📚 Year 13 AQA Philosophy: Key Terminology Quick Revision Guide | AQA 十三年级哲学：关键术语速记指南
Mastering the dense vocabulary of AQA Year 13 Philosophy is essential for top marks. This quick revision guide unpacks the core terms from the Metaphysics of God and Metaphysics of Mind units, with clear definitions and memory prompts to help you recall them under exam pressure. Each entry pairs an English explanation with a Chinese counterpart, so you can reinforce your understanding in both languages.
掌握 AQA 十三年级哲学中密集的术语是取得高分的关键。本速记指南梳理了“上帝的形而上学”与“心灵的形而上学”单元的核心词汇，配以清晰定义和记忆提示，助你在考试中快速回忆。每个词条都是英文解释加中文配对，帮助你用两种语言巩固理解。
1. Core Attributes of God | 上帝的核心属性
Theism: Belief in the existence of a personal God who created the universe and governs it, typically possessing omni-attributes. The term is the starting point for all God-talk in the AQA metaphysics unit.
有神论：相信存在一位人格化的、创造并支配宇宙的上帝，通常拥有全知、全能等属性。这是 AQA 形而上学单元中所有上帝讨论的起点。
Omnipotence: The attribute of being all-powerful. In philosophical analysis, omnipotence usually means the ability to do anything that is logically possible, avoiding contradictions like creating a square circle. Descartes defended a stronger voluntarist view, while Aquinas limited omnipotence to what is logically possible.
全能：指全能的属性。哲学分析中，全能通常意味着能够做任何逻辑上可能的事，从而避免诸如造出“方的圆”之类的矛盾。笛卡尔捍卫更强的意志主义观点，而阿奎那将全能限定在逻辑可能的范围内。
Omniscience: The attribute of being all-knowing. In the context of God, it entails knowing all facts, past, present and future, including future free human choices. This raises puzzles about free will and foreknowledge.
全知：指无所不知的属性。在上帝语境中，它意味着知晓所有事实，包括过去、现在和未来的事件，以及未来人类自由选择。这引发了关于自由意志与预知的难题。
Omnibenevolence: The attribute of being perfectly good or morally perfect. In the problem of evil, God’s omnibenevolence is often pitted against the existence of suffering. It implies that God always wills the good.
全善：指完全美善或道德完美的属性。在恶的问题中，上帝的全善常与苦难的存在形成张力。它意味着上帝总是意愿良善。
Eternal vs. Everlasting: ‘Eternal’ (or timeless) means God exists outside time, seeing all moments at once, like Boethius’ view. ‘Everlasting’ (sempiternal) means God exists at all times without beginning or end, enduring through time. This distinction matters for foreknowledge and free will debates.
永恒与永存：“永恒”指上帝存在于时间之外，像波爱修斯所说的那样，同时看到所有时刻。“永存”指上帝存在于所有时间点上，无始无终，在时间中持续存在。这对预知与自由意志的争论至关重要。
2. Arguments for God’s Existence | 上帝存在的论证
Ontological Argument: A family of a priori arguments that deduce God’s existence from the very concept of God. Anselm defines God as ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’ and argues that such a being must exist in reality, not just in the mind. Descartes later reformulated it using the concept of a supremely perfect being whose essence includes existence.
本体论论证：一类先天的论证，从上帝的概念本身演绎出上帝的存在。安瑟伦将上帝定义为“无法设想有比之更伟大者”，并论证这样的存在物必须在现实中而不仅在心灵中存在。笛卡尔后来用“最完美存在”的概念重述此论证，其本质中包含存在。
A priori / A posteriori: An a priori argument relies on reason alone, independent of experience (e.g. ontological argument). An a posteriori argument depends on empirical evidence or experience (e.g. teleological argument). The distinction is crucial for evaluating each argument’s force.
先天与后天：先天论证仅依赖理性，不借助经验（如本体论论证）。后天论证则依赖于经验证据或观察（如目的论论证）。这一区分对评估每种论证的说服力至关重要。
Teleological (Design) Argument: An a posteriori argument that infers an intelligent designer from the complexity, order or purpose observed in nature. Paley’s watchmaker analogy is the classic example. Hume’s objections through Philo challenged the analogy between artefacts and the universe.
