📚 CCEA Year 13 Philosophy: Key Terminology Quick Revision Guide | CCEA Year 13 哲学术语速记指南
Mastering the precise vocabulary of philosophy is essential for success in the CCEA A2 examination. This quick revision guide presents the key terms you are most likely to encounter across moral philosophy and philosophy of religion, each explained clearly and paired with a Chinese translation to reinforce your understanding. Use these definitions to sharpen your essays, support your arguments, and avoid common conceptual mistakes.
掌握精确的哲学词汇是 CCEA A2 考试成功的关键。本速记指南汇集了道德哲学与宗教哲学中你最可能遇到的核心术语，每个术语都给出了清晰的解释，并配有中文翻译以加深理解。请运用这些定义来打磨你的论文、支撑你的论证，并避开常见概念误区。
1. Act Utilitarianism | 行为功利主义
Act Utilitarianism – A version of utilitarianism championed by Jeremy Bentham. It judges the morality of an action solely by the consequences of that particular act: an act is right if, compared to all alternatives, it produces the greatest net happiness for all those affected.
行为功利主义 – 由杰里米·边沁倡导的一种功利主义形态。它仅根据某一具体行为自身的后果来判断其道德对错：如果该行为与所有可能的选择相比，能为全体受影响者带来最大净幸福，它就是对的。
Hedonic Calculus – Bentham’s quantitative method for measuring pleasure and pain generated by an act. It considers seven factors: intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity, and extent.
苦乐计算法 – 边沁用来度量一个行为所产生的快乐与痛苦的量化方法。它考量了七个要素：强度、持续时间、确定性、远近性、继生性、纯度和范围。
Principle of Utility – The foundational rule of utilitarianism: actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.
功利原则 – 功利主义的根本准则：行为正当与否，取决于其促进幸福的倾向；倾向于带来不幸的行为则是错误的。
2. Rule Utilitarianism | 规则功利主义
Rule Utilitarianism – Developed by John Stuart Mill to address objections to act utilitarianism. It states that an action is right if it conforms to a rule whose general observance would lead to the greatest happiness. Moral rules act as ‘middle axioms’ between the principle of utility and individual decisions.
规则功利主义 – 由约翰·斯图尔特·密尔提出，以应对行为功利主义所遭受的批评。它主张，一个行为如果符合某项规则，而该规则的普遍遵守会带来最大幸福，那么它就是对的。道德规则在功利原则与个体决定之间充当着“中间公理”。
Strong Rule Utilitarianism – The view that once optimal rules have been established, they must never be broken, even if breaking a rule in a particular case would produce more happiness.
强规则功利主义 – 认为一旦确立了最优规则，就绝不能违反，即便在某个具体情形下违反规则能带来更多幸福。
Weak Rule Utilitarianism – Holds that rules are strong guidelines but can be broken in exceptional circumstances where an individual calculation clearly shows that a deviation would maximise utility.
弱规则功利主义 – 主张规则是强有力的指引，但在例外情形下可以打破，只要个别计算明确显示偏离规则能够使功利最大化。
Higher and Lower Pleasures – Mill’s qualitative distinction: intellectual, moral, and aesthetic pleasures are intrinsically superior to mere bodily pleasures. Competent judges who have experienced both prefer the higher.
高级快乐与低级快乐 – 密尔提出的质的区分：理智的、道德的和审美的快乐在本质上优于单纯的肉体快乐。亲历过两种快乐的合格裁判官会偏爱高级快乐。
3. Kantian Deontology | 康德义务论
Deontological Ethics – Ethical theories in which the rightness of actions is determined not by consequences but by whether the action conforms to a moral rule or duty. Kant’s ethics is the classic example.
义务论伦理学 – 这类伦理学理论不以后果，而是以行动是否符合道德规则或义务来判断其正当性。康德的伦理学是典型代表。
The Good Will – For Kant, the only thing that is good without qualification. A good will acts out of respect for the moral law, not from inclination or self-interest.
善良意志 – 在康德看来，唯一无条件的善。善良意志出于对道德法则的尊重而行动，而非出于爱好或利己之心。
Maxim – A personal principle or rule on which an individual acts. Kant tests maxims using the Categorical Imperative.
