Core Knowledge for Year 13 AQA Philosophy | 核心知识点梳理

📚 Core Knowledge for Year 13 AQA Philosophy | 核心知识点梳理

Year 13 AQA Philosophy deepens the investigation into two major branches of philosophy: the metaphysics of God and the metaphysics of mind. This article synthesises the essential arguments, concepts, and objections you need to master for the exam, offering a clear structure for revision. It covers classic proofs for God’s existence, the challenges posed by the problem of evil, the distinctiveness of religious language, and the rival theories that seek to explain the nature of consciousness and mental states.

Year 13 AQA 哲学课程深化了对两大哲学分支的探究：上帝的形而上学与心灵的形而上学。本文梳理了考试中必须掌握的核心论证、概念与反驳，为复习提供清晰框架。内容涵盖上帝存在的经典证明、恶的问题带来的挑战、宗教语言的独特性，以及试图解释意识与心理状态本质的竞争性理论。

1. The Concept and Attributes of God | 上帝的概念与属性

In the metaphysics of God, philosophical inquiry begins with the concept of a perfect being. The God of classical theism is typically defined as omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, and necessary. These attributes are not merely a list; they must be co-possible. The coherence of this concept is contested: can a being be both omnibenevolent and omnipotent if evil exists? Are omniscience and free will compatible? AQA expects you to assess whether the traditional divine attributes are internally consistent and whether they can be reconciled with our experience of the world.

在上帝的形而上学中，哲学探究始于一个完美存在的概念。古典有神论的上帝通常被定义为全能、全知、全善且必然存在的。这些属性并非简单的罗列，它们必须具有共可能性。这一概念的融贯性遭到质疑：如果恶存在，一个存在者能否同时全善且全能？全知与自由意志是否相容？AQA 考题要求你评估传统的上帝属性是否内在一致，以及它们能否与我们对世界的经验相调和。

Omnipotence: Can God create a stone so heavy that He cannot lift it? Aquinas reinterpreted omnipotence as the power to do all logically possible things.
全能：上帝能否创造一块重到连祂自己也举不起来的石头？阿奎那将全能重新解释为能做一切逻辑上可能之事的能力。
Omniscience: If God knows the future, does this foreknowledge determine human actions, removing free will? Solutions include Boethius’s view that God is outside time.
全知：如果上帝知道未来，这种预知是否会决定人类行为从而取消自由意志？解决方案包括波伊提乌的观点，即上帝在时间之外。
Omnibenevolence and Euthyphro dilemma: Is an action good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good? This challenges the foundation of moral goodness.
全善与游叙弗伦两难：一个行为是因为上帝命令才成为善的，还是因为它是善的上帝才命令它？这挑战了道德善性的根基。

2. Ontological Arguments | 本体论论证

Ontological arguments attempt to deduce God’s existence from the very concept of a supremely perfect being. Anselm’s version defines God as ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’. If such a being exists only in the mind, we could conceive of a greater being that exists in reality as well. Therefore God must exist in reality to be the greatest conceivable. Gaunilo criticised this by parodying the argument for a perfect island, claiming it would force the existence of any perfect thing. Anselm’s reply is that the argument works only for necessary beings, not contingent islands. Descartes formulated a different ontological argument based on God’s perfections: existence is a perfection, so a supremely perfect being must possess existence. Kant’s objection is foundational: existence is not a real predicate; it does not add to the concept of a thing. A predicate must say what a thing is, but ‘exists’ merely posits it. Modern forms by Malcolm and Plantinga use modal logic (possible worlds) to argue that a maximally great being exists in every possible world. Evaluate the claim that logic alone can prove something about reality.

