📚 Year 13 CIE Philosophy: Case Study Practical Exercises | CIE 哲学案例分析实战演练
This article provides a structured set of case study exercises designed for Year 13 students preparing for the CIE A Level Philosophy examination. It demonstrates how to deconstruct philosophical problems, identify relevant theories, construct balanced arguments, and reach well-reasoned conclusions. Each section presents a concrete scenario followed by guided analysis prompts, mirroring the style of exam questions and helping you develop the critical skills necessary for high-band answers.
本文为准备 CIE 高级程度哲学科目考试的中五中六学生，提供一套有组织的案例分析练习。文中展示如何解构哲学问题、识别相关理论、构建正反论据，并得出有理有据的结论。每个小节呈现一个具体情境，然后附上引导性问题与分析提示，模拟考试题目风格，帮助考生培养获取高分所必需的关键能力。
1. Ethical Dilemma: The Runaway Trolley and Double Effect | 伦理两难：失控电车与双重效应
A runaway trolley is heading toward five workers who will be killed if it continues on its path. You are standing next to a lever that can divert the trolley onto a side track where one worker is standing. Would you pull the lever? Now consider a variant: you are on a footbridge above the track, and the only way to save the five is to push a large man off the bridge onto the track to stop the trolley. Are the two cases morally equivalent? Apply Kantian ethics and utilitarianism to justify your reasoning.
一辆失控的电车正冲向五名工人，若不改道，五人必死。你站在一个能改变电车轨道的杠杆旁，侧轨上有一名工人。你会拉动杠杆吗？再设想另一个版本：你站在轨道上方的天桥上，唯一拯救五人的方法是将身边一个身材魁梧的人推下桥，以阻止电车。这两种情况在道德上等同吗？请运用康德伦理学与功利主义为你的推理提供理由。
- Key concepts: Act/omission distinction, doctrine of double effect, categorical imperative, principle of utility.
- 核心概念： 行动与不作为论、双重效应原则、绝对命令、功利原则。
Analysis prompt: Explain why deontologists argue that pushing the man is impermissible even though pulling the lever may be allowed. Discuss how a utilitarian would calculate the net happiness in each scenario and whether a rule-utilitarian would reach a different conclusion from an act-utilitarian.
分析提示： 解释为何义务论者认为推人下桥是不可允许的，而扳动杠杆却或许能被允许。讨论功利主义者如何计算每种情境下的净幸福，以及规则功利主义者是否会与行为功利主义者得出不同结论。
2. Epistemology: The Fake Barn County | 认识论：假谷仓乡
Henry is driving through a region where, unbeknownst to him, the locals have erected numerous papier-mâché barn facsimiles. Henry looks at one structure that happens to be the only genuine barn in the area and forms the belief ‘That is a barn.’ Does Henry know that it is a barn? Use the tripartite definition of knowledge and the Gettier problem to evaluate whether his belief counts as knowledge. Then explore how a reliabilist might analyse this case.
亨利驾车经过一个地区，他不知道当地人立起了许多纸糊的谷仓假货。亨利看到一座恰好是该地区唯一真正的谷仓，并形成了“那是谷仓”的信念。亨利是否知道那是谷仓？请运用知识的三元定义以及葛梯尔问题，评判他的信念是否算作知识。然后探讨可靠论者会如何分析这个案例。
- Theoretical tools: Justified true belief, Gettier cases, causal theory of knowledge, reliabilism, safety condition.
- 理论工具： 辩真信、葛梯尔案例、知识因果论、可靠论、安全性条件。
Analysis prompt: Show why Henry’s belief is true and justified yet seems not to count as knowledge. Contrast the ‘no false lemmas’ response with the virtue epistemology approach.
分析提示： 说明为何亨利的信念是真的且有理据的，但又似乎不算是知识。对比“无虚假前提”反驳与德行知识论的取径。
3. Mind and Body: The Brain in a Vat | 心身问题：缸中之脑
Suppose an evil scientist has removed your brain and placed it in a vat of nutrients, connecting it to a supercomputer that feeds you a perfectly coherent virtual reality. You have no way of detecting this situation from within your experience. Does this thought experiment support external-world scepticism? How might Putnam’s semantic externalism challenge the coherence of the ‘brain in a vat’ hypothesis?