准则 – 个人据以行动的主观原则或规则。康德用定言命令来检验各个准则。
Categorical Imperative (First Formulation) – ‘Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.’ The test of universalisability: if a maxim cannot be consistently thought or willed as a universal law, acting on it is forbidden.
定言命令（第一公式） – “要只按你同时能够意愿它成为一条普遍法则的那个准则去行动。”即可普遍化检验：如果一个准则无法被一贯地设想或意愿为普遍法则，那么据此行动就是被禁止的。
Categorical Imperative (Second Formulation) – ‘Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.’ This forbids using rational beings merely as tools.
定言命令（第二公式） – “你要这样行动，永远都把你人格中的人性以及每个他人人格中的人性同时用作目的，而绝不只是用作手段。”这禁止仅仅把理性存在者当作工具来使用。
4. Aristotelian Virtue Ethics | 亚里士多德美德伦理学
Virtue Ethics – An approach to ethics that focuses on the character of the moral agent rather than on duties or consequences. To live well is to cultivate virtues.
美德伦理学 – 一种聚焦于道德行为者品格而非义务或后果的伦理学进路。有德性地生活就是要培育各类美德。
Eudaimonia – Often translated as ‘happiness’ or ‘flourishing’, eudaimonia is the final end for human beings: living in accordance with reason and realising one’s potential as a human being.
Eudaimonia（繁荣/至福） – 通常译为“幸福”或“繁盛”，是人类追求的最高目的：按照理性去生活，实现人作为人的潜在可能。
Function Argument – Aristotle argues that everything has a characteristic function (ergon), and its good lies in performing that function excellently. The human function is rational activity, so the human good is rational activity performed in accordance with virtue.
功能论证 – 亚里士多德论证说，每件事物都有其特有的功能 (ergon)，其善就在于出色地履行该功能。人的功能是理性的活动，因此人的善就是依循美德而进行的理性活动。
Doctrine of the Mean – Virtues are character traits that lie at a mean between extremes of excess and deficiency. For example, courage is the mean between rashness and cowardice.
中道学说 – 美德是处于过度与不足两个极端之间的品格特质。例如，勇敢是鲁莽与怯懦的中道。
5. Meta-Ethics: Cognitivism vs Non-Cognitivism | 元伦理学：认知主义与非认知主义
Meta-Ethics – The branch of philosophy that examines the meaning and nature of moral language, rather than prescribing what we ought to do. It asks what we are doing when we say ‘murder is wrong’.
元伦理学 – 哲学的分支，考察道德语言的含义与本性，而非规定我们应当如何做。它追问：当我们说“谋杀是错的”时，我们到底在做什么。
Moral Realism (Cognitivism) – The view that moral statements express beliefs that are capable of being true or false, and that at least some of these beliefs are true. Moral properties exist mind-independently.
道德实在论（认知主义） – 认为道德陈述表达了可被判断为真或假的信念，且至少有部分此类信念为真。道德属性独立于心灵而存在。
Ethical Naturalism – A form of cognitivism claiming that moral properties are reducible to natural properties, e.g., ‘good’ means ‘maximises pleasure’. It is defended by utilitarians.
伦理自然主义 – 一种认知主义，主张道德属性可还原为自然属性，例如“善”即“使快乐最大化”。功利主义者为其辩护。
Intuitionism (G.E. Moore) – Holds that ‘good’ is a simple, non-natural property that cannot be defined in natural terms. We grasp it directly through moral intuition. Any attempt to define it commits the naturalistic fallacy.
直觉主义（G.E. 摩尔） – 主张“善”是一种单纯的、非自然的属性，无法用自然术语来定义。我们通过道德直觉直接把握它。任何定义它的企图都犯了自然主义谬误。
Emotivism (A.J. Ayer) – A non-cognitivist theory: moral statements are not truth-apt; they merely express emotional attitudes and attempt to evoke similar feelings in others. ‘Stealing is wrong’ means something like ‘Stealing – boo!’
情绪主义（A.J. 艾耶尔） – 一种非认知主义理论：道德陈述不具有真值，它们只是表达情感态度并试图唤起他人相似感受的语句。“偷窃是错的”大致相当于“偷窃——呸！”。
6. The Problem of Evil | 恶的问题
The Logical Problem of Evil – Formulated by J.L. Mackie, it argues that the existence of an omnipotent, wholly good God is logically incompatible with the existence of evil. If God is all-powerful, He could remove evil; if all-good, He would want to. Since evil exists, such a God cannot exist.
