Year 13 CIE Philosophy: Core Knowledge Review | CIE A-Level 哲学核心知识点梳理

📚 Year 13 CIE Philosophy: Core Knowledge Review | CIE A-Level 哲学核心知识点梳理

This article reviews the central topics, arguments, and key thinkers that appear in the CIE A-Level Philosophy specification (9696) at Year 13 (A2). It is designed to help students consolidate their understanding of epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of religion, ethics, and philosophy of mind. By working through the core knowledge in a structured way, you can strengthen your ability to evaluate arguments, compare theories, and construct well-supported essays under exam conditions.

本文梳理了 CIE A-Level 哲学（9696）Year 13（A2）阶段的核心主题、论证与关键思想家的观点，旨在帮助同学们巩固认识论、形而上学、宗教哲学、伦理学及心灵哲学等领域的知识。通过系统性地整理这些核心知识点，你可以更有效地评估论证、比较理论，并在考试中写出论据充分的文章。

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1. Epistemology: The Nature of Knowledge | 认识论：知识的本质

The traditional account of knowledge is justified true belief (JTB). According to this analysis, a subject S knows that P if and only if (i) P is true, (ii) S believes that P, and (iii) S is justified in believing that P. Plato’s Theaetetus is often cited as an early source of this tripartite definition, though Plato ultimately rejects it.

传统的知识定义是得到辩护的真信念（JTB）。根据这一分析，主体 S 知道命题 P，当且仅当 (i) P 为真，(ii) S 相信 P，且 (iii) S 对相信 P 拥有辩护。柏拉图的《泰阿泰德篇》常被引为这个三元定义的早期来源，尽管柏拉图本人最终否定了这一定义。

Edmund Gettier’s 1963 paper presented counterexamples that challenged the sufficiency of JTB. In a typical Gettier case, a person has a justified true belief but it seems incorrect to say that they know. For instance, Smith believes ‘the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket’ based on strong evidence about Jones, but unbeknownst to Smith, he himself gets the job and coincidentally also has ten coins. The belief is true and justified, yet we hesitate to call it knowledge.

埃德蒙·盖梯尔在1963年的论文中提出了反例，挑战了 JTB 作为知识的充分条件。在典型的盖梯尔案例中，一个人拥有得到辩护的真信念，但我们却不愿承认他是真的知道。例如，史密斯基于关于琼斯的强证据相信“那个将要得到工作的人口袋里装有十枚硬币”，但史密斯不知道的是，他自己获得了那份工作，且他口袋里恰好也有十枚硬币。这个信念既真又有辩护，但我们并不认为这构成了知识。

Responses to Gettier include adding a fourth condition, such as the ‘no false lemmas’ condition (the belief must not be inferred from any falsehood) or adopting a reliabilist account of justification. Reliabilism states that a belief is justified if it is produced by a reliable cognitive process, like perception or memory, where the process tends to yield true beliefs.

对盖梯尔问题的回应包括增添第四个条件，例如“无虚假前提”条件（信念不能从任何虚假信念中推导出来），或是采取可靠论的辩护观。可靠论认为，如果信念是由可靠的认知过程所产生的，那么它就是得到辩护的；所谓可靠的过程，如知觉或记忆，往往能产出真信念。

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2. Scepticism and Responses | 怀疑论及其回应

Philosophical scepticism questions whether we can have any knowledge of the external world. Global scepticism appeals to scenarios like Descartes’ evil demon or the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis to suggest that all our perceptual experiences could be indistinguishable from those generated by a deceptive source, leaving us without justification for our ordinary beliefs.

哲学怀疑论质疑我们对客观世界是否拥有任何知识。全域怀疑论借助笛卡尔的邪恶精灵或缸中之脑假说，表明我们的所有知觉经验可能都与由欺骗性源头产生的经验无法区分，这让我们对日常信念失去了辩护。

Descartes’ own response was to argue that a benevolent God would not systematically deceive him, and that clear and distinct perceptions are reliable. However, this response is often criticised for circularity, as it relies on God’s existence which Descartes attempts to prove through clear and distinct ideas.

笛卡尔本人的回应是论证一位仁慈的上帝不会系统性地欺骗他，并且清楚明晰的知觉是可靠的。然而，这个回应常被批评为循环论证，因为它依赖于上帝的存在，而笛卡尔正是试图通过清楚明晰的观念来证明上帝存在的。

Another influential response is found in G.E. Moore’s ‘Proof of an External World’ and his ‘Here is one hand’ argument. Moore claims that his belief in the existence of his hand is more certain than any sceptical premise, and that we are entitled to accept common-sense knowledge without needing to defeat every sceptical possibility. Contextualists, conversely, argue that ‘knows’ means different things in different contexts; in ordinary contexts sceptical scenarios are irrelevant.