假设一个邪恶科学家移除了你的大脑，放入营养缸中，并将其连接至一部向你输入完美连贯虚拟现实的超级计算机。你从自己的经验内部无法察觉这一状况。这个思想实验是否支持外部世界怀疑论？普特南的语义外在论如何挑战“缸中之脑”假设的自洽性？
- Key thinkers: Descartes, Putnam, Nozick.
- 主要思想家： 笛卡儿、普特南、诺齐克。
Analysis prompt: Reconstruct the sceptical argument (if I know P, then I know I am not a brain in a vat; I do not know the latter; therefore I do not know P). Then explain Putnam’s counterargument based on the claim that words like ‘vat’ and ‘brain’ would refer to different things in the vat-world, making the statement ‘I am a brain in a vat’ self-refuting when uttered by the envatted being.
分析提示： 重构怀疑论论证（若我知P，则我知自己不是缸中之脑；我不知后者，故我不知P）。然后解释普特南的反驳，其基于在缸中世界里“缸”和“脑”等词会指向不同事物，使得被缸养的存在者说出“我是缸中之脑”这陈述自相推翻。
4. Free Will: The Neurosurgeon’s Intervention | 自由意志：神经外科医生的介入
Claire is considering whether to accept a job offer in a distant city. Unbeknownst to her, a neurosurgeon has implanted a device that can activate her neural pathways. If the device detects that Claire is about to decide against the move, it will intervene and cause her to choose acceptance. In the event, Claire voluntarily decides to accept the offer, and the device remains inactive. Does Claire act freely? Evaluate the case using Frankfurt’s hierarchical mesh theory and the principle of alternate possibilities.
克莱尔正在考虑是否接受一个远方城市的工作机会。她不知道，一位神经外科医生在她脑内植入了一个可以激活神经通路的装置。如果该装置检测到克莱尔即将决定不接受调动，它就会介入并导致她选择接受。最终，克莱尔自愿决定接受，装置没有启动。克莱尔的行为是自由的吗？请运用法兰克福的层级契合理论和替代可能性原则进行评析。
- Concepts: Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP), Frankfurt counterexamples, compatibilism, deep self-view.
- 概念： 替代可能性原则（PAP）、法兰克福式反例、相容论、深层自我观。
Analysis prompt: Explain why Frankfurt denies that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise. Discuss whether Claire’s second-order volition is satisfied and whether her decision counts as autonomous despite the presence of the counterfactual intervener.
分析提示： 解释为何法兰克福否认道德责任要求有做他种行为的能力。讨论克莱尔的第二序决意是否得到满足，以及在存在反事实介入者的情况下，她的决定是否算作自主。
5. Political Philosophy: The Self-Imposed Prison | 政治哲学：自我强加的牢狱
A community of 500 people voluntarily enters a closed society governed by an absolute ruler who imposes severe restrictions on movement, speech, and personal relationships. All members gave explicit consent at the age of 21 after a full briefing, and the society remains open for anyone to leave at any time, though leaving means permanent exile. Analyse the legitimacy of this arrangement through the lens of Hobbes’s social contract theory and Mill’s harm principle. Does consent justify the curtailment of liberty even when the liberty to exit is preserved?
一个五百人的社群自愿进入一个由绝对统治者管治的封闭社会，统治者严格限制行动、言论和个人关系。所有成员在二十一岁那年，经过充分了解后给予了明确同意，而且社会对任何人在任何时候离开都保持开放，尽管离开意味着永久流放。请透过霍布斯的社会契约论和密尔的伤害原则，分析这一安排的正当性。即使保留了离开的自由，同意是否能证成对自由的剥夺？
- Connections: Hobbes’s sovereign authority, tacit vs. express consent, Mill’s liberty-limiting principles, Rousseau’s general will.