目的论（设计）论证：一种后天论证，从自然界观察到的复杂性、秩序或目的推断存在一位智慧的设计者。佩利的钟表匠类比是经典范例。休谟借斐罗之口提出反驳，质疑人工制品与宇宙之间的类比。
Cosmological Argument: A family of a posteriori arguments that trace back from the existence of the cosmos to a first cause or necessary being. Aquinas’ Five Ways include versions from motion and causation. The Kalam version emphasises the impossibility of an actual infinite regress of causes.
宇宙论论证：一类后天论证，从宇宙的存在回溯到一个第一因或必然存在。阿奎那的五路论证包含了从运动和因果关系出发的版本。卡拉姆版本则强调实际的无限回溯是不可能的。
Moral Argument: An argument that infers God as the source of objective moral values and duties. Kant argued that practical reason postulates God to ensure that virtue leads to happiness (summum bonum). Others claim that moral truths require a divine lawgiver.
道德论证：一种论证，推断上帝是客观道德价值和义务的来源。康德认为实践理性必须设定上帝，以确保德行最终能通向幸福（至善）。另一些人则主张道德真理需要一个神圣的立法者。
3. The Problem of Evil & Theodicies | 恶的问题与神义论
Logical Problem of Evil: The claim that the existence of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God is logically incompatible with the existence of any evil. If God can prevent evil and wants to, why does evil exist? This is often framed as an inconsistency argument by J.L. Mackie.
恶的逻辑问题：主张全能全善的上帝与任何恶的存在在逻辑上不相容。如果上帝既能阻止恶又愿意阻止恶，恶为何存在？麦基常将其表述为一种不一致性论证。
Evidential Problem of Evil: The argument that while evil and God’s existence may not be logically contradictory, the sheer amount and distribution of pointless suffering makes belief in a good God highly improbable. This is more about the weight of evidence.
恶的证据问题：主张恶与上帝存在或许无逻辑矛盾，但大量且分布不均的无谓苦难使相信一位善上帝变得非常不可能。这更涉及证据的份量。
Theodicy: An attempt to justify God’s goodness in the face of evil by providing a morally sufficient reason for allowing it. A successful theodicy would explain why even an omnipotent God might permit evil. The term literally means ‘justice of God’.
神义论：一种为上帝在面对恶时的美善辩护的尝试，提供上帝允许恶存在的道德充分理由。一个成功的神义论能解释为什么全能的上帝仍会容许恶。该词字面意为“上帝的正义”。
Free Will Defence: A defence rather than a theodicy, often associated with Alvin Plantinga, arguing that it is logically possible that God could not create free beings who never do evil, because free will inherently involves the risk of misuse. This aims to block the logical problem of evil.
自由意志辩护：更像一种辩护而非神义论，常与普兰丁格关联，它论证逻辑上不可能存在一个上帝造出的、永远不犯错的自由生物，因为自由意志本身就包含被误用的风险。其目的是阻挡恶的逻辑问题。
Soul-making Theodicy: Developed by Irenaeus and later John Hick, this theodicy sees evil as necessary for human moral and spiritual development. Suffering helps us grow into mature, virtue-bearing souls, much like a child matures through hardship.
灵魂塑造神义论：由爱任纽提出、后由希克发展，认为恶是人类道德和精神成长所必需的。苦难帮助我们成长为拥有美德、成熟的灵魂，就像孩子通过磨难走向成熟。
Moral Evil vs. Natural Evil: Moral evil results from the misuse of free will by human beings (e.g. murder, theft). Natural evil refers to suffering caused by natural events, like earthquakes and diseases, which seemingly have no moral agent behind them. The distinction is key theodicies must address.
道德恶与自然恶：道德恶源于人类对自由意志的误用（如谋杀、偷盗）。自然恶指由自然灾害和疾病引起的痛苦，这类恶背后似乎没有道德主体。神义论必须应对这种区分。
4. Religious Language: Meaning & Verification | 宗教语言：意义与证实
Cognitivism vs. Non-cognitivism: Cognitivism holds that religious utterances express factual propositions that can be true or false. Non-cognitivism argues that such language is not factual but expresses emotions, attitudes or commitments, and is not truth-apt. AQA exam questions often ask you to assess whether ‘God exists’ is a meaningful factual claim.
认知主义与非认知主义：认知主义认为宗教话语表达可真可假的事实命题。非认知主义主张这类语言并非陈述事实，而是表达情感、态度或决心，不具备真值。AQA 试题常要求评估“上帝存在”是否为一个有意义的事实断言。
Verification Principle: Championed by the logical positivists (e.g. A.J. Ayer), this principle states that a sentence is only meaningful if it can be empirically verified or is an analytic truth. Religious language fails this test, and so is deemed cognitively meaningless.