另一个有影响力的回应是 G.E. 摩尔的“外部世界的证明”与他的“此处有一只手”的论证。摩尔宣称，他对于自己手存在的信念比任何怀疑论的前提都更为确定，我们有资格接受常识知识，而无需非得击败每一个怀疑论可能性。而语境主义者则主张，“知道”在不同语境下意义不同；在日常语境中，怀疑论情境并不相关。

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3. Perception: Direct Realism vs. Indirect Realism | 知觉：直接实在论与间接实在论

Direct realism claims that we perceive physical objects and their properties directly, without any intermediary. When you look at a tree, you are directly aware of the tree itself. This view is challenged by illusions (a straight stick appears bent in water) and hallucinations (seeing things that are not there), which suggest perception does not always match reality.

直接实在论声称，我们直接感知物理对象及其属性，而不经过任何中介。当你看一棵树时，你是直接意识到树本身。这种观点面临错觉（直棍在水中看起来是弯的）和幻觉（看到并不存在的东西）的挑战，它们暗示知觉并非总是与现实相符。

Indirect realism, associated with John Locke, holds that we perceive objects indirectly via sense-data, which are mental items that represent physical objects. Locke distinguished between primary qualities (shape, size, motion, solidity) that resemble objects as they are in themselves, and secondary qualities (colour, taste, sound) that are powers to produce ideas in us but do not resemble the objects.

约翰·洛克所主张的间接实在论认为，我们通过感觉材料（sense-data）间接地感知对象；感觉材料是代表物理对象的心理项目。洛克区分了第一性的质（形状、大小、运动、坚实性），它们与物体自身相似；以及第二性的质（颜色、味道、声音），它们是物体使我们产生观念的力，与物体本身并不相似。

Berkeley’s idealism rejects the distinction between primary and secondary qualities and denies the existence of mind-independent matter altogether. For Berkeley, to be is to be perceived (esse est percipi), and objects are collections of ideas in the mind. The regularity of our perceptions is sustained by God’s mind.

伯克莱的唯心论拒绝第一性的质与第二性的质的区分，并且完全否认心灵独立物质的存在。对伯克莱而言，存在即被感知（esse est percipi），对象不过是心灵中观念的集合。我们知觉的规律性由上帝的心灵维持。

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4. The Ontological Argument | 本体论论证

Anselm’s ontological argument defines God as ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’. He argues that if God exists only in the understanding, we can conceive of a greater being that exists both in the understanding and in reality. Therefore, to avoid contradiction, God must exist in reality. Gaunilo replied using the perfect island parody, claiming the same logic could prove the existence of a perfect lost island.

安瑟伦的本体论论证将上帝定义为“无法设想有比之更伟大之物”。他论证说，如果上帝仅存在于理智中，我们就能够设想一个既存在于理智中又存在于现实中的更伟大之物。因此，为了避免矛盾，上帝必须存在于现实中。高尼罗以“完美岛屿”的类比来回应，声称同样的逻辑可以证明一个完美失落岛的存在。

Descartes offered a different version based on the concept of a supremely perfect being. Existence is a perfection, just as having three angles is part of the essence of a triangle. Hence, a supremely perfect being necessarily exists. Kant’s famous objection is that existence is not a real predicate: it does not add anything to the concept of a thing but merely posits the thing itself.

笛卡尔提出了一个基于“至上完美存在”概念的版本。存在是一种完美性，就像拥有三个角是三角形本质的一部分一样。因此，至上完美的存在必定存在。康德著名的反驳在于，存在并非一个实在的谓词：它并不给事物的概念增加任何内容，而只是设定了该事物本身。

Contemporary supporter Alvin Plantinga formulates a modal ontological argument using possible worlds. He argues that a maximally excellent being (a being that is omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect) existing in all possible worlds is possible; if it is possible that such a being exists in every possible world, it follows that it exists in the actual world.

当代支持者阿尔文·普兰丁格使用可能世界表述了一个模态版本的本体论论证。他论证说，一个在一切可能世界中存在的极大卓越存在（全能、全知且道德完美）是可能的；如果这样一个存在于每一个可能世界中的存在是可能的，那么它实际上也存在于现实世界之中。

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5. The Problem of Evil | 恶的问题

The logical problem of evil, articulated by J.L. Mackie, asserts an inconsistent triad: God is omnipotent, God is wholly good, and yet evil exists. If any two of these are true, the third must be false. The traditional free will defence argues that moral evil arises from creaturely free will, and that it is logically impossible for God to create free beings who are guaranteed always to do good.

