Pre-U OCR Philosophy: Key Terminology Quick Memory Guide | Pre-U OCR 哲学:词汇术语速记指南

📚 Pre-U OCR Philosophy: Key Terminology Quick Memory Guide | Pre-U OCR 哲学:词汇术语速记指南

Mastering philosophical terminology is essential for success in Pre‑U OCR Philosophy. Clear definitions allow you to construct precise arguments and analyse texts with confidence. This guide presents core terms from epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, mind, religion, and logic, offering paired English and Chinese explanations to deepen understanding and aid memorisation.

掌握哲学术语是在 Pre‑U OCR 哲学考试中取得成功的关键。清晰的定义能让你构建严谨的论证并自信地分析文本。本指南精选认识论、形而上学、伦理学、心灵哲学、宗教哲学和逻辑学中的核心词汇,以英中双语解释帮助你深化理解、强化记忆。


1. Epistemology: Knowledge and Justification | 认识论:知识与辩护

A priori – Knowledge that is independent of experience, justified through reason alone (e.g., mathematical truths, ‘all bachelors are unmarried’). In Pre‑U papers, recognise a priori claims when the justification does not rely on sensory observation.

先验知识 – 独立于经验、仅通过理性辩护的知识(如数学真理、“所有单身汉都未婚”)。在 Pre‑U 答题中,当辩护不依赖感官观察时即可识别为先验主张。

A posteriori – Knowledge that depends on experience or empirical evidence (e.g., ‘water boils at 100°C’). Contrast this with a priori in essays on rationalism vs. empiricism.

后验知识 – 依赖经验或实证证据的知识(如“水在 100°C 沸腾”)。在理性主义与经验主义论文中,需将其与先验知识进行对比。

Justified true belief (JTB) – The traditional tripartite definition of knowledge: S knows that P iff P is true, S believes that P, and S is justified in believing that P. Reference this when discussing the Gettier problem.

确有辩护的真信念 – 传统的知识三元定义:S 知道 P,当且仅当 P 为真,S 相信 P,且 S 有辩护地相信 P。讨论葛梯尔问题时需引用此定义。

Gettier case – A scenario where justified true belief is present but intuitively lacks knowledge, showing the JTB account is insufficient. Memorise a classic example (e.g., the stopped clock) for exam use.

葛梯尔案例 – 一个存在确有辩护的真信念、但直觉上缺乏知识的情景,表明 JTB 解释不足。记住一个经典例子(如停摆的钟)以备考。

Foundationalism – The view that knowledge rests on a base of self‑justifying, indubitable beliefs (e.g., Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas). Criticisms focus on the arbitrariness of the foundations.

基础主义 – 认为知识建立在自辩、无可置疑的基本信念之上(如笛卡尔的清晰分明观念)。批评多集中于基础的任意性。

Coherentism – Knowledge is justified by the mutual support among a system of beliefs, like a web. Essays often contrast it with foundationalism; note the isolation objection.

融贯论 – 知识由信念系统内部的相互支持而辩护,如一张网。论文常将其与基础主义对比;注意隔离反驳。

Reliabilism – A belief is justified if produced by a reliable cognitive process (e.g., perception, memory). Externalist in nature; use the ‘brain in a vat’ thought experiment to test it.

可靠主义 – 若信念由可靠的认知过程(如感知、记忆)产生,则得到辩护。属于外在主义;可用“缸中之脑”思想实验检验。


2. Metaphysics: Reality and Existence | 形而上学:实在与存在

Substance – That which exists independently and persists through change. For Descartes, mind and body are distinct substances (substance dualism); for Spinoza, there is only one substance (God or Nature).

实体 – 独立存在并在变化中持存者。笛卡尔认为心灵与身体是不同实体(实体二元论);斯宾诺莎则主张唯一实体(上帝或自然)。

Dualism – The mind and body are two fundamentally different kinds of substance or property. Pre‑U questions often require you to evaluate interaction problems and the ‘ghost in the machine’ critique.

二元论 – 心灵与身体是两种根本不同的实体或属性。Pre‑U 题目常要求评估交互作用难题与“机器中的幽灵”批评。

Physicalism – Everything that exists is physical or supervenes on the physical. Key variants include type identity theory (mental states = brain states) and functionalism (mental states defined by causal roles).

物理主义 – 存在的一切都是物理的,或随附于物理的。主要变体包括类型同一论(心理状态=大脑状态)和功能主义(心理状态由因果角色定义)。

Determinism – Every event, including human actions, is causally necessitated by prior states. Contrast with libertarianism (free will) and compatibilism (free will compatible with determinism).

