📚 Year 13 CAIE Philosophy: Ultimate Glossary & Memory Guide | 13年级CAIE哲学：词汇术语速记指南
Mastering A-level Philosophy requires not only deep conceptual understanding but also a precise command of technical vocabulary. This guide groups essential terms by topic, offering clear definitions, memorable shortcuts, and practical examples to help you navigate essays and exam questions with confidence.
精通A-level哲学不仅需要深刻的概念理解，还需要对专业词汇的精确掌握。本指南按主题分组关键术语，提供清晰的定义、易记的捷径和实际例子，帮助你在论文和考试中自信地应对各种问题。
1. Epistemology: The Nature of Knowledge | 认识论：知识的本质
Knowledge as Justified True Belief (JTB): A traditional analysis holding that S knows that p if and only if p is true, S believes that p, and S is justified in believing that p. Remember the ‘TJB’ acronym – Truth, Justification, Belief – but recall Gettier cases show this is insufficient.
知识即得到辩护的真信念（JTB）：传统的分析认为，S知道p当且仅当p为真、S相信p并且S对相信p有辩护。记住首字母缩写’TJB’——真、辩护、信念——但要记住盖梯尔案例表明这还不够。
Gettier Case: A scenario where someone has a justified true belief that intuitively does not count as knowledge (e.g. Smith’s belief about the man with ten coins). Memory link: ‘Get-tier’ = you ‘get it wrongly’ despite JTB.
盖梯尔案例：一种情境，其中某人拥有得到辩护的真信念，但直觉上并不算作知识（例如史密斯关于有十枚硬币的人的那个信念）。记忆联想法：’Get-tier’ → 尽管有JTB，你还是’搞错了’。
A Priori / A Posteriori: A priori knowledge is independent of experience (e.g. 2+2=4); a posteriori depends on experience (e.g. ‘water boils at 100°C’). Think ‘A Priori Prior to experience’, ‘A Post’ = after experience.
先天知识 / 后验知识：先天知识独立于经验（如2+2=4）；后验知识依赖于经验（如’水在100°C沸腾’）。联想：先天 = 先于经验，后验 = 经验之后。
Cartesian Doubt: Descartes’ method of doubting all beliefs that can possibly be doubted, to find an indubitable foundation. Mnemonic: ‘Cartesian Cleansing’ – sweeping away uncertainty to reach the Cogito.
笛卡尔式怀疑：笛卡尔的方法，怀疑所有可能被怀疑的信念，以找到不可怀疑的基础。助记：’笛卡尔大扫除’——扫除不确定性，达到’我思’。
2. Justification and Reliabilism | 辩护与可靠主义
Reliabilism: A belief is justified if it is produced by a reliable cognitive process (one that tends to produce true beliefs). Simply put: ‘reliable gizmo = justified belief’. Think of a trusty watch that nearly always tells the correct time.
可靠主义：一个信念如果有可靠的认知过程（倾向于产生真信念的过程）所产生，它就是得到辩护的。简单说：’可靠的小工具 = 得到辩护的信念’。想象一块几乎总是显示正确时间的手表。
Internalism vs Externalism about Justification: Internalism claims that justifying factors must be cognitively accessible to the subject (inside the mind); externalism allows factors outside the subject’s awareness. Memory: ‘Internal = Inside the mind, External = External to awareness’.
辩护的内在主义与外在主义：内在主义主张辩护因素必须是认知上可由主体获取的（在心灵之内）；外在主义允许主体意识之外的因素。记忆法：’内在 = 心灵内部，外在 = 意识之外’。
Foundationalism: The view that some beliefs are basic (self-justified) and all other justified beliefs rest on them. Picture a house: basic beliefs are the foundation; other beliefs are the walls. The regress argument supports foundationalism: avoid infinite regress by having a ‘stopping point’.
基础主义：认为有些信念是基础的（自我辩护的），所有其他得到辩护的信念都立基于它们。想象一栋房子：基础信念是地基；其他信念是墙壁。回溯论证支持基础主义：通过确立一个’终止点’避免无穷回溯。
3. Perception: Direct Realism & Representationalism | 知觉：直接实在论与表象论
Direct Realism (Naïve Realism): The view that we directly perceive mind-independent physical objects. ‘What you see is what there is.’ Challenge: illusion and hallucination seem to show perception is indirect.
直接实在论（素朴实在论）：认为我们直接知觉到不依赖于心灵而存在的物理对象。’所见即所在’。质疑：错觉和幻觉似乎表明知觉是非直接的。
Sense-Datum Theory (Representative Realism): We perceive mind-dependent sense-data that represent physical objects. Lockean: objects have primary qualities (shape, size) and secondary qualities (colour, taste). Memory: ‘Sense-Data Screen’ – we never see the world directly, only through a mental TV screen.
感觉材料理论（表象实在论）：我们知觉到依赖于心灵的感觉材料，这些材料代表了物理对象。洛克式：对象具有第一性质（形状、大小）和第二性质（颜色、味道）。记忆：’感觉材料屏幕’——我们从未直接看到世界，只是通过心灵的电视屏幕看到。
Idealism (Berkeley): To be is to be perceived (esse est percipi). All objects are collections of ideas in minds. The ‘Master Argument’: we cannot conceive an unperceived object without thereby perceiving it. Mnemonic: ‘Berkeley’s Big Idea: no perception, no world.’
唯心主义（贝克莱）：存在即被感知（esse est percipi）。所有对象都是心灵中观念的集合。’主论证’：我们不可能设想一个未被感知的对象而又不因此感知到它。助记：’贝克莱的大观念：没有感知，就没有世界。’
4. Metaphysics of Mind: Dualism & Physicalism | 心灵形而上学：二元论与物理主义
Substance Dualism (Descartes): Mind and body are two distinct substances; the mind is non-physical and can exist without the body. The problem of interaction: how does the non-physical cause physical effects? Remember the ‘ghost in the machine’ image.