J.L. 麦基所阐述的逻辑上的恶之问题断言了一个不一致的三元组：上帝全能，上帝全善，然而恶却存在。如果其中任何两者为真，第三者便必为假。传统的自由意志辩护主张，道德之恶源于受造物的自由意志，并且上帝不可能在逻辑上创造出被保证永远行善的自由存在。

The evidential problem of evil focuses on the sheer amount and distribution of suffering, particularly gratuitous or pointless suffering. William Rowe’s example of a fawn dying in pain in a forest fire, unseen by anyone, seems to serve no greater purpose. The evidential argument concludes that, given such apparently pointless suffering, it is more likely that God does not exist.

证据性的恶之问题关注痛苦的数量与分布，尤其是那些无端的或无意义的痛苦。威廉·罗引用的例子是一只在森林大火中痛苦死去且无人看见的幼鹿，这似乎毫无更高的目的。证据性论证的结论是，考虑到这些显然无意义的苦难，上帝更有可能不存在。

Theodicies attempt to justify God’s permission of evil. Soul-making theodicy, developed by John Hick from Irenaeus, views earthly suffering as necessary for spiritual growth and moral development, enabling humans to freely choose to enter a loving relationship with God. Plantinga’s ‘O Felix Culpa’ theodicy suggests that some goods, such as the incarnation and atonement, require the existence of evil and sin.

神义论试图为上帝容许恶提供正当理由。由约翰·希克从爱任纽的思想发展出的灵魂锻造神义论，将尘世苦难视为灵性成长和道德发展的必要途径，使人得以自由选择进入与上帝的相爱关系。普兰丁格的“幸哉罪责”（O Felix Culpa）神义论则提出，某些善，如道成肉身与赎罪，需要恶与罪的存在。

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6. Metaethics: Cognitivism vs. Non-cognitivism | 元伦理学：认知主义与非认知主义

Cognitivism holds that moral judgements express beliefs that are truth-apt – they can be true or false. Naturalism claims that moral properties are natural properties, reducible to facts about pleasure, pain, or survival. G.E. Moore’s open question argument challenges naturalism by asking whether the property identified with ‘good’ (e.g., pleasure) is itself good, suggesting that ‘good’ is a simple, non-natural property. This leads to Moore’s intuitionism: we know moral truths through intuition.

认知主义认为，道德判断表达的是信念，这些信念具有真值——既可为其亦可为假。自然主义声称，道德属性是自然属性，可还原为关于快乐、痛苦或生存的事实。G.E. 摩尔的开放问题论证挑战自然主义，他追问与“善”等同的属性（如快乐）其本身是否就是善的，从而暗示“善”是一个简单的非自然属性。这导向了摩尔的直觉主义：我们通过直觉获知道德真理。

Non-cognitivism denies that moral judgements express beliefs. Emotivism, associated with A.J. Ayer, claims that moral statements like ‘Stealing is wrong’ merely express emotions of disapproval, equivalent to shouting ‘Boo to stealing!’. Prescriptivism, developed by R.M. Hare, argues that moral language is prescriptive and universalisable; saying ‘One ought to keep promises’ is to command that promise-keeping be done universally.

非认知主义否认道德判断表达信念。与 A.J. 艾耶尔相关的情绪主义声称，像“偷窃是错的”这样的道德陈述只是在表达不赞同的情绪，无异于喊出“偷窃，呸！” R.M. 黑尔所发展的规定主义则主张，道德语言具有规定性和可普遍化性；说“人应当遵守承诺”就是在发出一个命令，要求要普遍地遵守承诺。

Error theory, defended by J.L. Mackie, is cognitivist about the semantics but anti-realist about morality. Moral judgements indeed express beliefs, and they aim to describe objective moral properties, but all such beliefs are systematically false because objective moral properties do not exist. Mackie uses the argument from queerness and the argument from relativity to support this view.

J.L. 麦基所捍卫的错误理论在语义上属于认知主义，但在道德上持反实在论立场。道德判断确实表达信念，并试图描述客观的道德属性，但所有这些信念都是系统性地为假的，因为客观的道德属性根本就不存在。麦基通过怪异论证和相对性论证来支持这一观点。

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7. Normative Ethics: Utilitarianism, Deontology, Virtue Ethics | 规范伦理学：功利主义、义务论与美德伦理学

Classical utilitarianism, advanced by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, holds that the right action is the one that maximises utility – usually understood as pleasure or happiness. Bentham’s hedonic calculus weighs the intensity, duration, certainty, and extent of pleasures. Mill introduces higher and lower pleasures, arguing that intellectual pleasures are qualitatively superior to bodily pleasures.

