Powers of Persuasion and the Character of Each President | 说服力权力与各位总统的性格特征

📚 Powers of Persuasion and the Character of Each President | 说服力权力与各位总统的性格特征

In A Level US Politics, presidential power is not simply a list of constitutional powers; it is fundamentally the power to persuade. Richard Neustadt’s famous claim that ‘presidential power is the power to persuade’ captures the idea that presidents must bargain, negotiate and mobilise support rather than command obedience. This article explores the nature of presidential persuasion and the individual characteristics of modern US presidents from Franklin Roosevelt to Joe Biden, showing how each president’s personality shaped their ability to persuade Congress, the public and foreign leaders.

在 A Level 美国政治课程中，总统权力并不仅限于宪法列举的权力；从根本上说，它是一种说服的权力。理查德·诺伊施塔特提出的著名论断 ‘总统权力就是说服的权力’ 指出，总统必须通过讨价还价、谈判和动员支持来施政，而不是单靠命令让人服从。本文探讨总统说服力的本质，以及从富兰克林·罗斯福到乔·拜登各位现代美国总统的个人特征，说明每位总统的性格如何影响他们说服国会、公众和外国领导人的能力。

1. The Concept of Presidential Persuasion | 总统说服力的概念

Presidential persuasion refers to the informal influence a president uses to convince other political actors to support their agenda. Unlike a prime minister in a parliamentary system, the US president cannot rely on a disciplined party majority to pass laws automatically.

总统说服力是指总统用来说服其他政治行为体支持其议程的非正式影响力。与议会制中的首相不同，美国总统不能依赖纪律严明的政党多数自动通过法律。

The formal powers of the presidency, such as the veto, appointment and commander-in-chief roles, are significant but limited by checks and balances. Persuasion fills the gap between what the president wants and what other actors are willing to do.

总统的正式权力，如否决权、任命权和总司令角色，虽然重要，但受到制衡机制的限制。说服力填补了总统想要什么与其他行为体愿意做什么之间的空白。

Persuasion operates in multiple arenas: Congress, the executive branch, the courts, interest groups and especially the public. A president with strong persuasive skills can turn weak formal powers into major legislative achievements.

说服力在多个领域发挥作用：国会、行政部门、法院、利益集团，尤其是公众。一位具有强说服技巧的总统可以将较弱的正式权力转化为重大立法成就。

2. Richard Neustadt’s ‘Power to Persuade’ | 诺伊施塔特的 ‘说服力权力’

Richard Neustadt’s 1960 book Presidential Power argued that the US constitutional system does not give the president command authority over Congress. Instead, the president must persuade others that what the president wants is what they should want for themselves.

理查德·诺伊施塔特 1960 年出版的《总统权力》一书指出，美国宪法体系并未赋予总统对国会的命令权。相反，总统必须说服他人，让他们相信总统想要的就是他们自己应该想要的。

Neustadt identified two key resources for presidential persuasion: professional reputation and public prestige. Professional reputation refers to how Washington insiders view the president’s skill and determination, while public prestige is the president’s standing with the voters.

诺伊施塔特确定了总统说服力的两个关键资源：专业声誉和公众威望。专业声誉指华盛顿圈内人对总统技巧和决心的看法，而公众威望是总统在选民中的地位。

Presidents must guard these resources carefully. Every decision, negotiation style and public appearance either increases or decreases their perceived power to persuade. A president seen as weak or indecisive will find it harder to bargain effectively.

总统必须小心保护这些资源。每一个决定、谈判风格和公开露面都会增强或削弱他们被认为具有的说服力。如果总统被视为软弱或优柔寡断，他们将更难有效地讨价还价。

3. The Bully Pulpit and Public Persuasion | 讲坛权力与公众说服

The term ‘bully pulpit’ was coined by Theodore Roosevelt to describe the president’s unique platform to command public attention and shape national debate. Modern presidents use speeches, press conferences, social media and televised addresses to mobilise public opinion.

