Funding Student Welfare: Should a Levy on International Students Pay for Targeted Maintenance Grants? | 国际学生税的资金用途：针对性生活补助金的重新引入

📚 Funding Student Welfare: Should a Levy on International Students Pay for Targeted Maintenance Grants? | 国际学生税的资金用途：针对性生活补助金的重新引入

The rising cost of student living is now the dominant constraint on university participation in many developed economies. At the same time, international students represent a large and highly concentrated stream of fee revenue. This has produced a recurring policy proposal: impose a levy on international student fees and hypothecate the proceeds to a ring-fenced fund that pays targeted maintenance grants to low-income domestic students. This article examines that proposal as an applied economics problem – covering tax design, revenue estimation, incidence, targeting, second-round effects, distributional impact and implementation risk.

在许多发达经济体，学生生活成本的上涨已成为阻碍大学入学机会的主要约束。与此同时，国际学生构成了一笔规模庞大且高度集中的学费收入。由此产生了一个反复出现的政策方案：对国际学生学费征收附加税，并将所得款项专款专用，用于向低收入本国学生发放定向生活补助金。本文将这一方案作为应用经济学问题加以分析，涵盖税制设计、收入测算、税负归宿、瞄准机制、二阶效应、分配影响与执行风险。

---

1. Policy Context: Why the Debate Has Returned | 政策背景：这场争论为何重新出现

Maintenance support for domestic students has been progressively shifted from grants to loans in several systems, most notably the 2016 replacement of maintenance grants with maintenance loans in England. Grants reduce debt at graduation; loans simply defer the cost. When inflation in rent, energy and food outpaces per-student support, the binding constraint on participation stops being tuition and becomes cash flow during term time.

在一些国家，本国学生的生活费支持已逐步从补助金转向贷款，最典型的是英格兰在 2016 年以生活费贷款取代生活费补助金。补助金减少的是毕业时的债务，贷款只是把成本推迟。当房租、能源与食品通胀快于生均资助增长时，制约入学机会的约束就不再是学费，而是学期内的现金流。

Meanwhile, international student fees have become the marginal revenue source for many institutions. Public funding per domestic student has stagnated in real terms, so universities have cross-subsidised teaching and research from full-fee international recruitment. That cross-subsidy is precisely what makes international students a visible “tax base” in political debate.

与此同时，国际学生学费已成为许多高校的边际收入来源。本国学生的生均公共拨款实际停滞，高校便用全额缴费的国际学生收入交叉补贴教学与科研。正是这种交叉补贴，使国际学生在政治辩论中成为一个显眼的”税基”。

The proposal is therefore best understood as a package: a levy on the export education sector, plus a reintroduced targeted maintenance grant for domestic students. Each half can be justified separately, but the political appeal comes from linking them through hypothecation.

因此，这一方案应被理解为一个组合：对教育出口部门征税，加上为本国学生重新引入定向生活补助金。两半各自都可以单独论证，但其政治吸引力来自通过专款专用把二者绑定在一起。

---

2. Tax Design: Base, Rate and Hypothecation | 税制设计：税基、税率与专款专用

A levy can be levied on three alternative bases. A per-head levy (a flat amount per international student per year) is simple to collect and predictable, but regressive relative to fee levels. An ad valorem levy (a percentage of tuition fees) scales automatically with fee inflation and raises more from high-fee programmes. A visa-linked surcharge collects at the point of immigration control, which is administratively cheap but harder to vary by institution.

附加税有三种可选税基。按人头征收（每名国际学生每年固定金额）征收简单、可预测，但相对于学费水平具有累退性。从价征收（按学费的一定百分比）会随学费上涨自动扩张，并从高学费项目中筹集更多。与签证挂钩的附加费在移民管制环节征收，行政成本低，但难以按院校差异调整。

Hypothecation – legally earmarking the revenue for a specific purpose – is the defining feature of this proposal. Its advantage is political credibility: taxpayers and voters can see where the money goes, which raises acceptance of the levy. Its disadvantage is fiscal rigidity: in years when international recruitment collapses, the grant fund collapses with it, exactly when domestic students may need support most.

