The influence of the Supreme Court on the executive and parliament | 最高法院对行政机关与议会的影响

📚 The influence of the Supreme Court on the executive and parliament | 最高法院对行政机关与议会的影响

The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, established by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and opened in 2009, has become a central actor in the UK constitution. Its most significant function is to review whether the executive and, in certain respects, Parliament act within the law. This article explains the Court’s influence on both branches, using key cases and principles relevant to Edexcel A-Level Politics.

英国最高法院依据《2005年宪法改革法》设立,并于2009年正式运作,现已成为英国宪法中的核心行为体。它最重要的职能是审查行政机关以及在某些方面议会是否在法律范围内行事。本文结合与Edexcel A-Level政治学相关的关键案例和原则,说明最高法院对这两大权力分支的影响。

1. Origins and constitutional role | 起源与宪法角色

The Supreme Court replaced the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, separating the highest court from the legislature and creating clearer judicial independence. It is the final court of appeal in all civil cases and in criminal cases from England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Its constitutional role includes interpreting statutes, developing the common law and ensuring that public bodies do not exceed their legal powers.

最高法院取代了上议院上诉委员会,实现了最高司法机关与立法机关的制度分离,使司法独立更加明确。它是所有民事案件以及英格兰、威尔士和北爱尔兰刑事案件的终审法院。其宪法角色包括解释成文法、发展普通法,以及确保公共机构不超越其法定权力。

The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 removed the Lord Chancellor’s former judicial role and transferred it to the Lord Chief Justice, strengthening the separation of powers. The new Court also took over most devolution jurisdiction, making it a key arbiter in disputes between the UK government and devolved administrations.

《2005年宪法改革法》取消了大法官原有的司法职能,将其移交给首席大法官,从而强化了权力分立。新设立的法院还承接了大部分权力下放案件的管辖权,成为英国政府与地方分权政府之间争端的重要仲裁者。


2. Judicial review and executive action | 司法审查与行政行为

Judicial review allows courts to examine the lawfulness of decisions made by ministers, departments and other public bodies. It is not an appeal on the merits; the Court asks whether a decision was made within legal authority, whether relevant considerations were taken into account, and whether the process was fair. Cases such as R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (2017) show that the executive cannot use prerogative powers to bypass Parliament where statute is involved.

司法审查使法院能够审查大臣、政府部门及其他公共机构所做决定的合法性。它不是对案件事实的实体上诉;法院关注的是决定是否在法定权限内作出、是否考虑了相关因素,以及程序是否公正。例如 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (2017) 一案表明,在涉及成文法的领域,行政机关不能利用特权绕过议会。

By quashing unlawful ministerial decisions, the Supreme Court creates real consequences for policy delivery. Government departments must re-take decisions, revise guidance or amend practices. This means judicial review acts as a standing check on executive power, even though the Court cannot substitute its own policy choice for that of a minister.

通过撤销违法的大臣决定,最高法院对政策执行产生了实际影响。政府部门必须重新作出决定、修订指引或调整做法。这意味着司法审查是对行政权力的持续性制约,尽管法院不能用自己的政策选择取代大臣的选择。


3. The 2019 prorogation case | 2019年议会休会案

In R (Miller) v The Prime Minister (2019), the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that Boris Johnson’s advice to prorogue Parliament for five weeks was unlawful because it had the effect of frustrating Parliament’s constitutional role without reasonable justification. The Court quashed the prorogation, and Parliament resumed sitting. This case demonstrated the Court’s willingness to hold the executive to account even in politically sensitive matters.

在 R (Miller) v The Prime Minister (2019) 案中,最高法院一致裁定,鲍里斯·约翰逊建议议会休会五周的行为违法,因为该行为在没有合理理由的情况下,实质性地阻碍了议会履行宪法职责。最高法院撤销了休会决定,议会随即复会。这一案件表明,即使在政治敏感事务中,最高法院也愿意追究行政机关的责任。

The judgment was viewed by some as a landmark defence of parliamentary sovereignty, because it prevented the executive from closing down the legislature to avoid scrutiny during the Brexit process. For critics, it illustrated judicial overreach into a political arena. Either way, it is now a central case study for evaluating the Court’s influence on both the executive and Parliament.

一些人认为这一判决是对议会主权的里程碑式捍卫,因为它阻止了行政机关在脱欧进程中通过关闭议会来逃避审查。对于批评者而言,它体现了司法机构过度介入政治领域。无论哪种解读,它现在都是评估最高法院对行政机关和议会影响的核心案例。


4. Human Rights Act and declarations of incompatibility | 人权法与不相容声明

Under the Human Rights Act 1998, higher courts may issue a declaration of incompatibility if a statute cannot be interpreted compatibly with the European Convention on Human Rights. The declaration does not invalidate the Act; it leaves the remedy to Parliament. Nevertheless, it creates strong political pressure for amendment. This gives the Court an indirect influence over both the executive, which must respond, and Parliament, which decides whether to change the law.