- 关联点： 霍布斯的最高权力、默认为与明确同意、密尔的自由限制原则、卢梭的公共意志。
Analysis prompt: Consider whether a contract can bind individuals who later change their minds. Weigh Mill’s argument that the individual is sovereign over his own body and mind against the idea that withdrawing consent is always an option, albeit with heavy costs.
分析提示： 考虑契约是否可以约束后来改变主意的人。权衡密尔关于个体对自己身心拥有主权的论点，与“撤回同意虽然代价沉重但总是一个选择”这想法之间的张力。
6. Philosophy of Religion: The Hidden Idol and Epistemic Distance | 宗教哲学：隐藏的偶像与认知距离
A deity creates a world with abundant evidence of design but deliberately plants misleading fossils and geological deposits that suggest the universe is billions of years old. The deity also remains hidden from human senses, expecting belief to be based on faith alone. A believer in this scenario claims a direct experiential relationship with the deity. Assess the epistemic rationality of this belief by applying Pascal’s wager, James’s will to believe, and the evidentialist objection. Is it intellectually virtuous to believe on insufficient evidence?
一位神祇创造了一个充满设计证据的世界，却故意布下误导性的化石与地质沉积物，暗示宇宙有数十亿年历史。神祇亦向人的感官隐藏自身，期望信仰仅基于信心。在此情境下，一个信徒宣称与神祇有直接的体验性关系。请运用帕斯卡的赌注、詹姆斯的相信意志及证据主义反驳，评价这个信念在知识论上的合理性。在证据不足的情况下相信，是否合乎理智德性？
- Arguments: Pascal’s wager, Clifford’s ethics of belief, James’s pragmatic justification, evidentialism, reformed epistemology.
- 论证： 帕斯卡的赌注、克里福德的信念伦理、詹姆斯的实用辩护、证据主义、改革宗知识论。
Analysis prompt: Distinguish between prudential, pragmatic, and epistemic reasons for belief. Discuss whether a hidden deity undermines the possibility of a genuine loving relationship, drawing on the concept of ‘epistemic distance’ used by John Hick.
分析提示： 区分信念的审慎理由、实用理由与认知理由。运用希克所用的“认知距离”概念，讨论一位隐藏的神祇是否会破坏建立真正爱的关系的可能性。
7. Metaethics: The Moral Twin-Earth | 元伦理学：道德孪生地球
Imagine a planet identical to Earth in all physical respects, but where the chemical formula for water is XYZ instead of H₂O. Now imagine a Moral Twin-Earth where people use moral terms with the same conceptual roles, but the natural properties that realise moral goodness are different. On Earth, goodness is realised by maximising pleasure; on Moral Twin-Earth, it is realised by fulfilling divine commands. Analyse the case to determine whether moral terms such as ‘good’ are rigid designators and what this implies for naturalistic moral realism.
设想一个在物理层面与地球完全相同的星球，但水的化学式是 XYZ 而非 H₂O。再设想一个道德孪生地球，那里的人使用道德词汇时概念角色相同，但实现道德善的自然属性却不同。在地球上，善由最大化快乐来实现；在道德孪生地球，则是由服从神圣命令来实现。分析这个案例以判断“善”这样的道德词语是否为严格指示词，以及这对自然主义道德实在论有何意涵。
- Metaethical positions: Naturalism, non-naturalism, error theory, expressivism. Key terms: rigid designation, open-question argument, synthetic identity.
- 元伦理学立场： 自然主义、非自然主义、错误论、表达主义。关键术语：严格指示、开放问题论证、综合同一性。
Analysis prompt: Use the Twin-Earth thought experiment to support or undermine the analogy between moral terms and natural-kind terms. Consider whether disagreement between Earth and Moral Twin-Earth speakers is genuine or merely verbal.