本体论论证试图从最完美存在的概念本身推导出上帝的存在。安瑟伦的版本将上帝定义为“那无法设想比之更伟大的存在者”。若这样的存在者仅存在于心灵中，我们就能设想一个同样存在于现实中的更伟大者，因此上帝必须存在于现实中才能是最伟大的可设想对象。高尼罗通过戏仿，提出完美岛屿的论证进行批评，认为这会迫使任何完美事物都存在。安瑟伦回应说，该论证只适用于必然存在者而非偶然的岛屿。笛卡尔基于上帝的完美性提出了不同的本体论论证：存在是一种完美，故最完美的存在必须具有存在性。康德的反对是奠基性的：存在不是实在的谓词，它并不给事物的概念增加内容；谓词必须说明事物是什么，而“存在”只是设定它。马尔科姆和普兰丁格的现代形式使用模态逻辑（可能世界）论证一个极大伟大的存在者存在于每一个可能世界中。请评估仅凭逻辑能否证明现实事物的论断。

3. Teleological (Design) Arguments | 目的论（设计）论证

Teleological arguments infer an intelligent designer from the apparent order, purpose, and complexity in the natural world. Paley’s watchmaker analogy argues that if you find a watch on a heath, its intricate parts working together for a purpose lead you to infer a watchmaker; analogously, the complexity of nature implies a divine designer. Hume’s criticisms, presented in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, are devastating: the universe is not sufficiently like a machine to permit the analogy; even if it were, the designer may not be the God of classical theism (it could be a team, an apprentice god, or a finite being); and the existence of evil and imperfection suggests a flawed design. Design arguments have taken modern forms with the fine-tuning argument: the fundamental constants of physics seem precisely calibrated to allow life. If any of these constants were slightly different, life could not exist. This points to either chance, necessity, or design. Swinburne’s probabilistic version uses Bayes’s theorem to argue that a designer makes the existence of a life-permitting universe more probable. Critics invoke the anthropic principle and the possibility of a multiverse to explain fine-tuning without God. Evaluation requires balancing explanatory power against ontological simplicity.

目的论论证从自然世界显见的秩序、目的和复杂性中推断出一位理智的设计者。佩利的钟表匠类比认为，如果你在荒野中发现一只表，其精密部件为某一目的协同工作，你会推断出钟表匠的存在；类似地，自然的复杂性意味着一位神圣的设计者。休谟在《自然宗教对话录》中提出的批评是毁灭性的：宇宙并不足够像一台机器以允许这种类比；即便像，设计者也可能不是古典有神论的上帝（它可能是一个团队、学徒神或有限存在者）；而恶与不完美的存在则暗示了设计的瑕疵。设计论证在现代取得了精调宇宙论的形式：物理学的基本常数似乎被精确校准以允许生命存在。若任何一个常数稍有不同，生命便不可能。这指向了偶然性、必然性或设计。斯温伯恩使用贝叶斯定理的概率版本论证说，一位设计者使得容许生命的宇宙更有可能存在。批评者援引人择原理与多重宇宙的可能性，无需上帝便可解释精调。评价需要在解释力与本体论简洁性之间权衡。

4. Cosmological Arguments | 宇宙论论证

Cosmological arguments appeal to the existence of the universe itself, seeking an ultimate explanation. Aquinas’s ‘Five Ways’ include arguments from motion and causation. The uncaused cause argument begins with the observation that some things undergo change. Whatever changes is moved by another, but this chain cannot go back to infinity because then there would be no first mover and consequently no subsequent motion. There must be a first unmoved mover, which is God. The Kalam cosmological argument, developed by al‑Ghazāli and defended by William Lane Craig, argues: everything that begins to exist has a cause; the universe began to exist; therefore the universe has a cause. This cause is identified as a personal creator with properties like timelessness and immateriality. Hume and Russell famously denied that the universe as a whole requires a cause: just because each part has a cause does not mean the totality does (fallacy of composition). Hume also challenged the principle of sufficient reason: we can conceive of something coming into existence without a cause. Aquinas’s reliance on the impossibility of an infinite regress is questioned by the possibility of an actually infinite series in mathematics. Modern cosmology (Big Bang theory) supports a beginning but does not necessarily entail a theistic cause. A successful answer must weigh these objections carefully.