根据《1998年人权法》,如果某项法律无法被解释为与《欧洲人权公约》相容,较高级别的法院可以发布不相容声明。该声明并不会使法律失效,而是把补救措施留给议会。然而,它会产生强大的政治压力,促使修法。这使最高法院对必须作出回应的行政机关以及决定是否修法的议会都产生了间接影响。

For example, after the Belmarsh case (A v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2004), the court declared that indefinite detention of foreign terrorist suspects under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was incompatible with the right to liberty. Parliament responded with the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, replacing detention with control orders. This shows a constitutional dialogue between the Court and the political branches.

例如,在贝尔马什案(A v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2004)之后,法院宣布《2001年反恐怖主义、犯罪及安全法》对恐怖主义嫌疑人的无限期拘留与自由权不相容。议会随后通过《2005年预防恐怖主义法》作出回应,以控制令取代拘留。这表明法院与政治分支之间存在宪法对话。


5. Parliamentary sovereignty: continuity and change | 议会主权:延续与变化

The traditional Diceyan view holds that Parliament can make or unmake any law and no court can set aside an Act of Parliament. The UK Supreme Court does not have the power to strike down primary legislation. However, by interpreting legislation in a rights-compatible way and by reviewing executive action, it has changed how parliamentary sovereignty operates in practice. Sovereignty remains formally with Parliament, but the Court’s interpretive role shapes the effect of legislation.

传统戴雪式观点认为,议会可以制定或废除任何法律,任何法院都不能废止议会的立法。英国最高法院无权推翻初级立法。然而,通过以符合权利的方式解释立法,以及审查行政行为,最高法院已经改变了议会主权在实践中运作的方式。主权在形式上仍属于议会,但法院的解释性角色塑造着立法的实际效果。

Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires courts to read legislation compatibly with Convention rights ‘so far as it is possible to do so’. This strong interpretive obligation can bend the literal meaning of statutory words, expanding judicial influence without formally overriding Parliament. Section 4 declarations preserve parliamentary sovereignty by leaving the final choice to Parliament.

《1998年人权法》第3条要求法院“在尽可能的范围内”以符合公约权利的方式解读立法。这种强烈的解释义务可以改变法条的字面含义,在不正式推翻议会的情况下扩大司法影响。第4条的不相容声明则把最终选择留给议会,从而维护议会主权。


6. Limits on the Supreme Court’s influence | 最高法院影响力的限制

The Court can be constrained by several factors. It cannot strike down primary legislation; it relies on Parliament to respond to declarations of incompatibility; its judges are not elected, which limits democratic legitimacy; and Parliament can legislate to reverse judicial decisions, as it did after the Belmarsh case with the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. Moreover, the Court waits for a case to be brought; it cannot proactively initiate review of government policy.

最高法院受到多种因素制约。它不能推翻初级立法;它依赖议会回应不相容声明;其法官并非民选,这限制了民主正当性;并且议会可以通过立法推翻司法判决,例如贝尔马什案后通过《2005年反恐法》。此外,法院只能等待案件被提起,不能主动启动对政府政策的审查。

The government also controls the court’s resources and can introduce legislation limiting judicial review, although such attempts often face strong opposition. The Conservative governments proposed a Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022, which altered remedies but did not remove the core of judicial review. Still, Parliament retains the ultimate authority to change the court’s jurisdiction.

政府还控制着法院的资源,并可以提出限制司法审查的立法,尽管这类尝试往往会遇到强烈反对。保守党政府曾提出《2022年司法审查与法院法》,调整了救济措施,但没有取消司法审查的核心。无论如何,议会仍拥有改变法院管辖权的最终权力。


7. Appointment, composition and independence | 任命、构成与独立性

Supreme Court judges are appointed by an independent selection commission. The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 removed the Lord Chancellor’s former judicial and legislative roles and created a clearer separation of powers. Judges of the Supreme Court have security of tenure and cannot be removed except by an address passed by both Houses of Parliament. This independence strengthens their ability to scrutinise the executive without fear of reprisal.

最高法院法官由一个独立的遴选委员会任命。《2005年宪法改革法》取消了大法官原有的司法和立法职能,建立了更清晰的权力分立。最高法院法官拥有任期保障,除议会两院通过弹劾外不得被免职。这种独立性增强了他们审查行政机关的能力,而无需担心报复。

The selection process reduces direct political control, but it is not wholly free from controversy. The President and Deputy President are chosen by peers and the commission, and the Lord Chancellor retains only a limited veto. The judiciary’s independence is also protected by the principle that judges cannot be sued for decisions made in good faith, which allows them to rule against the government without personal risk.

遴选过程减少了直接的政治控制,但也并非完全没有争议。院长和副院长由同僚和遴选委员会选出,大法官仅保留有限的否决权。司法独立还受到另一原则的保护,即法官不因善意作出的判决而被诉,这使他们能够作出不利于政府的裁决而无需承担个人风险。


8. Impact on ministers and civil servants | 对大臣与公务员的影响

The Court’s rulings affect how ministers and civil servants make decisions. The requirement to act within statutory powers and to follow fair procedures means that policy proposals are now drafted with legal risk in mind. Government lawyers play a major role in checking compatibility with the Human Rights Act and EU-retained law. This ‘judicialisation’ of policy-making is a form of indirect influence on the executive.

最高法院的裁决影响着大臣和公务员作出决策的方式。必须在法定权限内行动并遵循公正程序

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