📚 Year 12 CAIE Philosophy: Glossary & Memory Guide | 剑桥AS哲学：词汇术语速记指南
Mastering technical vocabulary is the first step to doing well in CAIE AS Philosophy. This guide pairs concise definitions with memory hacks, contrasting terms side by side so that your revision is structured, efficient, and exam-ready. The terms are drawn from the core areas of Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics covered in the syllabus.
掌握专业术语是在剑桥AS哲学考试中取得好成绩的第一步。这份指南将精炼的定义与记忆技巧相结合，并通过并置对比来呈现术语，让你的复习更有条理、更高效，直击考试所需。所选术语均来自考纲中的认识论、伦理学和形而上学的核心领域。
1. Foundational Trio: Proposition, Truth, Belief, Knowledge | 基础三重奏：命题、真理、信念、知识
A proposition is the factual content of a declarative sentence — what is asserted, which can be true or false. ‘It is raining’ and ‘Il pleut’ express the same proposition. Keeping proposition, sentence, and belief distinct prevents category mistakes when analysing knowledge.
命题是一个陈述句所断言的事实内容，即可以被判定为真或假的东西。“正在下雨”和“Il pleut”表达了同一个命题。在分析知识时，把命题、句子和信念区分开来，可以避免范畴错误。
The tripartite definition of knowledge identifies it as justified true belief (JTB). A subject S knows that p if and only if S believes p, p is true, and S has justification for believing p. Memory tip: think ‘JTB car’ — Justified, True, Belief — these three wheels must all turn for knowledge to move.
知识的三元定义将其界定为经过辩护的真信念（JTB）。一个主体S知道命题p，当且仅当S相信p，p为真，并且S对相信p有辩护。记忆提示：想象一辆“JTB小汽车”——辩护（Justified）、真（True）、信念（Belief）这三个轮子必须同时转动，知识才能前行。
Truth is often understood as correspondence with facts; belief is a psychological state of taking a proposition to be true. Many candidates confuse belief with truth. Remember: you can believe what is false, but you cannot know what is false.
真理常被理解为与事实相符；信念则是一种认为命题为真的心理状态。许多考生混淆信念与真理。记住：你可以相信假的东西，但你不可能知道假的东西。
2. Two Crucial Distinctions: A Priori / A Posteriori & Analytic / Synthetic | 两个关键区分：先天/后天与分析/综合
A priori knowledge is justified independently of sense experience (e.g. ‘All bachelors are unmarried’); a posteriori knowledge depends on sense experience (e.g. ‘The cat is on the mat’). The ‘a’ means ‘from’ in Latin, so a priori is ‘from the earlier’ — think prior to experience. A posteriori is ‘from the later’ — after experience.
先天知识的辩护独立于感官经验（例如“所有单身汉都未婚”）；后天知识依赖于感官经验（例如“猫在垫子上”）。“a”在拉丁语中意为“从……来”，因此a priori是“从早先来的”——想想经验之前；a posteriori是“从后来来的”——经验之后。
Analytic propositions are true in virtue of meaning alone, with the predicate contained in the subject concept; synthetic propositions add information not already contained in the subject concept. ‘All triangles have three sides’ is analytic; ‘All triangles are red’ is synthetic and false, but still synthetic. Use the mnemonic ‘A for Already inside’ (analytic) and ‘S for Something added’ (synthetic).
分析命题仅凭意义即为真，谓词已经包含在主词概念之中；综合命题则增加了主词概念中原本没有的信息。“所有三角形都有三条边”是分析的；“所有三角形都是红色的”是综合的且为假，但它仍然是综合的。运用记忆术“A代表Already inside（已经在内）”记为分析，而“S代表Something added（添加的东西）”记为综合。
Although often aligned, these distinctions are not identical. ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is both a priori and analytic. Yet some philosophers hold that there are synthetic a priori truths — Kant’s key claim. Keep the two axes separate: origin of justification vs. source of truth.