专款专用——以法律形式将收入锁定于特定用途——是本方案的核心特征。其优势是政治可信度：纳税人与选民能看见钱的去向，从而提高对征税的接受度。其劣势是财政刚性：在国际招生崩塌的年份，补助基金也随之崩塌，而这恰恰可能是本国学生最需要支持的时候。

A more robust design is partial hypothecation: earmark a floor (for example, the first 70% of projected revenue) and allow the remainder to flow to general higher education funding. This preserves the political signal while retaining a fiscal buffer.

更稳健的设计是部分专款专用：锁定一个下限（例如预计收入的第一个 70%），其余部分流入高等教育一般性经费。这样既保留了政治信号，又保留了财政缓冲。

Design choice | 设计选择	Advantage | 优势	Drawback | 缺陷
Per-head levy | 按人头	Simple, predictable | 简单、可预测	Regressive across programmes | 项目间累退
Ad valorem % | 从价百分比	Rises with fees | 随学费上涨	Raises price gap further | 进一步拉大价差
Visa surcharge | 签证附加费	Cheap to collect | 征收成本低	Blunt, no institutional differentiation | 粗放、无院校区分

---

3. Revenue Arithmetic: How Much Can It Raise? | 收入测算：究竟能筹到多少钱

Total levy revenue depends on the rate, the number of levy-paying students, and the collection efficiency of the system. The core identity is:

税收总收入取决于税率、缴税学生人数与征收效率。核心恒等式为：

R = t × Q × f

where R is annual revenue, t is the levy per student per year, Q is the number of levy-paying international students, and f is the collection efficiency (0 < f ≤ 1, reflecting exemption rates and administrative leakage).

其中 R 为年度收入，t 为每名学生每年的税额，Q 为缴税的国际学生人数，f 为征收效率（0 < f ≤ 1，反映豁免率与行政漏损）。

Suppose a system hosts 500,000 international students paying an average fee of £18,000, and a levy of 6% is applied. Then t = £1,080 per student, and with f = 0.95:

假设某国接收 50 万名国际学生，平均学费为 18 000 英镑，征收 6% 的附加税。则 t = 每人 1 080 英镑，若 f = 0.95：

R = £1,080 × 500,000 × 0.95 = £513 million per year

If a targeted maintenance grant of £4,000 per eligible student is paid to 120,000 eligible students, the annual cost is £480 million, leaving a small surplus for administration and contingency.

若向 12 万名符合条件的学生发放每人 4 000 英镑的定向生活补助金，年度成本为 4.8 亿英镑，尚有少量盈余可用于行政与应急。

The break-even levy rate, the rate at which revenue exactly covers the grant bill S, is found by rearranging:

收支平衡税率，即收入恰好覆盖补助金支出 S 的税率，可通过变形得到：

t* = S ÷ (Q × f)

This arithmetic is only a first-round calculation. It assumes Q is fixed. Section 4 shows why that assumption is the weakest link in the entire proposal.

这只是第一轮测算，它假定 Q 固定不变。第 4 节将说明，为什么这一假定是整个方案中最脆弱的一环。

---

4. Incidence: Who Actually Pays the Levy? | 税负归宿：究竟谁在付这笔税？

Statutory incidence and economic incidence differ. The levy is legally paid by the institution, but the burden is shared between the institution, the international student, and – if enrolment falls – domestic students and staff who bear the consequences of reduced institutional income.

法定归宿与经济归宿并不相同。附加税在法律上由院校缴纳，但负担实际由院校、国际学生，以及在招生下降时承担院校收入减少后果的本国学生与教职员共同分担。

The split depends on the price elasticity of demand for international places. Define:

分担比例取决于国际学生对学位的需求价格弹性。定义：

εₚ = (%ΔQᵈ) ÷ (%ΔP)

If demand is inelastic in the short run (|εₚ| < 1), institutions can pass most of the levy on to students through higher fees with only a small fall in numbers, and levy revenue rises roughly in proportion to the rate. If demand is elastic (|εₚ| > 1), a price increase drives a proportionally larger fall in enrolment and revenue may actually fall.