恶的逻辑问题 – 由J.L.麦基提出，论证全能、全善的上帝之存在与恶的存在在逻辑上不相容。如果上帝全能，他就能消除恶；如果全善，他就会想去消除。既然恶存在，这样的上帝就不能存在。
The Evidential Problem of Evil – Focuses on the amount, distribution, and apparent pointless nature of evil. It argues that the existence of gratuitous (pointless) suffering counts as strong evidence against the existence of a benevolent, omnipotent deity, even if a logical contradiction is avoided.
恶的证据问题 – 聚焦于恶的总量、分布与看似无意义的特征。它论证，即使避免了逻辑矛盾，无端（无意义）苦难的存在也构成了反对仁慈全能神存在的强有力证据。
Theodicy – An attempt to justify God’s ways to man by explaining why a perfectly good, all-powerful God might allow evil. Its aim is not to solve a logic puzzle but to offer a morally sufficient reason.
神义论 – 尝试通过解释一个至善全能的神何以会容许恶，来为上帝对人的做法进行辩护。其目标不是解决逻辑谜题，而是给出一个道德上充足的理由。
Augustinian Theodicy – Rooted in the Fall: evil is not a substance but a privation (absence) of good, arising from the misuse of free will by angels and humans. All suffering is a just punishment for original sin, and God’s goodness is preserved through the offer of redemption.
奥古斯丁神义论 – 植根于堕落叙事：恶并非实体，而是善的缺失 (privatio boni)，源自天使与人类对自由意志的误用。一切苦难都是对原罪的公正惩罚，而上帝的良善通过救赎的赐予得以保全。
7. Irenaean Theodicy & Process Theology | 伊里奈乌神义论与过程神学
Irenaean Soul-Making Theodicy – Developed by John Hick: evil is necessary to allow humans to develop virtues through freely chosen moral struggle. The world is a ‘vale of soul-making’ where hardships enable spiritual growth towards the likeness of God.
伊里奈乌式灵魂塑造神义论 – 由约翰·希克发展：恶是必要的，为的是让人类在自由选择的道德挣扎中发展出美德。世界是一片“灵魂塑造之谷”，艰难困苦促使我们的灵性成长，趋向上帝的样式。
Epistemic Distance – Hick’s concept that God deliberately keeps a certain hiddenness so that humans can make genuinely free moral choices without being overwhelmed by God’s presence.
认知距离 – 希克的概念，指上帝有意保持一定程度的隐藏，好让人类能够做出真正自由的道德抉择，而不至于被上帝临在的压倒性力量所胁迫。
Universal Salvation – In Hick’s theodicy, everyone will eventually complete soul-making and freely turn to God; Hell is thus not an eternal destination.
普世拯救 – 在希克神义论中，每个人最终都将完成灵魂塑造，并自由地归向上帝；因此地狱并非永恒的归宿。
Process Theology – A view inspired by A.N. Whitehead: God is not omnipotent in the classical sense but acts through persuasion, not coercion. God suffers with creation and cannot unilaterally eliminate evil; divine power is limited by the genuine freedom inherent in the world.
过程神学 – 受怀特海启发的观点：上帝并非古典意义上的全能者，而是透过劝服而非强制来运行。上帝与受造界一同受苦，无法单方面消除恶；神权受到世界固有真正自由的限制。
8. The Ontological Argument | 本体论论证
Ontological Argument – An a priori argument for God’s existence that deduces God’s necessary existence from the concept of a supremely perfect being or ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’.
本体论论证 – 一种先天的上帝存在证明，从“最完美存在者”或“无法设想有比之更伟大者”的概念中推导出上帝的必然存在。
Anselm’s Argument (Proslogion 2) – God is ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’. Even the fool who says ‘there is no God’ understands this definition. A being that exists in reality is greater than one that exists only in the mind. So if God existed only in the mind, we could conceive a greater being – one that also exists in reality. Therefore, God must exist in reality.