尽管这两个区分经常被对齐，但它们并不等同。“所有单身汉都未婚”既是先天的又是分析的。然而一些哲学家主张存在先天综合真理——这是康德的核心主张。要将这两个轴线分开：一个关乎辩护的来源，一个关乎真理的来源。
3. Modality: Necessary, Contingent, Possible Worlds | 模态：必然、偶然与可能世界
A necessary truth holds in all possible worlds; it could not have been false. A contingent truth is true in the actual world but could have been otherwise. ‘2+2=4’ is widely held to be necessary; ‘Paris is the capital of France’ is contingent because history could have unfolded differently. Use the ‘erase and rewrite’ test: if you could rewrite the facts of the universe so that a proposition becomes false, it is contingent.
必然真理在所有可能世界中都成立；它不可能为假。偶然真理在现实世界为真，但本可以是另外一种情况。“2+2=4”被广泛认为是必然的；“巴黎是法国的首都”则是偶然的，因为历史可能以不同的方式展开。运用“擦除并重写”测试：如果你可以重写宇宙的事实而使某个命题为假，那么它就是偶然的。
Possible worlds language is a heuristic, not a claim about parallel universes. When philosophers say ‘in some possible world, pigs fly’, they mean the idea of flying pigs contains no contradiction. This tool sharpens modal claims without metaphysical baggage.
可能世界的说法是一种启发式工具，而不是在声称存在平行宇宙。当哲学家说“在某个可能世界中猪会飞”时，他们的意思是“会飞的猪”这个观念不含矛盾。这个工具使模态论断更加精准，而不背负形而上学的包袱。
4. Rationalism vs. Empiricism: The Source of Ideas | 理性主义与经验主义：观念的来源
Rationalism asserts that some substantive knowledge comes from reason alone, independently of sense experience. Empiricism claims that all ultimate knowledge derives from sense experience. A quick memory key: Rationalism = Reason as the Route; Empiricism = Experience as Everything.
理性主义主张，某些实质性的知识仅来自理性，独立于感官经验。经验主义则声称，所有最终的知识都来源于感官经验。一个简短的记忆钥匙：Rationalism = 理性（Reason）是路径（Route）；Empiricism = 经验（Experience）是一切（Everything）。
Descartes’ trademark argument shows the rationalist approach: from the idea of perfection he deduces God’s existence. Hume’s empiricism, on the other hand, holds that the idea of necessary connection is no more than a mental habit. When revising, label arguments as either appealing to pure intellectual grasp or to sensory observation.
笛卡尔的商标论证表明了理性主义的方法：他从完美的观念推导出上帝的存在。休谟的经验主义则相反，认为必然联系的概念仅仅是心灵的习惯。在复习时，将论证标记为诉诸纯粹的理智把握，还是诉诸感官观察。
5. The Justification Game: Foundationalism, Coherentism, Reliabilism | 辩护之争：基础主义、融贯主义与可靠主义
Foundationalism builds knowledge on basic beliefs that are self-justifying or infallible, like incorrigible mental states. Descartes’ cogito is an archetypal foundation. Visualise a pyramid: foundational beliefs at the base supporting all others. Memory aid: Foundations hold a house up.
基础主义将知识建立在自明或无误的基本信念之上，比如不可纠正的心理状态。笛卡尔的“我思”就是一个典型的基石。想象一座金字塔：基本信念在底部支撑着所有其他信念。记忆辅助：基础（Foundations）撑起房屋。
Coherentism rejects privileged foundations, claiming beliefs are justified by fitting into a consistent web. A belief is justified if it coheres with your overall system. Think of a raft floating on a sea: planks hold each other up without touching solid ground. The image is from Otto Neurath’s boat metaphor.
融贯主义拒斥有特权的根基，主张信念通过融入一个一致的网络而得到辩护。一个信念若与你整个系统相融贯，就是得到辩护的。想想漂浮在海上的一只木筏：木板相互支撑而无需接触坚实的地面。这个意象来自奥托·纽拉特的船只隐喻。
Reliabilism shifts focus to the process: a belief is justified if produced by a reliable cognitive mechanism. Vision is usually reliable; wishful thinking is not. Remember ‘reliable track record’ — good enough for Goldman. This avoids the internalist demand for accessible reasons.