决定论 – 每个事件,包括人类行为,都由先前状态因果必然化。与意志自由论(自由意志)和相容论(自由意志与决定论兼容)相对比。

Possible worlds – A way of talking about necessity and possibility: a proposition is necessary if true in all possible worlds. Use in discussions of ontological arguments and modal logic.

可能世界 – 一种谈论必然性与可能性的方式:一个命题若在所有可能世界中为真,则是必然的。用于本体论论证和模态逻辑的讨论。


3. Philosophy of Mind: Consciousness and Intentionality | 心灵哲学:意识与意向性

Qualia – The subjective, qualitative aspects of conscious experience, such as the redness of red or the pain of a headache. The ‘knowledge argument’ (Mary the colour scientist) is a classic challenge to physicalism from qualia.

感受质 – 意识经验的主观、质性方面,如红色的红感或头痛的痛感。“知识论证”(色彩科学家玛丽)是来自感受质对物理主义的经典挑战。

Intentionality – The ‘aboutness’ of mental states: beliefs are about propositions, desires about objects. Brentano claimed intentionality is the mark of the mental; naturalistic theories try to explain it without mystery.

意向性 – 心理状态的“关于性”:信念关于命题,欲望关于对象。布伦塔诺宣称意向性是心理的标志;自然主义理论试图不加神秘地解释它。

Functionalism – Mental states are defined by their causal relations to sensory inputs, behavioural outputs, and other mental states. The inverted spectrum and absent qualia objections are central to Pre‑U essays.

功能主义 – 心理状态由其与感觉输入、行为输出及其他心理状态的因果关系来定义。颠倒光谱与缺失感受质的反驳是 Pre‑U 论文的核心。

Eliminative materialism – Folk psychological concepts (belief, desire) are false and will be eliminated by mature neuroscience. Be ready to discuss whether this view is self‑refuting.

取消式唯物主义 – 民间心理学概念(信念、欲望)是错误的,将被成熟的神经科学所取消。需准备讨论该观点是否自相矛盾。


4. Ethics: Normative Theories | 伦理学:规范理论

Utilitarianism – The right action is the one that maximises overall happiness or utility. Distinguish act (e.g., Bentham) from rule utilitarianism (Mill); key criticisms include the ‘tyranny of the majority’ and demandingness.

功利主义 – 正当的行为即最大化总体幸福或效用的行为。区分行为功利主义(如边沁)与规则功利主义(密尔);关键批评包括“多数暴政”和苛求性。

Deontology – Duty‑based ethics; actions are right or wrong in themselves regardless of consequences. Kant’s categorical imperatives (universal law formulation, humanity formulation) are essential.

义务论 – 基于义务的伦理学;行为本身对错不取决于后果。康德的定言命令(普遍法则公式、人性公式)至关重要。

Virtue ethics – Focuses on character and the virtues (courage, temperance, wisdom) rather than rules or consequences. Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean is central; the ‘action‑guidance’ objection questions its practicality.

德性伦理学 – 关注品格与德性(勇敢、节制、智慧)而非规则或后果。亚里士多德的中道学说核心;“行为指导”反驳质疑其实用性。

Moral relativism – Moral truths are relative to culture or individual. Distinguish descriptive (what people believe) from normative (what is right); often criticised for making moral progress impossible.

道德相对主义 – 道德真理相对于文化或个人。区分描述性相对主义(人们相信什么)与规范性相对主义(什么是正当的);常被批评使道德进步变得不可能。


5. Meta‑ethics: The Meaning of Moral Language | 元伦理学:道德语言的意义

Cognitivism – Moral statements express beliefs that can be true or false (e.g., ‘murder is wrong’ is truth‑apt). Naturalism and non‑naturalism are cognitivists; the open question argument challenges naturalism.

认知主义 – 道德陈述表达可真可假的信念(如“谋杀是错误的”具有真值)。自然主义与非自然主义均为认知主义;开放问题论证挑战自然主义。

Non‑cognitivism – Moral statements do not express beliefs but emotions (emotivism: Ayer, ‘Boo‑hoorah’ theory) or prescriptions (prescriptivism: Hare). Focus on the Frege‑Geach problem as a major difficulty.