宇宙论论证诉诸宇宙本身的存在，寻求最终的说明。阿奎那的“五路”包括从运动和因果性出发的论证。不被推动的推动者论证始于观察：有些事物经历变化。凡变化者皆被他者推动，但这一链条无法无限回溯，否则就不会有第一推动者，从而也就没有任何后继运动。故必存在一个不被推动的第一推动者，即上帝。卡拉姆宇宙论论证由安萨里发展、威廉·莱恩·克雷格辩护，认为：一切开始存在的事物都有其原因；宇宙开始存在；因此宇宙有一个原因。这个原因被认定为具有无时间性、非物质性等属性的位格造物主。休谟和罗素著名地否定了宇宙整体需要一个原因的说法：部分各有原因不等于整体也有原因（合成谬误）。休谟还挑战了充足理由律：我们可以设想某物没有原因而开始存在。阿奎那对无限回溯不可能性的依赖受到数学中实际无限序列可能性的质疑。现代宇宙学（大爆炸理论）支持宇宙的开端，但并不必然蕴含有神论的原因。成功的答题需要仔细权衡这些反对意见。

5. The Logical and Evidential Problem of Evil | 逻辑与证据的恶的问题

The problem of evil is arguably the strongest objection to the existence of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God. The logical problem, formulated by Mackie, asserts an inconsistency: if God is all‑powerful, He can eliminate evil; if all‑good, He would want to; but evil exists. Therefore such a God does not exist. Plantinga’s free will defence aims to show compatibility: it is logically possible that a world containing free creatures who freely choose good has greater value than a world of automatons, and even an omnipotent God cannot guarantee that free creatures never choose evil without removing their freedom. This defence does not require that our world be the best possible, only that God’s existence and evil are not logically contradictory. The evidential problem, pressed by Rowe, accepts logical compatibility but argues that the sheer amount and distribution of gratuitous evil makes God’s existence unlikely. Examples include the suffering of innocent children and animal pain before human sin. Hick’s soul‑making theodicy offers a developmental picture: evil and suffering are necessary for moral and spiritual growth; the world is a ‘vale of soul‑making’. Critics argue this does not justify the intensity or apparent pointlessness of some suffering. Another response is sceptical theism: our cognitive limitations mean we cannot fathom God’s reasons for permitting specific evils. Debate centres on whether the evidence counts decisively against divine existence.

恶的问题可以说是反对全能全善上帝存在的最强有力反驳。麦基提出的逻辑问题断言了不一致性：若上帝全知全能，祂就能消除恶；若全善，祂就会想要消除恶；但恶存在，故这样的上帝不存在。普兰丁格的自由意志辩护旨在展示其可兼容性：逻辑上可能的是，一个拥有能够自由选择善的受造物的世界比自动机器的世界更有价值，而即便是全能的上帝也无法确保自由受造物永不选择恶，除非取消其自由。此辩护不要求我们的世界是最佳可能世界，只要求上帝的存在与恶不构成逻辑矛盾。罗维强调的证据恶的问题接受逻辑的兼容性，但认为毫无意义的恶的数量与分布使得上帝的存在极不可能。例子包括无辜儿童的苦难和人类犯罪之前的动物痛苦。希克的灵魂锻造神义论提供了一种成长图景：恶与苦难对于道德和灵性成长是必要的，世界是“灵魂塑造之谷”。批评者认为这无法为某些苦难的强度或显见的无意义性辩护。另一个回应是怀疑论有神论：我们认知的局限意味着我们无法参透上帝允许特定恶的理由。争论焦点在于证据是否决定性地不利于神圣存在。

6. Religious Language: Cognitivism and Non‑cognitivism | 宗教语言：认知主义与非认知主义

If God is transcendent, how can human language meaningfully refer to God? The verification principle, championed by Ayer, holds that a statement is meaningful only if it is analytically true by definition or empirically verifiable. Since religious claims are neither, they are not false but literally meaningless – they express emotion or attitude. Flew applied falsification: a statement like ‘God loves us’ dies the death of a thousand qualifications unless we can say what would count against it. Non‑cognitivist accounts include Randall’s view that religious language functions symbolically, performing a unique job of evoking feelings, binding communities, and stimulating moral action. Hick’s eschatological verificationism proposes that religious claims will be verified after death, preserving factual meaningfulness. Analogy and symbol: Aquinas argued that terms like ‘good’ apply to God analogically, not univocally or equivocally. We can scale up creaturely goodness without falling into anthropomorphism. Tillich held that religious language is symbolic; symbols participate in the reality they point to and open up levels of reality otherwise closed to us. Wittgenstein’s language game theory portrays religion as a distinct form of life with its own internal criteria of meaning; the believer’s utterances are not hypotheses but expressions of a religious attitude. Critically assess whether these strategies rescue religious discourse from meaninglessness.