‘讲坛权力’ 一词由西奥多·罗斯福创造，用来形容总统独特的平台，可吸引公众注意力并塑造全国辩论。现代总统利用演讲、新闻发布会、社交媒体和电视讲话来动员公众舆论。

Public approval is a crucial persuasive resource. When a president is popular, members of Congress are more willing to support their proposals because they fear electoral punishment. When approval falls, the president’s bargaining power weakens.

公众支持度是至关重要的说服资源。当总统受欢迎时，国会议员更愿意支持其提案，因为他们担心受到选举惩罚。当支持率下降时，总统的讨价还价能力就会减弱。

Reagan: used simple, optimistic television addresses to pressure Congress into tax and budget cuts.
Obama: relied on inspiring campaign-style rallies to push healthcare reform, though this sometimes polarised opposition.
Trump: used Twitter and social media as a direct, unfiltered bully pulpit to dominate news cycles and pressure legislators.

里根：利用简单乐观的电视讲话向国会施压，推动减税和预算削减。奥巴马：依靠鼓舞人心的竞选式集会推动医疗改革，尽管这有时激化了反对。特朗普：利用推特和社交媒体作为直接、未经过滤的讲坛，主导新闻周期并向议员施压。

4. Persuading Congress: Bargaining and Deal-Making | 说服国会：讨价还价与交易

Congress is the principal arena for presidential persuasion. The president can offer inducements such as campaign support, federal projects in a member’s district, or White House invitations. They can also threaten vetoes, negative publicity or party primary challenges.

国会是总统说服的主要舞台。总统可以提供激励，如竞选支持、给议员选区的联邦项目或白宫邀请。他们也可以威胁使用否决权、负面宣传或党内初选挑战。

Lyndon B. Johnson was a master of the ‘Johnson Treatment’, using his physical presence, flattery, threats and relentless personal lobbying to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other Great Society programmes.

林登·约翰逊是 ‘约翰逊式对待’ 的大师，利用自身的身体存在、奉承、威胁和不懈的个人游说来通过 1964 年民权法案和其他伟大社会计划。

Bill Clinton used a strategy of ‘triangulation’, positioning himself between the Democratic left and Republican right. By adopting some Republican themes such as welfare reform and balanced budgets, he persuaded enough moderates to pass legislation while maintaining his own re-election.

比尔·克林顿使用 ‘三角定位’ 策略，将自己定位在民主党左翼和共和党右翼之间。通过采纳一些共和党主题，如福利改革和平衡预算，他说服了足够的温和派通过立法，同时维持自己的连任。

Presidents must also work with the opposing party. Divided government makes persuasion harder, but it can still succeed if the president selects manageable issues and builds cross-party coalitions.

总统还必须与反对党合作。分裂政府使说服更难，但如果总统选择可处理的问题并建立跨党派联盟，说服仍可能成功。

5. Personality and Leadership Style | 性格与领导风格

James David Barber’s influential typology classifies presidents according to their energy level (active or passive) and their emotional attitude toward the job (positive or negative). These personality traits shape how presidents approach persuasion.

詹姆斯·戴维·巴伯颇具影响的类型学根据总统的精力水平（积极或消极）和对工作的情感态度（积极或消极）对总统进行分类。这些人格特征塑造了总统进行说服的方式。

Active-positive: confident and flexible, enjoy the job and adapt to new information. Examples: FDR, JFK, Clinton.
Active-negative: driven and anxious, struggle with self-doubt, may become rigid. Examples: Nixon, LBJ in some respects.
Passive-positive: agreeable and seek approval, less assertive. Example: Reagan in some interpretations.
Passive-negative: withdrawn and dutiful, avoid conflict. Example: Eisenhower in some accounts.

积极-积极型：自信灵活，享受工作并能适应新信息。例如：罗斯福、肯尼迪、克林顿。积极-消极型：有动力但焦虑，与自我怀疑斗争，可能变得僵化。例如：尼克松、某些方面约翰逊。消极-积极型：和蔼并寻求认可，不够果断。例如：某些解释中的里根。消极-消极型：退缩且尽责，避免冲突。例如：某些描述中的艾森豪威尔。

Barber’s model is useful for revision, but exam answers should note that personality is only one factor. Institutional constraints and events often matter more than a president’s psychological profile.