可靠主义将焦点转向过程：一个信念若由可靠的认知机制产生，便是得到辩护的。视觉通常是可靠的；一厢情愿的思维则不是。记住“可靠的过往记录”——对戈德曼来说这就够了。这避开了内在主义对可通达理由的要求。
6. Perception: Realism, Idealism and the Veil of Ideas | 知觉：实在论、观念论与观念之幕
Direct realism maintains that we perceive mind-independent physical objects immediately. Naïve realism is its everyday version; the table is simply there. The challenge comes from illusion and hallucination: if objects can appear other than they are, what we perceive directly might not be the physical world itself.
直接实在论主张我们直接知觉到独立于心灵的物理对象。朴素实在论是其日常版本：桌子就在那里。挑战来自错觉和幻觉：如果对象可能通过不同的方式显现，那么我们直接知觉到的可能就不是物理世界本身。
Indirect realism holds that we perceive sense-data — mental intermediaries caused by physical objects. Locke’s primary-secondary quality distinction supports this: solidity is in the object, colour is only a power to produce sensation. This ‘veil of ideas’ leads to scepticism about the external world. Visualise: you watch a screen, and the object is the camera outside — indirect access.
间接实在论认为我们知觉到的是感觉材料——由物理对象引起的心灵中介物。洛克的初性-次性区分支持了这一点：坚实性在对象当中，颜色仅仅是一种产生感觉的能力。这张“观念之幕”导致了对外部世界的怀疑。形象化：你看着屏幕，而对象是外面的摄像机——间接进入。
Berkeley’s idealism dissolves the physical altogether: to be is to be perceived (esse est percipi). Objects are collections of ideas in minds, sustained by God’s infinite perception. This avoids the external-world gap but demands a divine perceiver. The mnemonic: ‘Idealism insists Ideas are all there is.’
贝克莱的观念论则完全消解了物理的东西：存在即被感知（esse est percipi）。对象是心灵中诸观念的集合，由上帝的无限感知来维持。这避开了外部世界的鸿沟，但要求一个神圣的感知者。记忆术：“观念论坚持观念（Ideas）就是一切（Idealism insists Ideas are all there is）”。
7. Utilitarianism: Hedonic Calculus and the Greatest Happiness | 功利主义：快乐计算与最大幸福
Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory: the right action is the one that maximises overall happiness. Bentham’s act utilitarianism calculates pleasure minus pain for each individual affected, using the hedonic calculus’s seven dimensions: intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity, extent. Remember the mnemonic ‘I D C P F P E’ — ‘I Don’t Care Please Feed People Everywhere’ to recall the criteria.
功利主义是一种后果论：正确的行为就是能最大化总体幸福的行为。边沁的行为功利主义运用快乐计算的七个维度——强度、持续时间、确定性、临近度、丰度、纯度和范围——来计算每个受影响个体的快乐减去痛苦。记忆术：用“I D C P F P E”编句“I Don’t Care Please Feed People Everywhere”来回忆这些标准。
Mill’s rule utilitarianism refines this: follow secondary principles (rules) that over time tend to promote the greatest happiness. Instead of calculating each act, obey rules like ‘do not lie’ because they generally maximise utility. Mill also distinguishes higher intellectual pleasures from lower bodily pleasures — ‘better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied’.
密尔的规则功利主义对此进行了改良：遵循那些从长远看能促进最大幸福的次级原则（规则）。不用去计算每一个行为，只需遵守像“不说谎”这样的规则，因为它们通常能实现功利最大化。密尔还区分了高级的理智快乐与低级的肉体快乐——“宁做不满足的苏格拉底，也不做满足的傻瓜”。
8. Deontology: Duty, the Good Will, and the Categorical Imperative | 义务论：义务、善良意志与定言命令
Kantian deontology places moral worth entirely on the motive of duty, not consequences. The only unqualifiedly good thing is a good will — willing out of respect for the moral law. Contrast with utilitarianism: the motive is duty, not happiness. Memory key: ‘Duty for duty’s sake.’
康德的义务论将道德价值完全置于义务的动机上，而非后果。唯一无条件善的东西就是一个善良意志——出自对道德法则的尊重而意愿。与功利主义相对照：动机是义务，而非幸福。记忆关键：“为义务而义务”。
The Categorical Imperative provides the test. The first formulation (Formula of Universal Law) states: ‘Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.’ A contradiction in conception (e.g. false promising) or in will (e.g. not helping others) shows the act is impermissible. Visualise a ‘Maxim lens’: could everyone wear it without contradiction?