古典功利主义由边沁和密尔提出，主张正确的行为就是能最大化功利——通常被理解为快乐或幸福——的行为。边沁的幸福微积分权衡快乐的强度、持续时间、确定性和广度等因素。密尔引入了高级快乐与低级快乐的区分，主张理智上的快乐在品质上优于身体上的快乐。

Kantian deontology holds that morality is grounded in reason and the categorical imperative. The Formula of Universal Law requires that one act only according to maxims that can be consistently willed as universal laws. The Formula of Humanity demands that we treat persons always as ends in themselves, never merely as means. Kant emphasises acting from duty, not merely in accordance with duty.

康德的义务论主张道德基于理性与定言命令。普遍法则公式要求，只按照你同时能够愿意其成为普遍法则的准则去行动。人性格言公式则要求，我们始终将人当作目的本身来对待，而绝不仅仅当作手段。康德强调出自义务而行动，而不仅仅是符合义务。

Aristotelian virtue ethics focuses on character and eudaimonia (flourishing). Virtues are character traits that enable a person to live well; they lie in a mean between extremes (e.g., courage is the mean between cowardice and rashness). Practical wisdom (phronesis) is required to discern the right action in specific circumstances. Modern virtue ethicists like Alasdair MacIntyre argue that virtues are developed within practices and traditions.

亚里士多德的美德伦理学聚焦于品格与 eudaimonia（人的繁盛）。美德是使人能够活得好的品性；它们存在于两极之间的中道之中（如勇敢就是怯懦与鲁莽之间的中道）。实践智慧（phronesis）是辨别具体情境下正确行为所必需的。当代美德伦理学家如麦金泰尔主张，美德是在实践和传统之中得以培养的。

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8. Free Will and Determinism | 自由意志与决定论

Hard determinism holds that every event, including human actions, is causally determined by prior events and the laws of nature. Since free will requires the ability to do otherwise, and this is incompatible with determinism, hard determinists conclude that free will is an illusion. B.F. Skinner’s psychological behaviourism is often cited as a form of hard determinism applied to human behaviour.

极端决定论主张，每一个事件——包括人类行为——都由先前事件和自然规律所因果决定。既然自由意志要求有能力做出不同选择，而这一点与决定论不相容，极端决定论者就得出结论说自由意志不过是一个幻象。斯金纳的心理行为主义常被引用为将极端决定论应用于人类行为的例子。

Libertarianism in the free will debate claims that determinism is false and that humans possess genuine free will, often grounded in agent causation or non-causal theories of action. Agent causation theory, associated with Thomas Reid and Roderick Chisholm, argues that a person, as a substance, can initiate causal chains without being determined to do so. This view faces the challenge of explaining how agent causation works without lapsing into randomness.

自由意志辩论中的自由意志论声称决定论是假的，人类拥有真正的自由意志，其基础常在于行为者因果性或者非因果的行为理论。与托马斯·里德和罗德里克·齐硕姆相关的行为者因果理论主张，人作为实体，能够无需被决定地启动因果链。这种观点面临的挑战是，如何解释行为者因果性的运作而不致滑入随机性。

Compatibilism (soft determinism) argues that free will is compatible with determinism. According to classical compatibilism, a free action is one that is caused by the agent’s own desires and beliefs, without external coercion. More sophisticated accounts, such as Harry Frankfurt’s hierarchical mesh theory, focus on whether second-order volitions (desires about desires) align with first-order desires. If an agent wholeheartedly identifies with a desire, they act freely.

相容论（温和决定论）主张，自由意志与决定论是相容的。按照古典相容论，自由的行为是由行为者自身的欲望和信念所导致且没有外部强制的行为。更精细的说明，如哈里·法兰克福的层级契合理论，聚焦于二阶意欲（关于欲望的欲望）是否与一阶欲望相契合。如果行为者全心全意地认同某个欲望，其行动就是自由的。

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9. The Mind-Body Problem | 心身问题

Substance dualism, most famously defended by Descartes, claims that mind and body are two distinct substances: the mind is a thinking, non-extended substance, while the body is an extended, non-thinking substance. The principal challenge for dualism is the interaction problem: how can an immaterial mind cause changes in a material body and vice versa?