如果上帝是超越的，人类语言如何能够有意义地指称上帝？由艾耶尔倡导的可证实原则认为，一个陈述只有在下述情况下才有意义：它在分析上为真（根据定义为真），或可被经验证实。由于宗教断言两者皆非，它们不是假的，而是字面上无意义的——它们表达了情感或态度。弗卢运用了证伪性：诸如“上帝爱我们”这样的陈述，除非我们能说出什么将构成对它的反对，否则就会死于一千次限定。非认知主义解释包括兰德尔的观点，即宗教语言象征性地发挥作用，执行引发感情、凝聚社群和激发道德行动的特殊任务。希克的末世论可证实主义提出，宗教断言将在死后得到证实，从而保留事实意义上的意义。类比与象征：阿奎那论证说，“善”之类的词类比地应用于上帝，既非单义也非歧义。我们可以按比例放大受造物的善性，而不陷入拟人论。田立克认为宗教语言是象征性的；象征参与其所指涉的实在，并开启否则向我们关闭的实在层次。维特根斯坦的语言游戏理论将宗教描绘为一种独特的生活形式，具有自身内部的意义标准；信徒的话语不是假说，而是宗教态度的表达。批判性地评估这些策略是否将宗教言论从无意义中拯救出来。

7. Substance Dualism | 实体二元论

In the metaphysics of mind, substance dualism claims that mind and body are two distinct substances: mental substance is non‑spatial and conscious, while physical substance is extended in space and governed by mechanical laws. Descartes’s conceivability argument proceeds: I can clearly and distinctly conceive of my mind existing without my body; if I can conceive of A without B, then A and B are distinct; therefore mind and body are distinct substances. The divisibility argument adds that body is divisible into parts, but the mind is indivisible, so they must be different. Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia raised the interaction problem: how can an unextended mental substance causally affect an extended physical body? Descartes suggested the pineal gland as a meeting point, but this merely relocates the mystery. Dualism also faces the problem of other minds: if I only ever observe physical behaviour, how can I know others have minds? The argument from analogy (Mill) infers similar mental states from similar behaviour, but this is a weak inductive link. Challenges to dualism include empirical dependence of mind on brain (Phineas Gage) and the simplicity principle of Ockham’s razor. Nevertheless, the appeal to first‑person perspective and qualia keeps dualism alive in philosophy of mind.

在心灵哲学中，实体二元论主张心灵和身体是两种不同的实体：心灵实体是非空间性的、有意识的，而物理实体在空间中延伸并受机械法则支配。笛卡尔的可设想性论证如下：我能清楚分明地设想我的心灵没有身体而存在；如果我能设想A没有B，那么A与B是不同的；因此心灵和身体是不同的实体。可分性论证补充说，身体可分割为部分，但心灵不可分割，故它们必然不同。波西米亚的伊丽莎白公主提出了交互作用问题：一个无广延的心灵实体如何能因果地影响一个有广延的物理身体？笛卡尔提出松果腺作为接触点，但这只是重新定位了谜团。二元论还面临他心问题：如果我只能观察到物理行为，我如何知道他人拥有心灵？类比论证（密尔）通过类似的行为推断类似的心理状态，但这是一种薄弱的归纳联系。对二元论的挑战包括心灵对大脑的经验依赖性（菲尼亚斯·盖奇案例）以及奥卡姆剃刀的简单性原则。然而，对第一人称视角和感受质的诉诸使得二元论在心灵哲学中依然存在。