若短期需求缺乏弹性（|εₚ| < 1），院校可将大部分税负通过提高学费转嫁给学生，而人数只小幅下降，税收收入大致随税率同比例上升。若需求富有弹性（|εₚ| > 1），价格上涨会引起更大幅度的招生下降，收入反而可能减少。

The deadweight loss created by the levy rises with the square of the rate, which means high rates are disproportionately inefficient:

附加税造成的无谓损失随税率的平方增长，这意味着高税率的效率代价不成比例地大：

DWL ≈ ½ × t × ΔQ = ½ × |εₚ| × Q × t² ÷ P

Evidence from major Anglophone destinations suggests postgraduate taught demand is highly elastic in the long run (estimates around −1.5 to −2.5) because students compare several countries and delay enrolment, while undergraduate demand is less elastic in the short run. A design implication follows: a levy on postgraduate fees carries more revenue risk than a levy spread across all levels.

主要英语国家的经验证据显示，授课型硕士需求的长期弹性很高（估计约在 −1.5 至 −2.5），因为学生会在多国之间比较并推迟入学；而本科需求的短期弹性较低。由此得出的设计含义是：对研究生学费征税的收入风险，高于在全部学段平均征收。

---

5. Why Targeted Living Subsidies Are Justified | 为何定向生活补助金具有理论依据

Three standard market failures justify public maintenance support. First, capital market failure: human capital cannot be used as collateral, so private lenders will not finance study at socially optimal levels, especially for students from low-wealth households. Second, positive externalities: graduates generate productivity spillovers, higher tax contributions, better health outcomes and stronger civic participation, so the social return exceeds the private return.

三项标准的市场失灵为公共生活补助提供依据。第一，资本市场失灵：人力资本无法作为抵押品，私人贷款者不会以社会最优水平为求学融资，对来自低财富家庭的学生尤其如此。第二，正外部性：毕业生带来生产率溢出、更高的税收贡献、更好的健康结果与更强的公民参与，因此社会回报高于私人回报。

Third, liquidity constraints during term time distort behaviour in ways that reduce completion. A student who must work 25 hours a week to pay rent studies less, fails more modules and drops out more often. Since the marginal cost of tuition is already covered by fee loans in many systems, the marginal barrier to participation is now living cost, not price.

第三，学期内的流动性约束会以降低毕业率的方式扭曲行为。一个必须每周打工 25 小时才能付房租的学生，学习时间更少、模块不及格更多、辍学率更高。在许多体系中，学费的边际成本已由学费贷款覆盖，因此当前制约入学的边际障碍是生活费，而不是价格。

The case for targeting rather than universality rests on three arguments: the marginal utility of an extra pound is higher for low-income students; a given budget reaches more students if the taper is well designed; and universal grants paid to high-income households have a large deadweight cost relative to the participation they actually generate.

选择定向而非普惠，基于三点论证：额外一英镑对低收入学生的边际效用更高；预算固定时，设计良好的递减机制能覆盖更多学生；而向高收入家庭发放普惠补助金，相对于其实际带来的入学增量，存在较大的无谓成本。

---

6. Designing the Grant: Means-Testing, Tapering and Incentives | 补助金设计：资产审查、递减与激励

A targeted maintenance grant is normally means-tested on household income, then tapered. A simple linear taper is:

定向生活补助金通常以家庭收入进行审查，然后递减。简单的线性递减公式为：

G = M − τ × (Y − Y₀), subject to 0 ≤ G ≤ M

where G is the grant, M is the maximum award, Y is assessed household income, Y₀ is the income threshold at which the full award is paid, and τ is the taper rate (the fraction of each extra pound of income that is withdrawn).

其中 G 为补助金额，M 为最高额度，Y 为核定的家庭收入，Y₀ 为可获全额补助的收入门槛，τ 为递减率（每增加一英镑收入被削减的比例）。

The taper rate creates an effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) on parental income. If τ = 0.3 and the household also faces income tax and social contributions, the combined withdrawal can exceed 50%, weakening work incentives for the very households the policy intends to help. A lower τ widens the income range over which the grant is paid, raising total cost; a higher τ reduces cost but sharpens the incentive problem.

递减率会形成对父母收入的有效边际税率（EMTR）。若 τ = 0.3，而家庭同时承担所得税与社会缴费，合计扣减率可能超过 50%，反而削弱了政策本意要帮助的家庭的工作激励。降低 τ 会扩大补助覆盖的收入区间并推高总成本；提高 τ 可降低成本但加剧激励问题。

Delivery details matter as much as the formula. Term-time instalments smooth consumption better than a single lump sum; direct payment to the student rather than the household improves control; and light conditionality (registration plus satisfactory progression) protects against non-completion without excluding students who fail one module.

