📚 OCR Year 13 Philosophy: Key Terminology Memory Guide | OCR 13年级哲学：关键术语速记指南
Mastering technical vocabulary is the foundation of high-level philosophical analysis. In OCR Year 13, you encounter complex terms from the Philosophy of Religion and Ethics that need to be recalled instantly under exam pressure. This revision guide breaks down the most critical concepts into digestible definitions, paired with memory hooks, examples, and cross-references to the syllabus. Use it alongside your notes to sharpen your essays and build a fluent philosophical lexicon.
掌握专业术语是高阶哲学分析的基础。在OCR 13年级课程中，你会遇到来自宗教哲学和伦理学的大量复杂词汇，需要在考试压力下快速提取。这份速记指南将最核心的概念拆解为易消化的定义，并配上记忆钩子、案例与课程关联，帮助你打磨论文，建立流畅的哲学术语库。
1. The Nature of God – Core Attributes | 神的本质——核心属性
Omnipotence – often defined as the ability to do anything that is logically possible. This concept faces puzzles like the paradox of the stone: can God create a stone so heavy He cannot lift it? OCR students must distinguish between absolute power and power constrained by logic.
全能——通常定义为能做任何逻辑上可能之事的属性。这一概念面临“石头悖论”之类的难题：上帝能否造出一块自己举不起的石头？OCR学生需要区分不受限的绝对权能与受逻辑约束的权能。
Eternal vs. Everlasting – God’s relationship with time is a key debate. An eternal God exists timelessly, seeing all moments at once (Boethius, Aquinas), while an everlasting God endures through time without beginning or end. Timelessness supports foreknowledge but challenges personal interaction.
永恒与永存——上帝与时间的关系是重要争论。永恒的上帝超越时间，一眼看穿全部时刻（波爱修斯、阿奎那）；永存的上帝则在时间中存续，无始无终。超时间性支持预知，却挑战了上帝与人的互动。
Omniscience and Free Will – If God knows the future infallibly, can humans have genuine free will? The tension between divine foreknowledge and human freedom requires careful handling of compatibilist and incompatibilist positions. Think of it as a knowledge-action gap: knowing an outcome does not cause it.
全知与自由意志——如果上帝无误地预知未来，人类还能拥有真正的自由意志吗？神之预知与人类自由的张力需要谨慎处理相容论与不相容论的立场。可将其视为知-行鸿沟：知道结果并不导致结果。
2. Ontological Argument | 本体论论证
A priori / Deductive – The ontological argument claims that reflection on the concept of God alone suffices to prove His existence, without needing empirical evidence. Anselm’s Proslogion 2 defines God as “that than which nothing greater can be conceived”; if such a being exists only in the mind, we could conceive a greater being existing in reality, which is a contradiction.
先验 / 演绎——本体论论证主张，仅凭对上帝概念的反思就足以证明其存在，无需经验证据。安瑟伦在《宣讲》第二章中将上帝定义为“无法设想有比之更伟大的存在者”；若此存在者仅存于心灵中，我们还能设想一个存在于现实中的更伟大者，这便产生矛盾。
Gaunilo’s Island – Gaunilo parodied Anselm by applying the same logic to a “perfect island”. The parody works because replacing “island” with “God” reveals that existence is not a predicate that can simply be added to a concept. Memory tip: imagine a lost island on a map that suddenly becomes real just by defining it as the greatest.
高尼罗的岛屿——高尼罗将安瑟伦的逻辑套用到“完美岛屿”上，以此戏仿论证。这个戏仿之所以有效，是因为将“岛屿”换成“上帝”就暴露出：存在并非一个可以简单添加到概念上的谓词。记忆法：想象地图上一座失落岛，仅靠定义为最伟大就突然成真——荒谬可想。
Modal Version (Plantinga) – Alvin Plantinga recasts the argument using possible worlds semantics: God is a maximally great being, existing in every possible world if He exists in one. The move shifts the debate from concept analysis to the plausibility of a necessarily existing being. Recall “possible worlds” by picturing parallel universes where maximal greatness demands omnipresence.