8. Physicalism: Behaviourism and Identity Theory | 物理主义：行为主义与同一论

Physicalism maintains that mental states are not separate substances but are in some way identical with or reducible to physical states. Philosophical behaviourism (also called analytical behaviourism) analyses mental concepts in terms of behaviour and behavioural dispositions. Hempel’s ‘hard’ behaviourism translates sentences about mental states into conditional statements about observable behaviour, so ‘Sam feels thirst’ becomes equivalent to a set of conditionals about drinking responses under certain stimuli. Ryle’s category mistake argument suggests dualism mistakenly treats the mind as a ‘ghost in the machine’ when mental terms refer to ways of acting. Objections: behaviourism cannot account for mental states that produce no behaviour (perfect actor, paralysed person) and ignores the qualitative feel—the ‘what‑it‑is‑likeness’. The mind‑brain identity theory (Smart, Place) asserts that mental states are numerically identical to brain states: pain just is C‑fibre firing. It is a contingent identity, discovered empirically, like lightning being an electrical discharge. Identity theory respects scientific reduction but faces the objection of multiple realisability: the same mental state (pain) can be realised by different neural structures across species, and even by silicon‑based systems. Putnam’s argument led many to abandon strict identity for functionalism. Identity theorists reply with species‑specific identities or token identity. Evaluate which physicalist approach best accommodates mental causation and qualia.

物理主义主张，心理状态并非独立的实体，而是以某种方式与物理状态同一或可还原为物理状态。哲学行为主义（亦称分析行为主义）用行为和行为的倾向来分析心理概念。亨普尔的“强硬”行为主义将关于心理状态的句子翻译成关于可观察行为的条件句，因此“山姆感到口渴”等同于一组在某些刺激下饮水反应的条件句。莱尔的范畴错误论证指出，二元论错误地将心灵视为“机器中的幽灵”，而心理词语指涉的是行为方式。反驳：行为主义无法解释那些不产生行为的心理状态（完美的演员、瘫痪者），也忽视了质的感受——“像什么”的性质。心脑同一论（斯马特、普莱斯）断言心理状态在数量上等同于脑状态：疼痛就是C纤维的激发。这是一种偶然的同一性，由经验发现，如同闪电是放电现象。同一论尊重科学还原，但面临多重可实现性的反对：相同的心理状态（疼痛）可以在不同物种中由不同的神经结构实现，甚至可以在硅基系统中实现。普特南的论证使许多人从严格的同一论转向功能主义。同一论者通过物种特定的同一性或个例同一性来回应。评估哪种物理主义进路最能容纳心理因果性和感受质。

9. Functionalism | 功能主义

Functionalism defines mental states not by their internal constitution but by their causal roles: the relations between sensory inputs, other mental states, and behavioural outputs. Armstrong’s causal functionalism treats a mental state as the state apt to be caused by certain stimuli and apt to cause certain behaviours. Putnam’s machine functionalism likens the mind to a Turing machine: mental states are functional states of a computational system, multiply realisable in different hardware. The key strength is that mental states can survive changes in substrate, making artificial intelligence conceptually possible. Functionalism nicely accounts for the causal efficacy of the mental and avoids the chauvinism of identity theory. However, it faces the problem of qualia: the inverted spectrum thought experiment suggests two people could have inverted colour experiences while all functional relations remain the same, so functionalism leaves out the subjective quality. The absent qualia (zombie) argument contends that a system could be functionally identical to a conscious being yet lack consciousness, meaning functionalism fails to capture what it is like. Lewis’s response using the ability hypothesis or differing on the nature of qualia appeases some but not all. The knowledge argument (Mary the colour scientist) powerfully illustrates that complete physical/functional knowledge can leave out something essential if subjective experience is not thereby known. Evaluate how far functionalism gives a satisfactory account of mind.

