📚 AS AQA Philosophy: Key Terminology Quick Memorisation Guide | AS AQA 哲学：词汇术语速记指南
Mastering the precise vocabulary of philosophy is not just a matter of passing an exam – it is the key to entering the conversation that has shaped human thought for centuries. For AS AQA students, the sheer number of technical terms in epistemology and moral philosophy can feel overwhelming, but with clear definitions and vivid memory hooks, every concept becomes manageable. This guide breaks down the essential terminology into bite-sized sections, pairing each term with a memorable explanation in both English and Chinese. By linking abstract ideas to concrete images and stories, you will build a mental framework that lasts far beyond the revision period.
掌握哲学中精确的词汇不仅仅是通过考试的问题——它是进入塑造了人类思想数个世纪的对话的钥匙。对于 AS AQA 的学生来说，认识论和道德哲学中大量的技术术语可能会让人感到不知所措，但有了清晰的定义和生动的记忆挂钩，每个概念都变得易于掌握。本指南将核心术语分解成小块，为每个术语配上中英双语的易记解释。通过把抽象观念与具体的图像和故事联系起来，你将建立一个超越复习期的思维框架。
1. Knowledge: The Starting Point of Epistemology | 知识：认识论的起点
In AQA philosophy, knowledge is standardly defined as justified true belief (JTB). That is, a person S knows that P if and only if: (i) P is true, (ii) S believes that P, and (iii) S is justified in believing that P. Think of this trio as the three legs of a stool: truth, belief, and justification. If any one leg is missing, the stool collapses and you do not have knowledge. When you memorise the term, picture a three-legged stool with the letters T, B, J carved into each leg.
在 AQA 哲学中，知识的标准定义是得到辩护的真信念（JTB）。也就是说，认知者 S 知道命题 P 当且仅当：（i）P 为真，（ii）S 相信 P，并且（iii）S 有理由相信 P。把这个三元组想象成凳子的三条腿：真、信念和辩护。如果某一条腿缺失，凳子就会倒塌，你就不拥有知识。记忆这个术语时，可以想象一张三条腿的凳子，每条腿上分别刻着 T、B、J。
2. Gettier Cases: When JTB Is Not Enough | 葛梯尔案例：当 JTB 还不够
Edmund Gettier showed that you can have a justified true belief and still lack knowledge. In his classic counterexample, Smith has strong evidence that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, and Smith himself has ten coins in his pocket. Smith’s belief is justified and true – but only because he himself unknowingly gets the job. The belief was true by luck, not because his justification was connected to the truth. The memory trick is to think of a coin landing on its edge: it looks lucky and unstable, just like a Gettier belief. The term ‘Gettier case’ now refers to any scenario where JTB is achieved accidentally.
埃德蒙·葛梯尔表明，你可以拥有得到辩护的真信念却仍然缺乏知识。在他经典的反例中，史密斯有强有力的证据表明“那个会得到工作的人口袋里有十个硬币”，而史密斯自己口袋里正好有十个硬币。史密斯的信念是得到辩护且为真的——但仅仅是因为他自己在不知情的情况下得到了那份工作。这个信念之所以为真纯属运气，而不是因为他的辩护与真相相连。记忆诀窍是把这想象成一枚硬币立在边缘上：看起来既幸运又不稳定，正是葛梯尔式信念。现在，“葛梯尔案例”这个术语指的是任何偶然满足 JTB 的处境。
3. Rationalism vs. Empiricism: The Sources of Knowledge | 理性主义与经验主义：知识的来源
Rationalism holds that we can gain substantive knowledge through reason alone, independently of sensory experience. Descartes’ ‘I think, therefore I am’ is rationalist because it is known by pure thought. Empiricism insists that all knowledge ultimately comes from sense experience; the mind starts as a blank slate. A quick mnemonic: ‘Ratio’ sounds like ‘reason’, so rationalists trust reasoning; ‘Empiric’ contains ’empir-‘ as in ’empirical’, meaning based on observation. In Chinese, 理 (reason) for rationalism and 验 (experience) for empiricism.
理性主义主张，我们可以仅仅通过理性获得实质知识，不依赖于感官经验。笛卡尔的“我思故我在”就是理性主义的，因为这是通过纯粹思维知道的。经验主义则坚持所有知识最终都来自感官经验；心灵开始时是一块白板。一个速记窍门：“Ratio”听起来像“reason”（理性），所以理性主义者信任推理；“Empiric”包含“empir-”，就像“empirical”（经验的），意味着基于观察。在中文里，理性主义的“理”对应理性，经验主义的“验”对应经验。
4. A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge | 先天知识与后天知识
These Latin terms are crucial for AQA essays. A priori knowledge is knowledge justified independently of experience (e.g., ‘all bachelors are unmarried’). A posteriori knowledge depends on experience (e.g., ‘the sky is blue’). Imagine the letter ‘i’ in ‘priori’ as the Roman numeral I (1), meaning it comes first, before experience. ‘Posteriori’ contains ‘post’, which means ‘after’ experience. In Chinese, 先天 means ‘before heaven’, i.e., innate; 后天 means ‘after heaven’, i.e., acquired through life.