笛卡尔最为著名的实体二元论声称，心灵与身体是两种不同的实体：心灵是非广延的、能思的实体，而身体是广延的、非能思的实体。二元论面临的主要挑战是交互作用问题：非物质的心灵如何引起物质身体的变化，反之亦然？

Property dualism accepts that there is only one substance (the physical), but holds that mental properties are non-physical and irreducible to brain states. Consciousness involves qualitative feels or ‘qualia’ (the what-it-is-like aspect of experience) that cannot be captured by physical descriptions. Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument, featuring the scientist Mary who knows all physical facts about colour yet learns something new upon seeing red, supports this view.

属性二元论承认只存在一种实体（物理实体），但坚持心理属性是非物理的，不可还原为脑状态。意识涉及质性感受，即“感受质”（经验之“如其所是”的面向），这是物理描述所无法捕捉的。弗兰克·杰克逊的知识论证——设想科学家玛丽知道所有关于颜色的物理事实，但当她走出黑白房间看见红色时仍学到了新东西——支持了这一观点。

Physicalist theories attempt to explain the mind entirely in physical terms. Behaviourism analyses mental states in terms of behavioural dispositions, while identity theory identifies mental states with brain states. Functionalism defines mental states by their causal roles, which can be realised by different physical systems (multiple realisability). Each position faces objections, such as the problem of qualia for functionalism and the multiple realisability objection against identity theory.

物理主义理论试图完全用物理术语解释心灵。行为主义将心理状态分析为行为倾向；同一论将心理状态等同于脑状态；功能主义则通过因果角色来定义心理状态，这些角色可以由不同的物理系统实现（多重可实现性）。各种立场都面临反例，例如功能主义面对感受质问题，而同一论则面对多重可实现性的反驳。

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10. Religious Language | 宗教语言

The problem of religious language stems from the apparent limitations of human language in talking about a transcendent God. The via negativa (apophatic way) suggests we can only speak of God in negative terms, saying what God is not. However, this yields very little positive knowledge and still relies on some positive concept of what would be denied.

宗教语言的问题源于人类语言在谈论超越的上帝时明显的局限性。否定之路（否证法）提出，我们只能用否定语词谈论上帝，说上帝不是什么。然而，这种方法所产生的正面知识极少，而且仍然依赖于某种被否定的正面概念。

Thomas Aquinas proposed analogical predication as a middle way between univocal and equivocal language. In analogy of attribution, a term is applied primarily to one thing and secondarily to another because of a causal relationship (bread is ‘healthy’ because it causes health in the body, while medicine is ‘healthy’ primarily). In analogy of proportional resemblance, the same quality exists in different things proportionally to their nature (God’s wisdom is to God as human wisdom is to humans).

托马斯·阿奎那提出了类比谓述作为单义语言与多义语言之间的中道。在归属性类比中，一个词项主要应用于一物，因因果关系而次要地应用于另一物（面包被称为“健康的”，因为它引发了身体的健康，而药物则是首要意义上的健康）。在比例相似性类比中，同一品质按照各自的本性在不同事物中按比例存在（上帝的智慧之于上帝，如同人类的智慧之于人类）。

Logical positivism’s verification principle, defended by A.J. Ayer, claims that a statement is only meaningful if it is either analytic (true by definition) or empirically verifiable. Religious statements, such as ‘God exists’, appear to be neither, and are thus cognitively meaningless. Critics argue that the verification principle itself fails its own test: it is neither analytic nor empirically verifiable.

以 A.J. 艾耶尔为代表的逻辑实证主义的可证实原则主张，一个陈述只有当其是分析命题（通过定义为真）或经验上可证实时，才有意义。宗教陈述，如“上帝存在”，似乎两者都不是，因而在认知上无意义。批评者指出，可证实原则本身通不过自己的检验：它既非分析的，也非经验上可证实的。

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy inspired a non-cognitive approach through ‘language-games’ and ‘forms of life’. Religious language is meaningful within the community of believers who share a particular practice. R.M. Hare’s concept of a ‘blik’ describes a fundamental, unverifiable yet unfalsifiable way of seeing the world that frames how religious believers interpret events. These views shift the focus from factual claims to the expressive and regulative functions of religious discourse.

维特根斯坦后期哲学启发了一种通过“语言游戏”和“生活形式”来看待宗教语言的非认知进路。宗教语言在共享特定实践的信仰团体内部是有意义的。R.M. 黑尔的“信念图景”（blik）概念，描述了一种根本的、既不可证实也不可证伪的看待世界的方式，它框定了宗教信徒如何诠释事件。这些观点将焦点从事实断言转向了宗教话语的表达性与调节性功能。

Published by TutorHao | Philosophy Revision Series | aleveler.com

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