功能主义不是通过内在构成，而是通过因果角色来定义心理状态：感官输入、其他心理状态和行为输出之间的关系。阿姆斯特朗的因果功能主义将心理状态视为倾向于由某些刺激引起并引致某些行为的状态。普特南的机器功能主义将心灵比作图灵机：心理状态是计算系统的功能状态，可在不同硬件上多重实现。关键优点是心理状态可以在基底改变后存活，使得人工智能在概念上成为可能。功能主义合理解释了心理的因果作用，并避免了同一论的沙文主义。然而，它面临感受质问题：颠倒光谱思想实验表明，两个人可以有颠倒的颜色经验，而所有功能关系保持不变，因此功能主义遗漏了主观性质。缺席感受质（僵尸）论证主张，一个系统可以在功能上等同于有意识的存在却不具有意识，这意味着功能主义未能捕捉“像什么样”的特征。刘易斯用能力假说或对感受质的不同理解所做的回应使部分人信服，但并非全部。玛丽颜色科学家的知识论证有力地表明，如果主观经验并未因此被知晓，那么完整的物理/功能知识仍可能遗漏本质性的东西。评估功能主义在多大程度上给出了令人满意的心灵说明。

10. Eliminative Materialism | 取消式唯物主义

Eliminative materialism (Churchland, Stich) takes a more radical view: our common‑sense psychological framework—folk psychology—is a deeply flawed theory that will be eliminated, not reduced, by mature neuroscience. Concepts like belief, desire, and pain belong to a primitive theory that fails to explain mental illness, sleep, memory, and learning in a systematic way. Just as phlogiston was eliminated from chemistry, propositional attitudes might be discarded. Churchland argues that folk psychology shows stagnation and explanatory failure, so we should expect it to go the way of demonology. The strongest objection is self‑refutation: if there are no beliefs, the claim ‘there are no beliefs’ cannot itself be believed. Eliminativists must interpret their own assertions non‑cognitively or as proto‑scientific postulates. Another difficulty is that folk psychology works extremely efficiently in everyday life, making its elimination highly counter‑intuitive. Responses draw on the possibility that a future neuroscience will so transform our understanding that we no longer need the old vocabulary. The debate hinges on whether the incorrigibility of first‑person awareness can survive the progress of science. AQA questions often ask you to compare eliminativism with functionalism or dualism on how well they explain subjectivity.

取消式唯物主义（丘奇兰德、斯蒂奇）采取更为激进的观点：我们常识的心理学框架——民间心理学——是一个有严重缺陷的理论，将被成熟的神经科学所取消，而非被还原。诸如信念、欲望、疼痛等概念属于一种原始的理论，它未能系统性地解释精神疾病、睡眠、记忆和学习。正如燃素从化学中被消除一样，命题态度也可能被弃置。丘奇兰德认为民间心理学显示出停滞和解释上的失败，因此我们应该预期它会走鬼神论的老路。最有力的反对是自我反驳：如果没有信念，那么“没有信念”这一断言自身就无法被相信。取消式唯物主义者必须将自身的断言解释为非认知性的或作为前科学的设定。另一个困难在于民间心理学在日常生活中极其高效，取消它高度反直觉。回应者则指出，未来的神经科学可能如此彻底地改变我们的理解，以至于我们不再需要旧的词汇。争论的焦点在于，第一人称觉知的不可纠正性能否在科学进步中存活。AQA 的问题经常要求你比较取消式唯物主义与功能主义或二元论在解释主观性方面的优劣。

11. Property Dualism and Qualia | 属性二元论与感受质

Property dualism concedes that there is only one substance (the physical) but holds that mental properties are non‑physical, emergent properties of complex brain processes. Chalmers’s zombie argument is central: a zombie is a molecule‑by‑molecule duplicate of a conscious human, but lacks phenomenal consciousness; zombie worlds are conceivable, which implies that consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical. Therefore physicalism is false. Chalmers proposes a dualism of properties: phenomenal properties are basic, irreducible aspects of the world, perhaps linked to information. Jackson’s knowledge argument (Mary) supports property dualism by showing that physical facts are not all the facts. The explanatory gap argument (Levine) holds that even if we find neural correlates of consciousness, we still cannot explain why these physical processes are accompanied by subjective experience. Property dualists often embrace epiphenomenalism (qualia have no causal power) or interactionist versions, facing the issue of mental causation. Criticisms include the charge that emergentism is mysterious and that positing irreducible phenomenal properties goes against the unity of science. Physicalists reply that conceivability does not entail possibility and that the knowledge argument merely trades on different modes of presentation. Evaluate how successfully property dualism preserves the reality of consciousness without abandoning a scientific worldview.