可证实原则：由逻辑实证主义者（如艾耶尔）倡导，该原则认为一个语句只有能被经验证实或者是分析真理才具有意义。宗教语言无法通过这一检验，因而被视为认知上无意义。
Falsification Principle: Antony Flew applied Karl Popper’s idea: a statement is meaningful only if we could specify what would count against it. Since believers refuse to let any evidence falsify ‘God loves us’, such claims die the ‘death by a thousand qualifications’ and are meaningless.
可证伪原则：弗卢应用了波普尔的思想：一个陈述只有当我们可以指明什么算作反对它的证据时才有意义。既然信徒不让任何证据证伪“上帝爱我们”，这类主张就死于“千次限定之死”，变得毫无意义。
Blick: R.M. Hare’s term for a fundamental, non-cognitive religious commitment or ‘way of seeing the world’ that is not falsifiable, yet is meaningful to the believer. Flew’s parable of the paranoid student illustrates a blik that cannot be reasoned away.
布利克：黑尔提出的术语，指一种基础性的、非认知的宗教信念或“看世界的方式”，它虽然不可证伪，但对信徒却有意义。弗卢妄想的学生的寓言就展示了一种无法用理性消除的布利克。
Via Negativa (Apophatic Way): The approach that we can only speak of God by saying what God is not, because finite human language cannot capture God’s infinite nature. E.g. ‘God is not mortal’. This avoids limiting God but can drain language of positive content.
否定之道：一种进路，认为我们只能通过否定来描述上帝，因为有限的人类语言无法把握上帝的无限本性，比如“上帝非必死之躯”。这能避免限制上帝，但也可能使语言失去正面内容。
Analogy (Aquinas): Aquinas held that language about God is not univocal (same meaning) or equivocal (totally different), but analogical. Terms like ‘good’ apply to God in a proportioned or analogous sense derived from creation. This allows meaningful, albeit limited, talk about God.
类比（阿奎那）：阿奎那认为谈论上帝的语言既非单义的（完全相同含义）也非歧义的（完全不同），而是类比的。像“善”这样的词在受造物的基础上以比例或类比的含义指向上帝。这使得谈论上帝虽然有限但富有意义。
5. Metaphysics of Mind: Substance Dualism | 心灵形而上学：实体二元论
Substance Dualism: The view that mind and matter are two fundamentally distinct substances. There is mental substance (characterised by thinking) and physical substance (characterised by extension in space), as classically defended by Descartes. The mind is a separate, non-physical thing that can in principle survive bodily death.
实体二元论：主张心灵与物质是两种根本不同的实体。存在思维实体（以思考为特性）和广延实体（以空间广延为特性），笛卡尔是这一观点的经典捍卫者。心灵是一个独立的、非物理的东西，原则上可以脱离身体而存活。
Res Cogitans / Res Extensa: Descartes’ Latin terms for ‘thinking thing’ (mind) and ‘extended thing’ (matter). Res cogitans is unextended, indivisible, and private; res extensa is extended in space, public, and governed by mechanical laws. Their interaction is the crux of the interaction problem.
思维之物与广延之物：笛卡尔拉丁术语，分别指“思维的东西”（心灵）和“广延的东西”（物质）。思维之物无广延、不可分、是私人的；广延之物在空间中延展、公开、受机械规律支配。两者的互动是互动难题的核心。
Indivisibility Argument: Descartes argued that the body is divisible into parts (you lose a limb and your body is literally divided), whereas the mind cannot be divided – you cannot have half a thought. Therefore mind must be a distinct, non-physical substance.
不可分性论证：笛卡尔论证，身体可分割（失去肢体后身体确实被分割），但心灵无法被分割——你无法拥有半个思想。因此心灵必是独特的非物理实体。
Conceivability Argument: It is conceivable (clearly and distinctly perceivable) that I exist without my body, or that mind exists without matter. If something is conceivable, it is logically possible; and if it is logically possible, the mind and body must be distinct substances. This modal argument supports dualism.
可设想性论证：我可以清晰分明地设想没有身体的我存在，或者心灵在没有物质的情况下存在。可设想则逻辑上可能；若逻辑上可能，则心灵与身体必是不同实体。这一模态论证支持二元论。
Problem of Interaction: The classic objection to substance dualism raised by Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia: how can an immaterial mind cause changes in a material body, and vice versa, without a causal mechanism? This threatens the coherence of Cartesian dualism.