这些拉丁术语对于 AQA 论文至关重要。先天知识是其辩护不依赖于经验的知识（例如，“所有单身汉都是未婚的”）。后天知识则依赖于经验（例如，“天空是蓝色的”）。想象“priori”中的“i”是罗马数字 I（1），意味着它在经验之先。“Posteriori”中包含“post”，意为在经验之“后”。在中文里，“先天”和“后天”本身就形象地区分了内在与习得。
5. Propositional Knowledge vs. Ability Knowledge | 命题知识 vs. 能力知识
Philosophers distinguish propositional knowledge (knowing-that) from ability knowledge (knowing-how). Propositional knowledge is factual and can be expressed in a that-clause, such as ‘I know that Paris is the capital of France’. Ability knowledge is skill-based, like knowing how to ride a bicycle. Remember: ‘Proposition’ has the word ‘position’ – it’s about holding a true position about the world. ‘Ability’ has ‘able’ – you are able to do something. In Chinese, 命题知识 is declarative, while 能力知识 is procedural.
哲学家区分命题知识（知道某事）和能力知识（知道如何做）。命题知识是事实性的，可以用 that 从句表达，比如“我知道巴黎是法国的首都”。能力知识是基于技能的，比如知道怎么骑自行车。记忆法：“Proposition”中含有“position”（立场），是关于对世界持有正确的立场。“Ability”中有“able”（能够），意味着你能够做某事。中文里，命题知识是陈述性的，能力知识是程序性的。
6. Direct and Indirect Realism in Perception | 知觉中的直接实在论与间接实在论
When you look at a tree, do you perceive the tree itself, or only a mental representation? Direct realism says you directly perceive physical objects and their properties. Indirect realism claims you perceive sense-data, which are caused by but distinct from physical objects. Picture a window: a direct realist believes the window is completely clear, so you see the tree directly; an indirect realist thinks there is a thin veil (sense-data) on the glass, so you see an image of the tree. The classic argument from illusion supports indirect realism, and the veil becomes a powerful memory image.
当你看着一棵树时，你感知到的是树本身，还是只是一个心理表征？直接实在论说你直接感知物理对象及其属性。间接实在论声称你感知到的是感觉材料，这些感觉材料由物理对象引起但又与之不同。想象一扇窗户：直接实在论者相信窗户完全透明，所以你直接看到了树；间接实在论者则认为玻璃上有一层薄纱（感觉材料），你看到的是树的影像。来自错觉的经典论证支持间接实在论，而这层纱就成了有力的记忆意象。
7. Utilitarianism: The Greatest Happiness Principle | 功利主义：最大幸福原则
Utilitarianism is the moral theory that the right action is the one that maximises overall happiness or utility. The founder Jeremy Bentham advocated a hedonic calculus weighing pleasure and pain. His follower John Stuart Mill introduced higher and lower pleasures, arguing that intellectual pleasures are superior. To remember the name, think of ‘utility’ – a utilitarian checks how useful an action is for creating happiness. In Chinese, 功利 means ‘merit and benefit’, directly capturing the cost-benefit mindset. The memory hook for Mill is that a mill grinds grain into finer flour, just as Mill refined Bentham’s crude pleasure calculation into higher-quality pleasures.
功利主义是这样一种道德理论：正确的行为是能够最大化总体幸福或效用的行为。创始人杰里米·边沁提倡一种衡量快乐与痛苦的快乐计算法。他的追随者约翰·斯图尔特·密尔引入了高级快乐和低级快乐，主张理智的快乐更为优越。记忆这个名字时，可以想想“utility”（效用）——一个功利主义者会检查一个行为对于创造幸福有多大用处。在中文里，“功利”二字本身就捕捉了得失计算的心态。对密尔的记忆挂钩是：磨坊（mill）把谷物磨成更精细的面粉，正如密尔把边沁粗糙的快乐计算提炼成了更高级的品质。
8. Kantian Ethics: Duty and the Categorical Imperative | 康德伦理学：义务与定言命令
Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy centres on acting from duty and following the categorical imperative. Unlike a hypothetical imperative (if you want X, do Y), a categorical imperative commands absolutely: ‘Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.’ The two key formulations are the universal law formulation and the humanity formulation (treat persons as ends, never merely as means). Remember ‘categorical’ as ‘no ifs or buts’ – it is absolute. The Chinese 定言命令 means ‘fixed-word command’, suggesting a command that is fixed and unconditional.