分析提示： 用孪生地球思想实验支持或质疑道德词语与自然种类词的类比。考虑地球与道德孪生地球说话者之间的分歧是真正的分歧还是仅属言辞之争。
8. Aesthetics: The Forged Masterpiece | 美学：伪造的杰作
An art museum displays a painting attributed to Rembrandt that receives wide critical acclaim for its composition, emotional depth, and technique. Later, scientific analysis reveals the painting is a brilliant modern forgery, physically identical to an unknown Rembrandt original that was destroyed. Critics now claim the painting is aesthetically inferior. Is this revision of judgement rationally defensible? Evaluate the role of origin, authenticity, and artistic intention by drawing on aesthetic formalism, expressionism, and institutional theories of art.
一间美术馆展出一幅被归属于伦勃朗的画作，因其构图、情感深度和技巧而广受赞誉。后来科学分析揭示，这幅画是一幅出色的现代赝品，在物理上与一幅已遭销毁的不知名伦勃朗真迹完全相同。此刻，评家声称这幅画的审美价值较低。这种评价的修正是否有理据？请运用美学形式主义、表现主义与艺术体制论，评价作品来源、真伪与艺术意图的作用。
- Theories: Bell’s significant form, Collingwood’s expression theory, Danto’s artworld, Dickie’s institutional theory.
- 理论： 贝尔的有意味形式、柯林武德的表现说、丹托的艺术界、迪基的体制论。
Analysis prompt: Present the argument that aesthetic value supervenes solely on perceptual properties versus the argument that historical properties can influence aesthetic judgement. Relate the problem to the concept of ‘imaginative seeing’ and the difference between artistic evaluation and mere craft appreciation.
分析提示： 呈现审美价值纯然依随于感知属性的论点，与历史属性可影响审美判断的论点。将问题关联至“想象式观看”概念，以及艺术评价与单纯工艺欣赏的区别。
9. Personal Identity: The Teletransporter Malfunction | 人格同一性：远距传输器故障
A teletransporter scans your body, destroys it, and creates an exact replica on Mars using local matter. One day, the device malfunctions: it creates the replica on Mars but fails to destroy your original body. Now there are two individuals with equal claim to be you, both psychologically continuous with your pre-transport self. Apply the psychological continuity theory, the biological continuity theory, and the no-self view (Bundle theory) to determine which, if any, of the two is identical to you.
一部远距传输器扫描你的身体，加以销毁，并用火星当地的物质制造出一个精确复制品。某天，装置发生故障：它在火星上制造了复制品，却没有销毁你的原初身体。现在有两个个体同等地声称是你，两者皆与传输前的你在心理上相连续。请运用心理连续性理论、生物连续性理论以及无我观（束论），判断两者中谁（如果存在）与你同一。
- Key theories: Lockean memory criterion, Parfit’s reductionism, Williams’s body-swap critique, Olson’s animalism.
- 关键理论： 洛克式记忆判准、帕菲特化约论、威廉斯的换体批判、奥尔森的动物论。
Analysis prompt: Discuss whether identity can be one-to-many and the implications of fission cases for the prudential concern we have for our future selves. Contrast the view that survival is a matter of degree with the view that identity is all-or-nothing.
分析提示： 讨论同一性是否可以是一对多的，以及分裂案例对我们关心自己未来自我的生命利益关切有何影响。对比存活是个程度问题之观点与同一性是非此即彼之观点。
10. Philosophy of Science: The Pessimistic Meta-Induction | 科学哲学：悲观元归纳
Case: Newtonian mechanics was empirically successful for over two centuries yet was replaced by Einstein’s general relativity, which asserts that Newton’s central concepts (absolute space, instantaneous action at a distance) are false. By analogy, we have reason to believe that our current best theories will also be replaced. Analyse this pessimistic meta-induction as a challenge to scientific realism. Then construct a response using structural realism and the ‘no miracles’ argument.
案例：牛顿力学在两个多世纪里取得经验成功，却被爱因斯坦的广义相对论所取代，后者断言牛顿的核心概念（绝对空间、超距作用）是错的。依此类推，我们有理由相信当前最好的理论将来也会被取代。请分析这种悲观元归纳对科学实在论的挑战。然后利用结构实在论和“无奇迹”论证，构建一个回应。
- Positions: Scientific realism, instrumentalism, constructive empiricism, entity realism, structural realism.