定言命令提供了检验标准。第一表述（普遍法则公式）声称：“只依据那些你同时能够意愿其成为普遍法则的准则去行动。”概念上的矛盾（如虚假承诺）或意愿上的矛盾（如不帮助他人）表明该行为不可允许。想象一个“准则透镜”：每个人都能没有矛盾地戴上它吗？
The second formulation (Formula of Humanity) commands: ‘Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.’ This grounds the absolute prohibition against using rational agents only as tools. Think: ‘People are ends, not instruments.’
第二表述（人性公式）命令道：“你要如此行动，永远将你自己人格中的人性以及其他每个人人格中的人性，同时当作目的，而绝不仅仅当作手段来使用。”这奠定了一条绝对禁令：绝不能仅仅把理性存在者当作工具。想一想：“人是目的，不是工具。”
9. Virtue Ethics: Character, Flourishing, and the Golden Mean | 美德伦理：品格、繁盛与中庸之道
Virtue ethics shifts focus from acts to agents, asking ‘What sort of person should I become?’ Aristotle’s answer: cultivate the virtues that lead to eudaimonia — human flourishing. Unlike deontology and utilitarianism, virtue ethics is not a decision procedure. Remember: ‘Character counts.’
美德伦理将焦点从行为转向行动者，追问“我应当成为什么样的人？”亚里士多德的回答是：培养那些导向eudaimonia——人类繁盛——的美德。与义务论和功利主义不同，美德伦理不提供决策程序。记住：“品格至关重要。”
A moral virtue is a settled disposition to choose the mean relative to us, determined by reason. Courage is the mean between cowardice and recklessness; generosity is between meanness and prodigality. The ‘Golden Mean’ is not a mathematical average but an optimal point that requires practical wisdom (phronesis). Visualise a target: hitting a bullseye requires judgement, not a formula.
道德美德是一种根据理性而确定的、选择相对于我们的中道的稳定习性。勇敢是怯懦与鲁莽之间的中道；慷慨是吝啬与挥霍之间的中道。“中庸之道”不是数学上的平均值，而是一个需要实践智慧（phronesis）才能找到的最佳点。想象一个靶子：射中靶心需要判断，而不是套公式。
Modern virtue ethics revives this agent-centred approach. Anscombe and MacIntyre argue that moral philosophy needs a conception of human nature and the goods proper to it. For the exam, always link virtue back to the broader notion of a good life.
现代美德伦理复兴了这种以行动者为中心的方法。安斯康姆和麦金泰尔主张道德哲学需要一种关于人性及其本有善益的观念。在考试中，始终要把美德与更广泛的良善生活概念联系起来。
10. Metaethics: Cognitivism, Non-Cognitivism, and Moral Language | 元伦理学：认知主义、非认知主义与道德语言
Metaethics examines what moral talk is about. Cognitivism claims moral statements express beliefs that are truth-apt (capable of being true or false). Moral realism, a form of cognitivism, holds that moral properties exist mind-independently; think ‘wrongness is like roundness’. Error theory, also cognitivist, insists all moral claims are systematically false — ‘wrongness is like witchhood’.
元伦理学考察道德言谈关乎什么。认知主义声称道德陈述表达的是具有真值能力（能够为真或为假）的信念。道德实在论是一种认知主义，主张道德属性独立于心灵而存在；想象“错误性就像圆形性”。错误理论也是认知主义，但坚持所有道德断言在系统上都是虚假的——“错误性就像女巫性”。
Non-cognitivism denies that moral utterances express truth-evaluable beliefs. Emotivism (Ayer, Stevenson) says they express emotional attitudes, like ‘Boo!’ or ‘Hurrah!’. Prescriptivism (Hare) treats moral judgements as universalisable prescriptions, akin to commands. Memory hack: Non-cognitivism = No truth claims, just feelings or prescriptions. Ask ‘Is the sentence something that can be checked against facts?’