非认知主义 – 道德陈述不表达信念,而表达情感(情绪主义:艾耶尔,“嘘-万岁”理论)或规约(规约主义:黑尔)。重点关注弗雷格—吉奇问题这一重大难题。

Moral realism – There are mind‑independent moral facts. Arguments from moral disagreement and queerness (Mackie) are standard objections; realists reply with companions in guilt arguments.

道德实在论 – 存在独立于心灵的道德事实。来自道德分歧与古怪性的论证(麦凯)是标准反驳;实在论者以同罪论证回应。

Error theory – First‑order moral claims are systematically false because there are no moral properties. Mackie’s combination of cognitivism and anti‑realism is a distinctive exam topic.

错误论 – 一阶道德主张因不存在道德属性而系统为假。麦凯结合认知主义与反实在论,是独特的考试主题。


6. Philosophy of Religion: Theistic Arguments | 宗教哲学:有神论论证

Ontological argument – An a priori argument for God’s existence from the concept of a perfect being. Anselm’s version (Proslogion) and Descartes’ version differ; Gaunilo’s ‘perfect island’ and Kant’s ‘existence is not a predicate’ are key critiques.

本体论论证 – 从完美存在者概念出发的先天上帝存在论证。安瑟伦(《宣讲》)与笛卡尔版本不同;高尼罗“完美岛屿”与康德“存在不是谓词”为关键批判。

Cosmological argument – An a posteriori argument from the existence of the universe to a first cause or necessary being. Aquinas’ Five Ways and the Kalam version; Hume’s ‘fallacy of composition’ and the possibility of an infinite regress are standard replies.

宇宙论论证 – 从宇宙存在推出第一因或必然存在的后天论证。阿奎那五路与卡拉姆版本;休谟“组合谬误”与无限回溯的可能性是标准回应。

Teleological argument – The argument from design: the complexity and apparent purpose in nature point to an intelligent designer. Paley’s watchmaker analogy; Hume’s criticisms (limited analogy, problem of evil) and Darwinian evolution are exam staples.

目的论论证 – 设计论证:自然界中的复杂性与明显目的指向一位智能设计者。佩利的钟表匠类比;休谟的批评(有限类比、恶的问题)与达尔文进化论是考试要点。

Problem of evil – The logical and evidential challenge to the existence of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God. Distinguish moral and natural evil; theodicies (Augustinian, Irenaean) attempt to reconcile God with evil.

恶的问题 – 对全能、全善上帝存在的逻辑与证据挑战。区分道德恶与自然恶;神义论(奥古斯丁式、爱任纽式)试图调和上帝与恶。


7. Political Philosophy: Liberty, Justice, and the State | 政治哲学:自由、正义与国家

Social contract – The idea that legitimate political authority derives from an agreement among individuals to form a society. Hobbes (absolute sovereignty), Locke (natural rights), and Rousseau (general will) offer contrasting versions.

社会契约 – 认为合法的政治权威源于个人间达成组建社会的协议。霍布斯(绝对主权)、洛克(自然权利)与卢梭(公意)提供不同版本。

Negative liberty – Freedom from interference by others; the absence of external constraints. Isaiah Berlin’s distinction; Nozick’s minimal state is built on this concept.

消极自由 – 免于他人干涉的自由;外在约束的缺失。以赛亚·伯林的区分;诺齐克的最低限度国家建立于此概念上。

Positive liberty – Freedom to be one’s own master, involving self‑realisation and rational self‑direction. Critics warn it can justify authoritarianism; Berlin’s concerns are vital for essays.

积极自由 – 成为自己主人的自由,涉及自我实现与理性自主。批评者警告其可能为威权主义辩护;伯林的担忧在论文中至关重要。

Justice as fairness – Rawls’ theory: principles of justice are those chosen behind a ‘veil of ignorance’. The two principles (equal basic liberties, difference principle) and the original position are central to contemporary political philosophy.

作为公平的正义 – 罗尔斯的理论:正义原则是在“无知之幕”背后被选择的。两个原则(平等的基本自由、差异原则)与原初状态是当代政治哲学核心。


8. Logic and Critical Thinking: Formal and Informal Fallacies | 逻辑与批判性思维:形式与非形式谬误

Modus ponens – A valid argument form: If P then Q; P; therefore Q. Recognising this structure helps you evaluate deductive reasoning in philosophy texts.

肯定前件式 – 有效论证形式:如果 P 则 Q;P;所以 Q。识别该结构有助于你在哲学文本中评价演绎推理。

Modus tollens – If P then Q; not Q; therefore not P. Often used in falsification and in replies to theistic arguments.