安瑟伦的论证（《宣讲》第二章） – 上帝是“无法设想有比之更伟大者”。就连说“没有上帝”的愚顽人也理解这一定义。存在于现实中的存在者，要比仅存在于心中的更大。所以，如果上帝仅存在于心中，我们就能设想一个更伟大的存在者——一个也存在于现实中的。因此，上帝必然存在于现实中。
Gaunilo’s ‘Lost Island’ Objection – Gaunilo argued that if Anselm’s reasoning were valid, one could prove the existence of the greatest conceivable island simply by defining it. The perfect island does not thereby exist, so the argument must be flawed.
高尼罗的“迷失之岛”反驳 – 高尼罗论证说，若安瑟伦的推理有效，我们就可以仅仅通过定义“最完美的岛屿”来证明其存在。但最完美的岛屿并不因此就存在，说明论证本身有缺陷。
Anselm’s Reply (Proslogion 3) – Existence is not a ‘great-making’ property that can be added to an island, but necessary existence is a unique attribute of God. An island is contingent; God alone can be thought of as necessarily existing.
安瑟伦的回应（《宣讲》第三章） – 可加诸于岛屿的“存在”并非一种“使人伟大”的属性，但“必然存在”是上帝独有的属性。岛屿是偶然的；唯有上帝能被设想为必然存在。
9. The Cosmological Argument | 宇宙论论证
Cosmological Argument – A posteriori argument that begins from the existence of the cosmos or some feature of it and argues to a first cause, necessary being, or unmoved mover which is identified with God.
宇宙论论证 – 一种后天的论证，从宇宙或其某种特征的存在出发，推至一个第一因、必然存在者或不动的推动者，并使其等同于上帝。
Aquinas’ First Way (Motion) – Things are in motion. Whatever is moved is moved by another. This chain cannot go back to infinity because there would be no first mover. Hence, there is a first unmoved mover: God.
阿奎那的第一路（运动） – 事物处于运动之中。凡被动者皆被另一者所推动。这个链条不能无限回溯，因为若没有第一推动者就不会有后续运动。因此，必须存在一个第一不动的推动者：上帝。
Aquinas’ Second Way (Causation) – We observe efficient causes ordered in series. Nothing can be the efficient cause of itself. If the chain were infinite, there would be no first cause and consequently no intermediate causes. Hence, a first uncaused cause exists.
阿奎那的第二路（原因） – 我们看到动力因以序列存在。没有任何东西是其自身的动力因。如果链条是无限的，就不会有第一因，从而也就不会有中间因。因此，必须有一个第一非受动因。
The Kalam Cosmological Argument – Defended by William Lane Craig: (1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause. (2) The universe began to exist. (3) Therefore, the universe has a cause, which is identified as a personal creator. The second premise is supported by both philosophical arguments against an actual infinite and scientific evidence (Big Bang).
卡拉姆宇宙论论证 – 由威廉·莱恩·克雷格捍卫：(1) 一切开始存在的东西都有其原因。(2) 宇宙开始存在。(3) 因此，宇宙有一个原因，这个原因被指认为一位有位格的创造者。第二个前提得到了反对实无限性的哲学论证和科学证据（大爆炸）的支持。
10. The Teleological (Design) Argument | 设计论论证
Teleological Argument – The argument from design: the complex order and apparent purpose observed in the natural world is best explained by the existence of an intelligent designer, rather than by chance or blind natural processes.
设计论论证 – 从设计出发的论证：自然界中观察到的复杂秩序与明显目的性，最好用一个智慧设计者的存在来解释，而不能归因于偶然或盲目的自然过程。
Paley’s Watch Analogy – If one finds a watch on a heath, its intricate mechanism suggests a watchmaker. Similarly, the far greater complexity of living organisms suggests a divine designer.
佩利的钟表类比 – 若在荒原上发现一块钟表，其精密机械装置暗示着一位制表工匠。同理，生命有机体远为复杂的结构，暗示着一位神圣设计者。
Hume’s Criticisms (through Philo) – The design argument is an inductive analogy that is weak: the world is not sufficiently like a machine to warrant a unique designer; even if a designer exists, it need not be the God of theism (it could be a team, a mortal being, or an apprentice). Moreover, the presence of evil makes it unlikely the designer is omnibenevolent.