巴伯的模型对复习很有用，但考试答案应指出性格只是一个因素。制度约束和事件往往比总统的心理特征更重要。

6. Franklin D. Roosevelt to Harry S. Truman | 罗斯福与杜鲁门

Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1945) transformed the presidency by using the radio fireside chats to speak directly to millions of Americans. His calm, optimistic tone persuaded the public to support the New Deal and later the war effort, building a durable Democratic coalition.

富兰克林·罗斯福（1933-1945）通过广播炉边谈话直接对数百万美国人讲话，改变了总统职位。他冷静乐观的语调说服公众支持新政和后来的战争努力，建立了一个持久的民主党联盟。

Roosevelt’s personality was active-positive: he experimented with policies, communicated confidence and never admitted defeat. Members of Congress respected his electoral appeal and feared crossing him because of his direct connection with voters.

罗斯福的性格属于积极-积极型：他尝试各种政策，传达信心，从不承认失败。国会议员尊重他的选举吸引力，并因为总统与选民的直接联系而害怕惹怒他。

Harry S. Truman (1945-1953) was blunt, plain-spoken and often confrontational. He framed issues in simple moral terms, such as defending democracy against communism, and frequently used the veto to force Congress to accept his version of legislation.

哈里·杜鲁门（1945-1953）直率、言谈朴实且经常对抗。他用简单的道德术语界定问题，如捍卫民主对抗共产主义，并频繁使用否决权迫使国会接受他的立法版本。

Truman lacked Roosevelt’s charm and often alienated legislators with his stubbornness. However, his ‘give ’em hell’ style eventually became an asset in the 1948 election, showing that determined simplicity can sometimes persuade voters even when elites disapprove.

杜鲁门缺乏罗斯福的魅力，且经常因固执疏远议员。然而，他 ‘给他们点颜色看看’ 的风格最终在 1948 年选举中成为资产，表明坚定的简单有时能说服选民，即使精英们不认同。

7. Dwight D. Eisenhower to Lyndon B. Johnson | 艾森豪威尔与约翰逊

Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961) practiced ‘hidden-hand’ leadership. He often appeared detached in public while working hard behind the scenes to persuade key committee chairs and senators through private meetings and subtle signals.

德怀特·艾森豪威尔（1953-1961）实行 ‘隐藏之手’ 领导。他在公开场合常显得超然，但在幕后通过私人会议和微妙信号努力说服关键的委员会主席和参议员。

Eisenhower’s passive style led many contemporaries to underestimate him, but his personal prestige from World War II gave him quiet authority. He preferred consensus-building over ideological confrontation.

艾森豪威尔的被动风格让许多同时代人低估了他，但他源自二战中的个人威望给予他安静的权威。他更喜欢建立共识，而不是意识形态对抗。

John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) used charm, wit and media savvy to persuade both the public and Congress. His televised press conferences and inspiring inaugural address created a powerful image of youthful energy and competence.

约翰·肯尼迪（1961-1963）利用魅力、机智和媒体敏锐度来说服公众和国会。他的电视新闻发布会和鼓舞人心的就职演说塑造了充满活力与能力的年轻形象。

Kennedy was less successful in Congress during his short presidency because he lacked deep legislative relationships and Southern Democrats blocked many civil rights and social programmes. His persuasive style was more rhetorical than transactional.

肯尼迪在短暂的总统任期内对国会的说服不太成功，因为他缺乏深厚的立法关系，且南方民主党人阻挠了许多民权和社会计划。他的说服风格更多是修辞性的而非交易性的。

Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969) combined a strong legislative background with an intense, personal style. His ‘Johnson Treatment’ involved standing very close to another senator, grabbing their lapel, flattering, cajoling and threatening all at once.

林登·约翰逊（1963-1969）结合了深厚的立法背景与强烈的个人风格。他的 ‘约翰逊式对待’ 包括站得离其他参议员非常近，抓住他们的衣领，同时奉承、哄骗和威胁。

Johnson used his detailed knowledge of Senate procedures and individual members’ needs to win votes one by one. This transactional mastery produced landmark civil rights and welfare legislation, though his Vietnam War policies later destroyed his public prestige.