非认知主义否认道德话语表达可评估真假的信念。情绪主义（艾耶尔、史蒂文森）说它们表达情感态度，就像“呸！”或“好哇！”。规定主义（黑尔）将道德判断视为可普遍化的规定，类似于命令。记忆窍门：非认知主义 = 没有真值断言，只有感受或规定。问自己“这个句子能够对照事实检验吗？”
11. Free Will and Determinism: Compatibilism, Libertarianism, Hard Determinism | 自由意志与决定论：相容论、自由意志论与强决定论
Determinism is the thesis that every event has a sufficient prior cause, rendering the future physically necessary given the past and the laws. The central question is whether this is compatible with moral responsibility. Hard determinism accepts determinism and rejects free will and responsibility — ‘you are a cog in the machine’.
决定论是这样的论点：每个事件都有一个充分的前因，这使得在给定过去与规律的条件下，未来在物理上是必然的。核心问题是这能否与道德责任相容。强决定论接受决定论并拒斥自由意志与责任——“你是机器中的一个齿轮”。
Libertarianism in free will debates insists that we have free will, so determinism must be false. Agent causation theories suggest we, as agents, can initiate causal chains without being determined. Some libertarians appeal to quantum indeterminacy, though randomness is not the same as freedom. Key: Libertarianism says ‘freedom requires genuine alternate possibilities’.
自由意志论在自由意志辩论中坚称我们拥有自由意志，因此决定论必定为假。行动者因果理论提出，我们作为行动者能够开启因果链条而不被决定。一些自由意志论者诉诸量子不确定性，尽管随机性并不等同于自由。关键点：自由意志论说“自由需要真正具有替代的可能性”。
Compatibilism (soft determinism) argues that free will and determinism are compatible. Classical compatibilists like Hume define freedom as the ability to act according to one’s desires without external constraint. Even if desires are determined, acting on them unimpeded is freedom. Think: ‘Freedom is doing what you want, not originating the want.’
相容论（温和决定论）主张自由意志与决定论是可兼容的。像休谟这样的古典相容论者将自由定义为在没有外在约束下按照自己的欲望行动的能力。即使欲望是被决定的，不受阻碍地据此行动就是自由。想一想：“自由是做自己想做之事，而不是创造那欲望本身。”
12. Logical Toolkit: Validity, Soundness, Deduction, Induction | 逻辑工具箱：有效性、可靠性、演绎与归纳
An argument is a set of premises intended to support a conclusion. In deductive arguments, validity means that if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. Validity is about logical structure, not actual truth. A sound argument is a valid argument with all true premises. Soundness = Validity + True premises.
一个论证是一组旨在支持一个结论的前提。在演绎论证中，有效性意味着如果前提为真，结论必然为真。有效性关乎逻辑结构，而非实际真理。一个可靠的论证是一个有效的论证且所有前提为真。可靠性 = 有效性 + 真前提。
Inductive arguments aim to make the conclusion probable, not guaranteed. A strong inductive argument gives high probability if premises are true; cogent is the inductive analogue of soundness. Inductive reasoning includes generalisation and causal inference. Memory: Deduction is ‘top-down’ certainty seeking; Induction is ‘bottom-up’ probability building.
归纳论证旨在使结论可能成立，而非确保其必然性。一个强的归纳论证在其前提为真时赋予结论很高概率；cogent（有说服力的）则是归纳版本中的可靠性。归纳推理包括概括与因果推论。记忆：演绎是“自上而下”寻求确定性；归纳是“自下而上”建立概率。
Fallacies are tempting errors in reasoning. Begging the question assumes the conclusion; equivocation switches meanings of a term. In ethics essays, spotting circular arguments or false dilemmas sharpens evaluation. A handy checklist: ‘Is the logic valid, premises true, and are there no hidden moves?’
谬误是推理中诱人的错误。乞题（循环论证）预设了结论；歧义谬误偷换了词语的意思。在伦理学论文中，发现循环论证或虚假两难能够强化评估。一份便利的检查清单：“逻辑是否有效，前提是否为真，是否有隐藏的手法？”
Published by TutorHao | Philosophy Revision Series | aleveler.com
更多咨询请联系16621398022（同微信）
屏轩国际教育cambridge primary/secondary checkpoint, cat4, ukiset,ukcat,igcse,alevel,PAT,STEP,MAT, ibdp,ap,ssat,sat,sat2课程辅导，国外大学本科硕士研究生博士课程论文辅导