- 立场： 科学实在论、工具主义、建构经验论、实体实在论、结构实在论。
Analysis prompt: Distinguish between the claim that current theories are strictly true and the claim that they successfully refer to unobservable entities. Use the example of Fresnel’s wave optics to illustrate how a theory can be radically false in its ontology yet preserve structural continuity.
分析提示： 区分“当前理论在严格意义上是真的”与“它们成功指涉不可观察实体”这两种论断。用菲涅耳波动光学的例子，说明一个理论在存有论上如何可能完全错误，却能保留结构上的连续性。
11. Metaethics: The Open Question Argument | 元伦理学：开放问题论证
Case: A philosopher claims that ‘good’ means ‘what is approved by the majority’ in the same way that ‘water’ means H₂O. A critic replies that it is always an open question whether something approved by the majority is good, whereas it is not an open question whether water is H₂O. Using Moore’s open question argument, analyse whether moral terms can be synonymous with natural properties. Assess the naturalist’s reply that the identity, though not a priori, can be a necessary synthetic truth.
案例：一位哲学家声称“善”意指“多数人所称许的”，正如“水”意指 H₂O 一样。一位批评者回应说，“为多数人称许的东西是否好”总是开放的，而“水是否为 H₂O”却不是开放问题。请运用摩尔的开放问题论证，分析道德词语能否与自然属性同义。评析自然主义者如下回应：这个同一性虽非先验的，却可以是必然的综合真理。
- Concepts: Analytic/synthetic distinction, necessary a posteriori, naturalistic fallacy, semantic naturalism, Cornell realism.
- 概念： 分析/综合区分、后验必然、自然主义谬误、语义自然主义、康奈尔实在论。
Analysis prompt: Explain why Moore thinks the open question shows that ‘good’ is simple and non-natural. Then apply the Kripke-Putnam theory of reference for natural-kind terms to moral properties. Conclude by evaluating whether moral explanations can be integrated into a naturalistic worldview without losing normativity.
分析提示： 解释为何摩尔认为开放问题显示“善”是简单且非自然的。然后将克里普克-普特南的自然种类词指称理论应用于道德属性。最后评价道德解释能否在不丧失规范性的前提下融入自然主义世界观。
12. The Meaning of Life: Sisyphus’s Choice | 人生意义：西西弗斯的选择
The gods condemn Sisyphus to roll a boulder up a hill, only for it to roll down each time he reaches the top, for all eternity. A re-imagining: the gods offer Sisyphus a drug that makes him forget his condition each day, so he experiences each ascent as a fresh, meaningful project. Should Sisyphus accept the drug? Use Camus’s absurdism, Taylor’s subjectivism, and Wolf’s fitting-fulfilment view to debate whether subjective engagement alone can confer meaning on an objectively futile activity.
诸神惩罚西西弗斯将巨石推上山，每当他到达山顶，巨石便滚回山下，如此永恒重复。重新想象：诸神给西西弗斯一种药物，能令他每天忘记自己的处境，从而将每次推石都体验为一次崭新而有意义的计划。西西弗斯应否接受此药？请运用卡缪的荒谬主义、泰勒的主观主义与沃尔夫的契合-完成观，辩论单凭主观投入能否赋予一件客观徒劳的活动以意义。
- Theories: Supernaturalism, objective naturalism, subjective naturalism, nihilism, hybrid theories of meaning.
- 理论： 超自然主义、客观自然主义、主观自然主义、虚无主义、意义混合论。
Analysis prompt: Argue for and against the view that self-deception undermines the meaningfulness of a life. Consider whether the perspective of the universe (the point of view of nowhere) should have any bearing on what makes an individual life meaningful.
分析提示： 为“自欺会损害生命的有意义性”此观点给出正反论证。思考宇宙视角（无处所的视点）是否应对个体生命有意义与否有任何影响。
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