否定后件式 – 如果 P 则 Q;非 Q;所以非 P。常用于证伪及对有神论论证的回应。

Begging the question – An informal fallacy where the conclusion is assumed in a premise. Watch for this in ontological arguments and some forms of relativism.

乞题谬误 – 一种非形式谬误,即结论被预设于前提中。关注本体论论证与某些形式的相对主义中出现的此类问题。

False dilemma – Presenting only two options when more exist. Common in debates on free will (determinism or libertarianism, overlooking compatibilism).

假两难推理 – 仅呈现两个选项,而实际上存在更多。常见于自由意志辩论(决定论或自由意志论,忽视相容论)。

Slippery slope – Arguing that a small first step will inevitably lead to a chain of negative events without sufficient justification. Frequently appears in ethical debates on euthanasia or genetic engineering.

滑坡谬误 – 论证一小步将不可避免地导致一连串负面事件,且缺乏充分辩护。常出现在安乐死或基因工程的伦理辩论中。


9. Ancient Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle Essentials | 古代哲学:柏拉图与亚里士多德精要

Form (Plato) – The eternal, unchanging, perfect archetype of a property (e.g., the Form of the Good). Understanding the theory of Forms is vital for Pre‑U sections on Plato’s epistemology and metaphysics.

理型(柏拉图) – 某属性的永恒、不变、完美原型(如善的理型)。理解理型论对 Pre‑U 中柏拉图认识论和形而上学部分至关重要。

Allegory of the cave – Plato’s illustration of the ascent from ignorance (shadows) to knowledge (the sun/Form of the Good). Use it to explain the divided line and the philosopher‑king concept.

洞穴寓言 – 柏拉图说明从无知(影子)上升到知识(太阳/善的理型)的比喻。用它解释线段比喻和哲学王概念。

Four causes (Aristotle) – Material, formal, efficient, and final cause explain why a thing is what it is. The final cause (telos) is central to Aristotle’s natural philosophy and virtue ethics.

四因说(亚里士多德) – 质料因、形式因、动力因与目的因解释事物何以如此。目的因(telos)是亚里士多德自然哲学与德性伦理学的核心。

Doctrine of the mean – Virtue is a mean between excess and deficiency relative to us. For example, courage is the mean between rashness and cowardice. Applied in character‑based moral education.

中道学说 – 德性是相对于我们而言过度与不及之间的中道。例如,勇敢是鲁莽与怯懦的中道。应用于品格道德教育中。


10. Revision Strategies: How to Internalise Philosophical Terminology | 复习策略:如何内化哲学术语

Create flashcards – Write the term on one side and the definition (English and Chinese) on the other. Add a typical exam question or counter‑argument to the back for deeper processing. Spaced repetition apps can automate review.

制作闪卡 – 一面写术语,另一面写英中定义。背面加上典型考题或反论,促进深度加工。间隔重复应用可自动化复习。

Use concept maps – Link terms visually: e.g., connect ‘a priori’ to ‘rationalism’, ‘Descartes’, ‘foundationalism’. This builds a network of associations that strengthens retrieval during exams.

使用概念图 – 将术语视觉化连接:如将“先验”连接至“理性主义”、“笛卡尔”、“基础主义”。这能构建联想网络,强化考试时的提取。

Apply terms to exam scripts – Practise writing paragraphs that embed key terminology naturally. For example, ‘The ontological argument is an a priori deductive argument that commits the fallacy of begging the question.’ Self‑evaluate for precision.

将术语应用于考卷 – 练习撰写自然嵌入关键术语的段落。例如,“本体论论证是一个先验演绎论证,犯有乞题谬误。”自我评估精确度。

Teach the terms – Explain a concept to a peer in your own words, using both English and Chinese. Teaching reveals gaps in understanding and forces you to clarify nuances, an effect supported by the protégé effect.

教导术语 – 用你自己的话、以中英双语向同伴解释概念。教学能暴露理解缺口并迫使你澄清细微差别,这一效果受教生效应支持。

Mnemonics for tricky distinctions – Create memorable cues: ‘JTB = Just True Belief? No, Justified True Belief.’ For meta‑ethics, ‘Cog‑Nat, Non‑Cog‑Emo’ can quickly cue cognitivism/naturalism vs non‑cognitivism/emotivism.

为难记区别创造记忆术 – 创造易记提示:“JTB = Just True Belief? 不,是 Justified True Belief。”对于元伦理学,“Cog‑Nat, Non‑Cog‑Emo”可快速提示认知主义/自然主义与非认知主义/情绪主义。

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