属性二元论承认只有一种实体（物理的），但主张心理属性是复杂脑过程的非物理的涌现属性。查尔默斯的僵尸论证是核心：一个僵尸在分子层面上与有意识的人类完全相同，但却缺乏现象意识；僵尸世界是可设想的，这意味着意识在逻辑上并不随附于物理，因此物理主义为假。查尔默斯提出了一种属性的二元论：现象属性是世界的基本的、不可还原的侧面，或许与信息相联。杰克逊的知识论证（玛丽）通过表明物理事实并非全部事实来支持属性二元论。解释鸿沟论证（莱文）认为，即使我们找到意识的相关神经物，我们仍无法解释为什么这些物理过程会伴有主观体验。属性二元论者通常接受副现象论（感受质没有因果力）或交互作用论的版本，从而面临心理因果性问题。批评包括：涌现主义是神秘的，确立不可还原的现象属性违背了科学的统一性。物理主义者回应说，可设想性并不蕴含可能性，知识论证仅仅是利用了不同的呈现模式。评估属性二元论在保留意识现实性而不放弃科学世界观方面的成功程度。

12. The Problem of Other Minds | 他心问题

The problem of other minds asks how we can justify the belief that other people have conscious experiences similar to our own. This is especially acute for substance dualists, who cannot directly observe others’ mental states. The argument from analogy (Mill) suggests we infer from our own case: I wince and feel pain; others wince; therefore they probably feel pain. Russell and others highlight the weakness: an inference from one instance (my own) is a very poor induction. Wittgenstein’s private language argument challenges the very model of drawing conclusions from one’s own case: the idea of a private sensation is incoherent because language requires public criteria. For Wittgenstein, mental states are not hidden inner objects; they are expressed in behaviour and understood within a shared form of life. Behaviourism thus provides a direct answer: mental states are not problematic because they are nothing over and above behavioural dispositions. The existence of other minds is as unproblematic as the existence of dispositions. However, the qualia objection returns: behaviourism cannot capture the felt quality. A physicalist identity theorist can argue that other minds are known by inference to the best explanation: the hypothesis that others have similar brains producing similar consciousness best explains their complex behaviour. Nagel’s bat argument reminds us of the subjective character of experience, but does not entail scepticism. Weigh these approaches in terms of their ability to secure our ordinary conviction that other minds exist.

他心问题追问我们如何能证成“他人拥有与我类似的意识经验”这一信念。这对实体二元论者尤为尖锐，因为他们无法直接观察他人的心理状态。类比论证（密尔）建议从自身实例进行推断：我皱眉蹙额并感到疼痛；他人皱眉蹙额；故他们很可能感到疼痛。罗素等人强调其弱点：从单一实例（我自己）得出的推断是极为贫弱的归纳。维特根斯坦的私人语言论证挑战了从自身实例下结论的整个模型：私人感觉的观念是不融贯的，因为语言要求公共的标准。对维特根斯坦而言，心理状态不是隐藏的内在对象；它们在行为中得到表达，并在共享的生活形式中被理解。行为主义由此给出了直接的回答：心理状态不成问题，因为它们无非就是行为倾向。他心的存在就像倾向的存在一样不成问题。然而，感受质的反驳再度出现：行为主义无法捕捉感受的性质。物理主义的同一论者可以论证说，他心是通过最佳解释的推理而得知的：他人拥有类似的大脑并产生类似的意识这一假说，最能说明他们复杂的行为。内格尔的蝙蝠论证提醒我们经验的主观特征，但并不意味着怀疑论。根据这些进路维系我们“他心存在”这一日常信念的能力来权衡它们。

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Core Knowledge for Year 13 AQA Philosophy | 核心知识点梳理