模态版本（普兰丁格）——普兰丁格用可能世界语义学重铸论证：上帝是至大伟大者，若在一个可能世界中存在，就在所有可能世界中存在。这一转换把争论从概念分析转移到必然存在者的合理性上。用“平行宇宙”图像来记：最大伟大要求在每一个可能世界中都全在。
3. Cosmological Argument | 宇宙论论证
A posteriori / Inductive – Cosmological arguments rely on experience of the world’s contingency, motion, or causation. They reason to a first cause or necessary being. Key forms include Aquinas’s Five Ways (especially the Second Way from efficient causation) and the Kalam argument, which uses the premise that an actual infinite cannot exist.
后验 / 归纳——宇宙论论证依赖对世界偶然性、运动或因果链条的经验，推出第一因或必然存在者。主要形式包括阿奎那的五路论证（尤其是从动力因出发的第二路）以及卡拉姆论证，其前提是“实际的无限不可能存在”。
Contingency and the PSR – Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) states that every fact requires a sufficient reason. Since contingent beings cannot explain themselves, there must be a necessary being containing its own reason for existence. Think of a chain of dependent facts that must ultimately be grounded in a self-explaining bedrock.
偶然性与充足理由律——莱布尼茨的充足理由律要求每个事实都有充足理由。偶然存在者无法自解，故必有一个自身包含存在理由的必然存在者。想象一串互相依赖的事实，最终必须扎根于一块自我解释的基岩。
Hume’s Criticisms – David Hume attacks the causal principle (every event needs a cause) as not demonstrably certain, and objects that even if a cause of the whole is posited, we cannot attribute theistic properties to it. His scepticism about induction undermines any leap from parts to whole. Memory hook: “Hume says we can’t glue causes to effects with certainty.”
休谟的批判——休谟攻击因果原则（每一事件皆需原因）并非确凿无疑，并反对即便为整体设定原因，也不能将神性归于该原因。他对归纳法的怀疑动摇了从部分到整体的飞跃。记忆钩子：“休谟说我们不能把原因和结果确定地粘在一起。”
4. Teleological Argument | 目的论论证
Design Analogies – William Paley’s watchmaker analogy: a watch’s complexity implies a watchmaker, so nature’s complexity implies a divine designer. The argument is analogical and a posteriori. Modern fine-tuning arguments cite cosmic constants that appear precisely calibrated for life.
设计类比——佩利的钟表匠类比：钟表的复杂性意味着存在钟表匠，因此自然的复杂性意味着存在神圣设计者。该论证是类比式且后验的。现代精调论证则引用宇宙常数的精确校准似乎专为生命而设。
Anthropic Principle – The weak anthropic principle observes that we should not be surprised to find conditions suitable for life, because if they were not, we would not be here to observe them. The strong version suggests the universe must have those properties. Used as both a challenge to and a version of the design argument.
人择原理——弱人择原理指出，我们不应为发现适合生命的条件而惊奇，因为若非如此，我们便不存在去观察它。强版本则声称宇宙必定具有这些性质。它既是设计论证的挑战，也是其变体。
Hume’s Counter-arguments – Through Philo in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume notes that the analogy is weak (universe is not clearly machine-like), an imperfect world suggests an imperfect designer, and the argument cannot yield the God of theism. Remember: Philo looks at the messy world and sees “a rude and unfinished job”.
休谟的反驳——休谟借《自然宗教对话录》中的斐罗之口指出，类比过弱（宇宙并非明显似机器），不完美的世界只暗示不完美的设计者，且该论证无法得出有神论的上帝。记住：斐罗审视混乱的世界，只看到“粗糙未竟的活计”。
5. Problem of Evil | 恶的问题
Logical vs. Evidential Problem – The logical problem (Mackie) claims that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God. The evidential problem (Rowe) argues that the amount and distribution of gratuitous evil make God’s existence improbable. Think of logical as “can’t coexist” and evidential as “unlikely coexist”.