休谟的批评（通过费罗之口） – 设计论证是一种薄弱的归纳类比：世界并不那么像一部机器，因此不足以断定为唯一设计者；退一步说，即使存在设计者，也不必是神论中的上帝（可能是一个团队、一个会死的存在者或学徒）。再者，恶的存在使设计者全善的说法难以成立。
Irreducible Complexity (Michael Behe) – A modern design argument: some biological systems cannot function if any one part is removed, so they could not have evolved gradually. They must be the product of an intelligent agent.
不可化约的复杂性（迈克尔·比希） – 一种现代版设计论证：有些生物系统如果移除任何一个部件就无法运作，因此不可能通过渐进式演化形成，必定是智慧行动者的产物。
11. Religious Experience | 宗教经验
Religious Experience – A non-empirical encounter or awareness of a transcendent reality, often described as a sense of the divine presence, a mystical union, or a numinous feeling. It is advanced as a direct source of knowledge of God.
宗教经验 – 对超越实在的一种非经验的际遇或觉知，常被描述为对神圣临在的感受、神秘合一的体验或敬畏感 (numinous)。它被当作认识上帝的直接来源。
William James’ Four Marks of Mystical Experience – (1) Ineffability: cannot be adequately described in words. (2) Noetic quality: imparts deep knowledge and insight. (3) Transiency: lasts a short time but has lasting effects. (4) Passivity: the experiencer feels taken over by a higher power.
威廉·詹姆士的神秘经验四特征 – (1) 不可言说性：无法用言语充分描述。(2) 知悟性：传达深刻的知识与洞见。(3) 短暂性：持续时间短，但影响持久。(4) 被动性：体验者感到被更高力量支配。
Argument from Religious Experience – If a person seems to perceive God, it is rational to believe God exists unless there are strong defeaters. The principle of credulity (Swinburne) suggests we should trust our experiences in the absence of counter-evidence.
宗教经验论证 – 如果一个人似乎感知到了上帝，那么相信上帝存在就是合理的，除非存在强有力的否证。根据斯温伯恩的轻信原则，在没有反对证据时，我们应当相信自己的经验。
Sceptical Challenges – The variability of experiences across cultures suggests they are shaped by upbringing; conflicting claims cannot all be true. Naturalistic explanations (epilepsy, fasting, psychological projection) undercut the need for a supernatural source.
怀疑论的挑战 – 不同文化中宗教经验的多样性表明它们受成长环境塑造；相互冲突的主张不可能同时为真。自然主义的解释（癫痫、禁食、心理投射）削弱了诉诸超自然源头的需要。
12. Free Will and Determinism | 自由意志与决定论
Libertarianism (Free Will) – Holds that humans have genuine free will: at the moment of choice, we could have done otherwise. Free will is incompatible with determinism, and determinism is false. This is essential for moral responsibility.
自由意志论（自由意志） – 主张人类拥有真正的自由意志：在选择的那一刻，我们本可以做出不同的行动。自由意志与决定论不相容，而决定论是错的。这是道德责任不可或缺的条件。
Hard Determinism – Every event, including human decisions, is causally necessitated by preceding events and natural laws. Therefore, free will is an illusion, and no one is morally responsible in the retributive sense.
硬决定论 – 每个事件，包括人的决定，都是由先前事件和自然法则因果必然决定的。因此，自由意志是一种幻象，在报应性意义上没有人负有道德责任。
Compatibilism (Soft Determinism) – Free will and determinism are compatible. To act freely is to act according to one’s own desires and intentions, without external constraint, even if those desires themselves are determined. Moral responsibility does not require the ability to have done otherwise absolutely.
相容论（软决定论） – 自由意志与决定论可以相容。自由地行动，就是按照自己的欲望和意愿行动，不受外部约束——即使这些欲望本身是被决定的。道德责任并不绝对要求“本可另做选择”的可能性。
Theological Determinism – If God is omniscient and foreknows all future actions, then those actions are inevitable, which seems to remove human free will. Responses include Boethius’ atemporal solution (God sees all time at once, not foreknowing but seeing) and the distinction between certainty and necessity.
神学决定论 – 如果上帝是全知的，预知一切未来行为，那么这些行为就是不可避免的，这似乎取消了人的自由意志。回应方案包括波爱修斯的超时间方案（上帝一次性看到全部时间，并非“预知”而是“看见”）以及确实性与必然性之间的区分。
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