit’s brain‑transplant cases), identity becomes one‑many, which is incoherent. Conclude by evaluating whether we should abandon the concept of identity in favour of survival or what matters in survival. Linking back to the Ship of Theseus shows the examiner you can move seamlessly between the abstract and the concrete.
一篇顶尖的论文将直接把这些理论应用于案例。运用帕菲特的远程传送和分裂案例来检验心理连续性理论。如果心理连续性可以分支，重新组装的船是否有更强的确权？讨论复制的问题：如果心理连续性可以被分裂（就像帕菲特的大脑移植案例中那样），同一性就变成了一对多的，这在逻辑上不连贯。最后评估我们是否应该放弃同一性概念，转而支持“幸存”或“幸存中重要的东西”。与忒修斯之船建立联系，将向考官显示你能够在抽象与具体之间自如切换。
7. Case 7: The Problem of Evil and the Free Will Defence | 案例七：邪恶问题与自由意志辩护
In 2004, a devastating tsunami struck the Indian Ocean, killing over 230,000 people, including countless children. This immense, seemingly gratuitous suffering presents the problem of evil in its starkest form. If God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good, why would a loving deity permit such horrors? The logical problem of evil, formulated by Epicurus and refined by J.L. Mackie, argues that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with the existence of a theistic God. For the WJEC specification, you must be prepared to present both the evidential and logical versions, showing how theists have responded with various theodicies and defences.
2004年，一场毁灭性的海啸袭击了印度洋，导致超过23万人丧生，其中包括无数儿童。这种巨大且看似无端的苦难以最赤裸的方式呈现了邪恶问题。如果上帝是全能的、全知的、全善的，为什么一个慈爱的神会允许这样的恐怖？逻辑的邪恶问题——由伊壁鸠鲁提出并由麦基完善——论证了邪恶的存在与有神论的上帝存在在逻辑上是不相容的。对于WJEC的考试大纲，你必须准备同时呈现证据性和逻辑性的版本，并展示有神论者如何以各种神正论和辩护来回应。
The free will defence, championed by Alvin Plantinga, tackles the logical problem directly. Plantinga argues that it is possible that God could not create a world containing moral good without also permitting moral evil, because free creatures must be genuinely free to choose between good and evil. A world in which humans always freely choose the good might not be feasible, if every free creature would sometimes sin. Since free will is a great good – making possible love, moral growth, and genuine relationships – God’s allowing the possibility of evil is not inconsistent with his goodness. However, the free will defence does not explain natural evil like tsunamis; for that, theists often appeal to the working of natural laws that make a stable environment possible, or to the fall of angelic beings.
由阿尔文·普兰丁格倡导的自由意志辩护直接应对逻辑问题。普兰丁格论证，上帝可能无法创造一个包含道德善却不允许道德恶的世界，因为自由被造物必须真正自由地在善恶之间做出选择。一个人类总是自由地选择善的世界可能并不可行，如果每一个自由被造物在某些情形下都会犯罪的话。既然自由意志是一个极大的善——使爱、道德成长和真实关系成为可能——上帝允许恶的可能性与他的善并不矛盾。然而，自由意志辩护并不能解释像海啸这样的自然恶；对此，有神论者常常诉诸于使稳定环境成为可能的自然法则的运作，或天使存在的堕落。
In your case‑study analysis, deconstruct the tsunami example. Explain how it supports the evidential problem – the sheer scale of suffering seems to overwhelm any plausible greater good. Introduce the sceptical theist response, which contends that our cognitive limitations prevent us from seeing the reasons an omniscient God might have. Evaluate whether the free will defence stretches credibility when applied to young children who never exercise significant moral freedom. The strongest answers will note that even if the logical problem is solved, the evidential problem retains formidable force, pushing some theists toward process theology or a limited God concept.
在你的案例分析中，解构海啸的例子。解释它如何支持证据性的邪恶问题——苦难的巨大规模似乎压倒了任何可信的更大的善。引入怀疑论有神论的回应，它主张我们认知的局限性使我们无法看到全知上帝可能具有的理由。评估自由意志辩护在应用于从未行使过重大道德自由的幼儿时是否牵强。最有力的回答将指出，即使逻辑问题得到了解决，证据性问题依然具有强大的力量，促使一些有神论者转向过程神学或有限上帝的概念。
8. Case 8: Religious Language – The Falsification Symposium | 案例八：宗教语言 – 证伪研讨会
In the mid‑20th century, Antony Flew introduced the falsification challenge to religious language. Drawing on the parable of the invisible gardener (originally from John Wisdom), Flew imagines two explorers who find a clearing in the jungle with flowers and weeds. One claims that a gardener tends the plot; the other is sceptical. After every empirical test fails to detect the gardener, the believer qualifies his statement: the gardener is invisible, intangible, silent, and so on, until the original assertion dies the death of a thousand qualifications. Flew argues that a statement that rules out nothing about observable reality is not a genuine factual statement. Religious claims like ‘God loves us’ are therefore cognitively meaningless unless believers specify what would count as falsifying them.
20世纪中叶，安东尼·弗卢对宗教语言提出了证伪挑战。弗卢借鉴了无形园丁的寓言（最初来自约翰·威兹德姆），想象两个探险者在丛林中找到一片空地，有花有草。一人声称有一个园丁照看着这块地；另一人表示怀疑。在每一次经验检验都未能发现园丁之后，信徒不断修正他的陈述：园丁是看不见的、触摸不到的、无声的等等，直到原来的断言死于一千次限定。弗卢论证，一个对可观察现实无所排除的陈述并非真正的事实陈述。因此，像“上帝爱我们”这样的宗教主张在认知上便是无意义的，除非信徒们明确什么将算作对它们的证伪。
R.M. Hare responded with his concept of the blik, a non‑cognitive, unfalsifiable framework through which a person interprets the world. Hare’s lunatic who believes that all dons want
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