伊曼努尔·康德的道德哲学的核心是出于义务而行动并遵循定言命令。与假言命令（如果你想达到 X，就做 Y）不同，定言命令是无条件地命令：“只按照你同时能够愿意它成为一条普遍法则的那个准则去行动。”两个关键表述是普遍法则公式和人性公式（始终把人当作目的，而绝不仅仅当作手段）。记忆“categorical”时，可以想象它意味着“没有任何如果或但是”——它是绝对的。中文“定言命令”暗示一种固定且无条件的命令。
9. Virtue Ethics: Character and Eudaimonia | 美德伦理学：品格与 eudaimonia
Aristotle’s virtue ethics focusses not on rules or consequences, but on the character of the moral agent. The goal is eudaimonia, often translated as human flourishing or living well. Key concepts include virtues (excellent character traits), the doctrine of the mean (virtue lies between two vices), and phronesis (practical wisdom). The Greek word ‘eu-daimon’ literally means ‘good spirit’; imagine a cheerful soul called ‘You-daimon’ guiding your choices. The Chinese 美德 is ‘beautiful virtue’, and 中庸之道 (the way of the mean) matches the doctrine of the mean perfectly.
亚里士多德的美德伦理学关注的不是规则或后果，而是道德行为者的品格。其目标是eudaimonia，通常译为人类的繁荣或生活得好。核心概念包括美德（卓越的品格特质）、中庸之道（美德处于两个恶习之间）以及phronesis（实践智慧）。希腊词“eu-daimon”字面上意思是“好的精灵”；想象一个名为“You-daimon”的快乐精灵在指引你的选择。中文“美德”是“美丽的德性”，“中庸之道”恰好与 the doctrine of the mean 吻合。
10. Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism in Metaethics | 元伦理学中的认知主义与非认知主义
Metaethics examines what moral language is doing. Cognitivism holds that moral statements express beliefs that can be true or false (e.g., ‘murder is wrong’ asserts a fact). Non-cognitivism argues that moral language expresses non-belief mental states, like emotions (emotivism) or universal prescriptions (prescriptivism). Think of ‘cognitive’ as related to ‘cognition’ or thought – cognitivism says morality is a matter of thinking true thoughts. Non-cognitivism denies this. In Chinese, 认知 (cognition) directly indicates the connection to truth-apt beliefs.
元伦理学考察道德语言在做什么。认知主义主张道德陈述表达可以判断真假的信念（例如，“谋杀是错误的”断言一个事实）。非认知主义则认为道德语言表达非信念的心理状态，比如情感（情感主义）或普遍的指令（规定主义）。把“cognitive”和“cognition”（认知）联系起来——认知主义说道德关乎思考真实的思想。非认知主义否认这一点。中文里，“认知”直接指示了与适真信念的关联。
11. Moral Realism vs. Anti-Realism | 道德实在论与反实在论
Moral realism asserts that there are mind-independent moral facts. Even if everyone thought torture was acceptable, it would still be wrong. Moral anti-realism denies such objective facts, holding that moral truth depends on our attitudes, cultural frameworks, or simply does not exist. Visualise a compass: a realist believes moral truths exist like magnetic north, fixed regardless of what anyone thinks. An anti-realist believes north is wherever the majority of compasses happen to point. In Chinese, 实在 (real existence) of moral properties captures the realist’s claim.
道德实在论断言存在独立于心灵的道德事实。即使每个人都觉得酷刑可以接受，它仍然是错误的。反实在论否认这类客观事实，认为道德真理取决于我们的态度、文化框架，或者根本不存在。想象一个指南针：实在论者相信道德真理就像磁北极一样存在，不论任何人怎么想。反实在论者则认为北方只是大多数指南针恰好指向的方向。中文里，道德属性的“实在”抓住了实在论的主张。
12. The Is–Ought Gap and the Naturalistic Fallacy | 事实-价值鸿沟与自然主义谬误
Hume pointed out that many moral arguments illicitly move from descriptive statements (what is) to prescriptive conclusions (what ought to be). This is the is–ought gap. G.E. Moore later identified the naturalistic fallacy – the mistake of defining moral terms like ‘good’ with natural properties like ‘pleasurable’. A quick way to remember: whenever you see someone saying ‘because it is natural, it must be right’, they have committed the naturalistic fallacy. The Chinese 鸿沟 (chasm) between ‘是’ and ‘应当’ captures the logical gulf beautifully.
休谟指出，许多道德论证非法地从描述性陈述（是什么）跳到了规定性结论（应当怎样）。这就是事实-价值鸿沟。G.E. 摩尔后来指出了自然主义谬误——用诸如“令人愉快的”这样的自然属性来定义“善”这类道德术语的错误。一个快速记忆法是：每当你看到有人说“因为这是自然的，所以一定是对的”，他们就犯了自然主义谬误。中文里“是”与“应当”之间的“鸿沟”形象地捕捉了这道逻辑深渊。
Published by TutorHao | Philosophy Revision Series | aleveler.com
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