逻辑问题与证据问题——逻辑恶的问题（麦基）主张，恶的存在与全能全善的上帝在逻辑上不相容。证据恶的问题（罗）则论证，无端恶的数量与分布使得上帝存在变得极不可能。记法：逻辑问题是“不能共存”，证据问题是“不太可能共存”。
Augustinian Theodicy – Evil is a privation of good, not a substance, resulting from the misuse of free will by angels and humans. All suffering is a just consequence of original sin. The free will defence, inspired by Augustine, says God is not responsible for moral evil. Memory: Augustine sees evil as a shadow – lack of light, not an object.
奥古斯丁神义论——恶是善的缺乏而非实体，源于天使与人类对自由意志的滥用。一切苦难都是原罪的公正后果。由奥古斯丁启发的自由意志辩护认为，上帝不对道德恶负责。记忆：奥古斯丁视恶为影子——光的缺失，而非一物。
Irenaean Soul-Making Theodicy – John Hick develops Irenaeus’s idea that humans were created imperfect, and the world is a vale of soul-making where suffering helps us grow into God’s likeness. Evil is instrumental for moral development. Picture a gym where hardship builds spiritual muscles.
爱任纽式灵魂塑造神义论——希克发展爱任纽的观点，认为人被造为不完美的，世界是灵魂塑造的熔炉，苦难帮助我们长成上帝的样式。恶是道德成长的工具。场景联想：世界如同一间健身房，困苦练就灵性肌肉。
6. Religious Experience & Language | 宗教体验与语言
Numinous & Mystical – Rudolf Otto describes the numinous as a fear-and-fascination encounter with a “wholly other” (mysterium tremendum et fascinans). Mystical experiences often involve union with the divine, ineffability, and a noetic quality. Swinburne’s principle of credulity suggests we should trust such experiences unless defeated.
努秘与神秘体验——奥托将努秘体验描述为对“全然他者”既畏惧又着迷的相遇（令人战栗又着迷的神秘）。神秘体验常包含与神的合一、不可言说性和理智性。斯温伯恩的轻信原则主张，若无击败理由，应信任此类体验。
Verification & Falsification – A.J. Ayer’s verification principle declares religious language meaningless because it cannot be empirically verified. Antony Flew invokes the falsification challenge: if no evidence could count against “God loves us”, the statement dies the “death of a thousand qualifications”. Memory: Flew’s invisible gardener parable burns away untestable claims.
可证实与可证伪——艾耶尔的可证实原则宣称，宗教语言因无法被经验证实而无意义。弗卢抛出可证伪挑战：若无任何证据可反对“上帝爱我们”，这句话将在“千次限定的死亡”中消散。记忆：弗卢的隐形园丁寓言烧掉了不可检验的断言。
Cognitive vs. Non-cognitive Language – Cognitivists hold that religious statements express factual beliefs (true or false). Non-cognitivists argue they express attitudes, emotions, or ways of life. Think of “God exists” as either a truth-claim or a poetic expression of commitment.
认知与非认知语言——认知主义者认为宗教陈述表达事实信念（可真可假）。非认知主义者则主张它们表达态度、情感或生活方式。将“上帝存在”视作要么是真理宣称，要么是献身的诗意表达。
7. Meta-ethics | 元伦理学
Moral Realism vs. Anti-Realism – Moral realism asserts that moral facts exist mind-independently. Anti-realism denies this, holding that moral properties depend on human attitudes or conventions. OCR requires connecting these to naturalism, intuitionism, and emotivism.
道德实在论与反实在论——道德实在论断言道德事实独立于心灵存在。反实在论否认这点，认为道德属性依赖于人的态度或约定。OCR要求将这些与自然主义、直觉主义和情感主义联系起来。
Naturalism (Cognitivist) – Naturalists claim moral properties are identical with natural properties (e.g. goodness = pleasure). Bentham’s utilitarianism is a naturalist theory. However, Moore’s open question argument challenges naturalism: we can always ask whether a natural property is good without contradiction.
自然主义（认知主义）——自然主义者主张道德属性等同于自然属性（例如善=快乐）。边沁的功利主义是自然主义理论。然而，摩尔的开放问题论证挑战自然主义：我们总能无矛盾地问某个自然属性“是否就是善”。
Intuitionism (Moore) – G.E. Moore argues that “good” is a simple, non-natural property intuited by reason. The naturalistic fallacy is the mistake of defining “good” in natural terms. Picture a yellow patch: you can’t define yellow, but you recognise it; “good” is similarly irreducible and intuited.