互动难题：对实体二元论的经典反驳，由伊丽莎白公主提出：非物质的思维如何能引起物质身体的改变，反之亦然，却又没有因果机制？这威胁到笛卡尔二元论的一致性。
6. Metaphysics of Mind: Property Dualism | 心灵形而上学：属性二元论
Property Dualism: The view that although there is only one kind of substance (physical), mental properties are non-physical and cannot be reduced to physical properties. Consciousness arises from the brain but mental states have emergent, irreducible qualities. This sidesteps the interaction problem but faces the challenge of causal exclusion.
属性二元论：主张虽然只有一种实体（物理实体），但心理属性是非物理的、不可还原为物理属性的。意识从大脑产生，但心理状态具有突现的、不可还原的质。这避开了互动难题，但面对因果排除的挑战。
Emergentism: A form of property dualism where mental properties emerge from complex physical systems (brains). Once they emerge, they are not reducible to the underlying physics and can exert downward causation. Memory cue: ‘whole is more than the sum of parts’.
突现论：一种属性二元论，认为心理属性从复杂的物理系统（大脑）中突现出来。一旦突现，它们就不可还原为底层物理，并能够实施向下因果作用。记忆线索：“整体大于部分之和”。
Qualia: The intrinsic, subjective ‘what-it-is-like’ qualities of conscious experience, such as the redness of red or the sharpness of a pain. Qualia are often cited as the hard problem that physicalist theories struggle to accommodate. They are central to the knowledge argument.
感受质：意识经验中内在的、主观的“像是什么”的质，例如红的红的感觉或疼痛的刺痛感。感受质常被引作物理主义者难以处理的难问题，是知识论证的核心。
7. Physicalist Theories: Behaviourism & Identity Theory | 物理主义理论：行为主义与同一论
Logical (Analytical) Behaviourism: The view that mental states are nothing but dispositions to observable behaviour. A pain just is the disposition to wince, say ‘ouch’, or withdraw. This avoids any ‘ghost in the machine’, but struggles with mental states that lack outward expression.
逻辑行为主义：主张心理状态无非是可观察行为的倾向。疼痛就是会畏缩、喊“哎哟”或缩手的倾向。这避免了“机器中的幽灵”，但难以处理缺乏外部表现的心理状态。
Category Mistake (Ryle): Ryle argued that substance dualism makes a logical error by treating the mind as a distinct substance when it is really a way of speaking about dispositions and abilities. Mistaking the ‘mind’ as a thing is like a visitor to Oxford looking for the university after seeing the colleges; the university is how the colleges are organised.
范畴错误（赖尔）：赖尔论证，实体二元论犯了一个逻辑错误，将心灵当作独立的实体，而心灵不过是谈论倾向和能力的方式。将“心灵”误作实物，就像访客看了各个学院后还在寻找牛津大学；大学其实是学院的组织方式。
Mind-Brain Identity Theory (Type Identity): The thesis that mental state types are numerically identical to brain state types. Pain is nothing over and above C-fibre firing. This is a reductive physicalist theory. It explains mental causation easily but faces the challenge of multiple realizability.
心脑同一论（类型同一论）：主张心理状态类型与大脑状态类型在数量上是同一的。疼痛就是 C-纤维放电，别无他物。这是一种还原的物理主义理论，容易解释心理因果，但面临多重可实现性挑战。
Token Identity Theory: A weaker version claiming that each particular instance of a mental state (token) is identical with some physical state, but the same type of mental state could be realised by different physical states in different organisms. This allows for multiple realizability.
个例同一论：较弱的版本，主张每一个具体的心理状态个例与某个物理状态同一，但同一类型的心理状态可以在不同生物中由不同物理状态实现。这允许多重可实现性。
8. Eliminative Materialism & Functionalism | 取消唯物论与功能主义
Eliminative Materialism: A radical physicalist position advanced by Paul and Patricia Churchland, holding that our common-sense understanding of mind (‘folk psychology’) is a deeply flawed theory. Concepts like belief and desire will be eliminated and replaced by neuroscientific categories, much like phlogiston was eliminated from chemistry.
取消唯物论：由丘奇兰德夫妇提出的激进物理主义立场，认为我们关于心灵的常识理解（“民间心理学”）是一个有严重缺陷的理论。信念、欲望等概念将被淘汰，由神经科学范畴取代，正如燃素被化学淘汰一样。
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