约翰逊利用他对参议院程序和个别议员需求的详尽了解，逐个赢得选票。这种交易式的掌控带来了里程碑式的民权和福利立法，尽管越南战争的政策后来摧毁了他的公众威望。

8. Richard Nixon to Jimmy Carter | 尼克松与卡特

Richard Nixon (1969-1974) was intelligent but suspicious and secretive. He preferred to work through White House staff rather than build broad congressional coalitions. His appeal to the ‘silent majority’ was a form of public persuasion aimed at bypassing elite opposition.

理查德·尼克松（1969-1974）聪明但多疑且行事隐秘。他更喜欢通过白宫幕僚工作，而不是建立广泛的国会联盟。他对 ‘沉默的大多数’ 的呼吁是一种旨在绕过精英反对的公众说服形式。

Nixon’s active-negative personality made him prone to seeing enemies everywhere. The Watergate scandal destroyed his remaining credibility, showing that persuasion based on manipulation and secrecy eventually collapses.

尼克松积极-消极型的人格使他倾向于到处看到敌人。水门事件摧毁了他仅存的公信力，表明基于操纵和秘密的说服最终会崩溃。

Gerald Ford (1974-1977) was honest and straightforward, but he lacked an electoral mandate after being appointed vice president and then president following Nixon’s resignation. His pardon of Nixon damaged his public reputation and made legislative persuasion much harder.

杰拉尔德·福特（1974-1977）诚实直率，但他在尼克松辞职后被任命为副总统再继任总统，缺乏选举授权。他对尼克松的特赦损害了他的公众声誉，使立法说服更加困难。

Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) ran as a moral outsider and refused to play Washington’s bargaining games. His personal integrity won initial public trust, but his micromanaging style and poor relations with Congress led to repeated legislative defeats.

吉米·卡特（1977-1981）以道德局外人的身份参选，拒绝玩华盛顿的讨价还价游戏。他的个人正直赢得了最初的公众信任，但他的微观管理风格和与国会的糟糕关系导致立法一再失败。

Carter’s experience illustrates that technical competence alone does not persuade. Presidents must understand the norms and incentives of Congress to translate personal virtue into policy success.

卡特的经历说明，仅有技术能力并不能说服。总统必须理解国会的规范和激励，才能将个人美德转化为政策成功。

9. Ronald Reagan to George H. W. Bush | 里根与老布什

Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) was known as the ‘Great Communicator’. His background as an actor and polished speaker allowed him to frame complex policy choices in clear, value-based language that appealed to ordinary Americans.

罗纳德·里根（1981-1989）被称为 ‘伟大的沟通者’。他作为演员和娴熟演讲者的背景使他能够用清晰、基于价值观的语言来阐述复杂的政策选择，吸引普通美国人。

Reagan used the bully pulpit to create public pressure that forced a Democratic Congress to support tax cuts and defence spending increases. He also cultivated personal friendships with key legislators, including some Democrats, which eased bargaining.

里根利用讲坛权力制造公众压力，迫使民主党控制的国会支持减税和增加国防开支。他还与主要议员，包括一些民主党人，培养私人友谊，使讨价还价更加容易。

George H. W. Bush (1989-1993) was a pragmatic diplomat who excelled at foreign policy coalition-building, especially during the Gulf War. However, he struggled with domestic persuasion and famously reneged on his ‘read my lips, no new taxes’ pledge, which angered his base and weakened his credibility.

乔治·赫伯特·沃克·布什（1989-1993）是一位务实的外交家，擅长建立外交政策联盟，尤其是在海湾战争期间。然而，他在国内说服方面表现不佳，并因违背 ‘听我说，不会加税’ 的承诺而激怒了他的基本盘，削弱了他的公信力。

Bush’s case shows that even a

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Powers of Persuasion and the Character of Each President | 说服力权力与各位总统的性格特征