直觉主义（摩尔）——摩尔认为“善”是一种简单的、非自然的属性，由理性直觉获知。自然主义谬误就是用自然词汇定义“善”的错误。想象一片黄色：你无法定义黄色，却能认出它；“善”同样不可还原，靠直觉把握。
Emotivism (Non-cognitivist) – Ayer and Stevenson: moral statements express emotions or commands, not facts. “Murder is wrong” means something like “Boo to murder!” or “I disapprove of murder; do so as well.” Stevenson adds persuasive power: moral language aims to influence others’ attitudes.
情感主义（非认知主义）——艾耶尔与史蒂文森：道德陈述表达情绪或指令，而非事实。“谋杀是错的”意思类似“谋杀，呸！”或“我不赞成谋杀，你也别赞成”。史蒂文森补充了劝说力：道德语言旨在影响他人态度。
8. Normative Ethical Theories – Key Terms | 规范伦理理论——关键术语
Utility & Hedonic Calculus – Central to Bentham’s act utilitarianism: the right action maximises pleasure and minimises pain. The hedonic calculus measures pleasure using seven criteria: intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity, and extent. Memory: “It’s Deep Certain Pink Fish, Pure Extent” – create your own acronym.
功利与快乐计算——边沁行为功利主义的核心：正确行为最大化快乐、最小化痛苦。快乐计算法用七个标准衡量快乐：强度、持续时间、确定性、远近度、再生力、纯度和广度。记忆：编一个中文口诀“强度持确远近生纯广”。
Mill’s Quality Distinction – J.S. Mill introduces a qualitative dimension: “higher pleasures” (intellect, imagination) are intrinsically superior to “lower pleasures” (bodily). Competent judges with experience of both prefer higher pleasures. Remind yourself: “Socrates dissatisfied is better than a pig satisfied.”
密尔的品质区分——密尔引入质的维度：“高级快乐”（理智、想象）本质上优于“低级快乐”（肉体）。具备两者经验的合格裁判会偏好高级快乐。提醒自己：“宁做不满足的苏格拉底，不当满足的猪。”
Categorical Imperative – Kant’s supreme moral principle: act only on maxims you can will as universal laws; treat humanity always as an end, never merely as a means. Maxims are subjective principles of action. Test them with universalisability: can you conceive a world where everyone lies to get loans?
定言命令——康德的最高道德原则：只依你能够愿意其成为普遍法则的准则行动；始终将人性作为目的，而绝不仅仅当作手段。准则是主观的行动原则。用可普遍化测试：你能设想一个人人为贷款而撒谎的世界吗？
Telos & Primary Precepts – Aquinas’s Natural Law builds on Aristotle’s telos (purpose). Human nature inclines towards the good, expressed in primary precepts: preserve life, reproduce, educate children, live in society, worship God. Secondary precepts derive from these via practical reason. Memory: “P-R-I-E-W” (Preserve, Reproduce, Instruct, Establish-society, Worship).
目的与首要诫命——阿奎那的自然法以亚里士多德的目的（telos）为基础。人性趋向善，表达为首要诫命：保存生命、繁衍、教育后代、社会共处、敬拜上帝。次要诫命是通过实践理性从中推演出来的。记法：“保存生养教社拜”（五字口诀）。
Agape & Situation Ethics – Joseph Fletcher proposes that the only absolute rule is agape (self-giving, unconditional love). All other rules are subordinate and may be set aside if love demands it. Six fundamental principles include: “Only one thing is intrinsically good, namely love” and “Love and justice are the same.” Think of the name “Fletcher” as flex-ethics: flexible when love commands.
圣爱与情境伦理——弗莱彻提出，唯一绝对的原则是圣爱（agape，舍己无条件的爱）。所有其他规则皆为从属，爱若要求，可被搁置。六条基本命题包括：“只有一样东西内在地善，即爱”和“爱与正义是同一的”。联想法：弗莱彻（Fletcher）名字像“flex-ethics”——因爱而灵活的伦理。
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