发放细节与公式同样重要。分期在学期内发放比一次性总额更能平滑消费；直接支付给学生而非家庭可增强自主性；轻度附条件（注册加学业进展达标）可防止辍学，又不至于把某一模块不及格的学生排除在外。

• Full award below Y₀ | Y₀ 以下全额发放
• Linear taper between Y₀ and Y₁ | 在 Y₀ 与 Y₁ 之间线性递减
• Zero award above Y₁, where Y₁ = Y₀ + M ÷ τ | Y₁ 以上不再发放，其中 Y₁ = Y₀ + M ÷ τ
• Budget cost = Σ (Gᵢ × nᵢ) across income bands | 预算成本 = 各收入组 (Gᵢ × nᵢ) 之和

---

7. Second-Round Effects: Enrolment, Substitution and the Export Sector | 二阶效应：招生、替代与出口部门

Education export is not only a fee stream; it is a trade in services. International students also spend on accommodation, food, transport and leisure, generating employment in university towns. The relevant fiscal question is therefore net, not gross: does the levy plus grant package raise more than it costs once lost export revenue is counted?

教育出口不只是学费流，它是一项服务贸易。国际学生还在住宿、食品、交通与休闲上支出，为大学城创造就业。因此相关的财政问题是净效应而非毛效应：一旦计入损失的出口收入，附加税加补助金的组合带来的收益是否大于成本？

Three second-round channels matter. First, the price effect: a levy passed on as higher fees reduces applications, particularly from price-sensitive markets. Second, the substitution effect: prospective students shift to competitor destinations such as Canada, Australia, Germany or the Netherlands. Third, the institutional response: universities may reduce domestic places, cut courses or lower entry requirements for international applicants to protect revenue.

三条二阶渠道值得关注。第一，价格效应：以更高学费形式转嫁的附加税会减少申请，尤其是来自价格敏感市场的申请。第二，替代效应：潜在学生会转向加拿大、澳大利亚、德国或荷兰等竞争目的地。第三，院校反应：为保住收入，高校可能减少本国学生名额、削减课程，或降低对国际申请者的录取要求。

A useful rule of thumb is the net fiscal balance:

一个实用的经验法则是净财政平衡：

Net fiscal effect = ΔR(levy) − ΔExport earnings − Admin cost − ΔInstitutional tax base effects

If a 6% levy reduces international enrolment by 5%, and each lost student forgoes £18,000 in fees plus £12,000 in living expenditure, the export loss can easily exceed the levy revenue raised. This is the classic case of a tax whose base shrinks faster than the rate rises.

若 6% 的附加税使国际招生下降 5%，而每流失一名学生损失 18 000 英镑学费加 12 000 英镑生活支出，出口损失很容易超过所筹税款。这正是税基收缩快于税率上升的典型案例。

---

8. Distributional Analysis: Equity in Three Dimensions | 分配分析：三个维度的公平

Vertical equity asks whether the policy transfers from better-off to worse-off groups. On one reading it does: the levy falls on students who pay full fees, often from relatively advantaged households, and the grant goes to low-income domestic students. However, international students are not homogeneous – a large share come from middle-income families for whom full fees represent a substantial income sacrifice.

纵向公平追问政策是否从较富裕群体向较贫困群体转移。一种解读是肯定的：附加税落在缴全额学费的学生身上（他们多来自相对优越的家庭），补助金流向低收入本国学生。然而国际学生并非同质群体——相当一部分来自中等收入家庭，全额学费对他们意味着巨大的收入牺牲。

Horizontal equity asks whether students in similar circumstances are treated alike. A per-head levy treats a medical student paying £38,000 and an arts student paying £15,000 identically, even though the resource cost of their education differs greatly. An ad valorem levy restores proportionality to fees but not to cost.

横向公平追问处境相似的学生是否被同等对待。按人头征税把支付 38 000 英镑的医学生与支付 15 000 英镑的文科生等同对待，尽管两者教育资源的实际成本差距很大。从价征税使税负与学费成比例，但这仍不等于与成本成比例。

Intergenerational equity concerns incidence over time. Grants reduce the debt stock carried by current cohorts, but the levy falls on future international cohorts whose numbers are uncertain. If the levy suppresses recruitment, future domestic students may face larger classes and reduced course offerings – a hidden transfer from future students back to current ones.

代际公平关注跨时间的归宿。补助金减少了当前世代的债务存量，而附加税落在人数不确定的未来国际学生群体上。若附加税抑制招生，未来的本国学生可能面对更大的课堂与更少的课程选择——这是一种从未来学生向当前学生的隐性转移。

Dimension | 维度	Test | 检验标准	Likely verdict | 可能结论
Vertical | 纵向	Progressive transfer? | 是否累进转移	Mildly progressive | 轻度累进
Horizontal | 横向	Like treated alike? | 同类是否同等待遇	Weak on per-head levy | 按人头征税较弱
Intergenerational | 代际	Future cohorts protected? | 未来世代是否受保护	Uncertain, risks regression | 不确定，存在倒退风险

---

9. Implementation: Targeting Errors and Administrative Cost | 执行：瞄准误差与行政成本

All means-tested systems make two kinds of error. Type I error (leakage) means paying students who are not eligible; Type II error (exclusion) means failing to pay students who are eligible, typically because of complexity, stigma or lack of awareness. Leakage raises cost per genuine recipient; exclusion undermines the stated objective.

所有资产审查体系都会犯两类错误。第一类错误（漏损）指向不符合条件的学生发放；第二类错误（排除）指未能向符合条件的学生发放，通常源于手续复杂、污名感或信息不足。漏损会抬高每名真实受益者的成本；排除则直接损害既定目标。

Administrative cost depends on data infrastructure. If the student finance agency already collects household income data through a joint application with the tax authority, the marginal administrative cost of the grant can be as low as 3-5% of expenditure. If a new verification system must be built, costs can exceed 10% and delays will hit the poorest applicants hardest.

行政成本取决于数据基础设施。若学生资助机构已通过与税务机关的联合申请收集家庭收入数据，补助金的边际行政成本可低至支出的 3-5%。若必须新建核验系统，成本可能超过 10%，而延误对最贫困的申请者打击最大。

Take-up rates are an underrated policy variable. A grant that costs £480 million but reaches only 70% of eligible students delivers less participation gain per pound than a slightly more expensive, simpler design reaching 95%. Evaluation frameworks should therefore measure take-up and completion, not merely disbursement.

领取率是被低估的政策变量。一项耗资 4.8 亿英镑但只覆盖 70% 符合条件学生的补助金，其每英镑带来的入学增量，低于一项成本略高但设计更简单、覆盖 95% 的补助金。因此评估框架应衡量领取率与毕业率，而不仅是发放金额。

---

10. Fiscal Risk and Scenario Planning | 财政风险与情景规划

Hypothecated funds are procyclical: revenue depends on international recruitment, which is exposed to visa policy, geopolitics, exchange-rate movements and competitor countries’ marketing. If the grant is a statutory entitlement, expenditure is relatively rigid. The mismatch between volatile revenue and rigid expenditure is the central fiscal risk.

专款专用基金具有顺周期性：收入取决于国际招生，而国际招生暴露于签证政策、地缘政治、汇率波动与竞争国的市场推广。若补助金属法定权益，支出则相对刚性。收入波动与支出刚性之间的错配，就是核心财政风险。

Three mitigation instruments are commonly used. A stabilisation reserve converts surpluses in good years into buffers for bad years. A floating rate band allows the levy rate to move within a pre-announced range (for example 4-8%) rather than requiring new legislation. A treasury backstop guarantees the grant in low-revenue years, at the cost of weakening the purity of hypothecation.

常用三种缓释工具。稳定储备金把好年份的盈余转化为坏年份的缓冲。浮动税率区间允许税率在预先公布的范围内（例如 4-8%）调整，而无须重新立法。财政部兜底则在低收入的年份保障补助金发放，代价是削弱专款专用的纯粹性。

Scenario planning should test at least three states of the world: a base case of stable recruitment, a downside case of a 20% fall in intakes, and an upside case of strong growth. Grants to liquidity-constrained students have a fiscal multiplier typically estimated between 0.8 and 1.2 because recipients spend quickly and locally, which partially offsets

Published by TutorHao | Exam Prep Revision Series | aleveler.com

更多咨询请联系16621398022（同微信）