实体二元论（笛卡尔）：心灵和身体是两种不同的实体；心灵是非物理的，可以离开身体而存在。互动问题：非物理的东西如何引起物理效果？记住’机器中的幽灵’这个形象。
Property Dualism (Chalmers): Only one substance (the brain), but it has both physical and non-physical properties (qualia). The ‘Hard Problem’ of consciousness: why physical processes are accompanied by subjective experience. Think ‘Dual Aspect’: one brain, two types of properties.
属性二元论（查尔默斯）：只有一种实体（大脑），但它同时具有物理属性和非物理属性（感受质）。意识的’困难问题’：为什么物理过程会伴随着主观体验。想象’双面体’：一个大脑，两种属性。
Type Identity Theory: Mental states are literally identical with brain states (e.g. pain = C-fibre firing). A firm physicalist view: ‘mind is brain’. Challenge: multiple realizability (different brains can have same mental state).
类型同一论：心灵状态实际上等同于大脑状态（例如疼痛 = C-纤维放电）。坚定的物理主义观点：’心灵即大脑’。质疑：多重可实现性（不同的大脑可以有相同的心理状态）。
5. Personal Identity: Psychological and Bodily Continuity | 人格同一性：心理连续性与肉体连续性
Psychological Continuity (Locke, Parfit): Personal identity consists in overlapping chains of memory and psychological connectedness. Locke’s ‘prince and cobbler’ thought experiment: if a prince’s consciousness enters a cobbler’s body, the person is the prince. Mnemonic: ‘You are your memories.’
心理连续性（洛克、帕菲特）：人格同一性在于记忆和心理联结的重叠链条。洛克的’王子与鞋匠’思想实验：如果王子的意识进入鞋匠的身体，那么这个人就是王子。助记：’你就是你的记忆。’
Bodily Continuity (Animalism): We are human animals, and our identity through time is guaranteed by the continuity of our biological organism. Think ‘same body, same person’. The brain transplant objection: if your brain is transplanted into another body, which person survives? Bodily theory says the original body, which seems counterintuitive.
肉体连续性（动物论）：我们是人类动物，我们在时间中的同一性由我们生物有机体的连续性所保证。想象’同一个身体，同一个人’。大脑移植反驳：如果你的大脑被移植到另一个身体，哪个人存活？肉体理论认为原是身体的那个存活，这似乎违反直觉。
Parfit’s Bundle Theory: There is no enduring self; we are just bundles of mental states connected by causal relations. Reductionist view: ‘identity is not what matters’ – survival is a matter of degree. Use the ‘Ship of Theseus’ analogy for a narrative self-replacement but Parfit rejects continuity of a single self.
帕菲特的无我理论（束理论）：没有持存的自我；我们只是由因果关系联结起来的一束束心理状态。还原论观点：’同一性并非重要的东西’——存活只是一个程度问题。用’忒修斯之船’来类比叙事上的自我更替，但帕菲特拒绝单一自我的连续性。
6. Free Will: Determinism, Libertarianism & Compatibilism | 自由意志：决定论、自由意志论与相容论
Determinism: Every event, including human actions, is causally necessitated by prior states. Often linked to the ‘Laplace’s demon’ idea: if one knew all the laws and all the positions, the future is entirely predictable. Memory: ‘Clockwork universe – no room for free choice.’
决定论：每一个事件，包括人类行为，都由先在状态因果必然地决定。常与’拉普拉斯妖’的观念相连：如果某人知道所有规律和所有位置，未来就是完全可预测的。记忆：’钟表宇宙——没有自由选择的空间。’
Libertarianism (Incompatibilist): Free will is incompatible with determinism, and we do have free will (e.g. agent causation, Chisholm). The challenge: how can a free act be ‘uncaused’ and yet not random? Use ‘prime mover unmoved’ analogy: the agent initiates the causal chain.
自由意志论（不相容论）：自由意志与决定论不相容，而我们确实拥有自由意志（例如行为者因果性，奇泽姆）。挑战：自由的行为如何是’无原因的’而又不是随机的？用’不被推动的第一推动者’类比：行为者开启了因果链。
Compatibilism (Soft Determinism): Free will is compatible with determinism; an act is free if it is caused by the agent’s desires and beliefs without external coercion. Hume: ‘liberty is a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will.’ Remember: ‘Free = unforced (even if determined).’ Frankfurt cases: alternative possibilities are not needed for moral responsibility.
相容论（温和决定论）：自由意志与决定论相容；一个行为如果由行为者的欲望和信念导致，且没有外部强制，它就是自由的。休谟：’自由是一种根据意志的决定而行动或不行动的能力。’记忆：’自由 = 不受强迫（即使是被决定的）。’法兰克福案例：道德责任不需要可供选择的可能性。
7. Ethics: Utilitarianism & Deontology | 伦理学：功利主义与义务论
Act Utilitarianism (Bentham): The morally right action is the one that maximises overall pleasure (utility). Use the ‘hedonic calculus’ to weigh intensity, duration, certainty, etc. Shortcut: ‘Greatest happiness for the greatest number’ – think of a ‘happiness calculator’.
行为功利主义（边沁）：道德上正确的行为是最大化总体快乐（效用）的行为。用’快乐计算’来衡量强度、持久性、确定性等。捷径：’最大多数人的最大幸福’——想象一个’幸福计算器’。
Rule Utilitarianism (Mill): Act according to rules that, if generally followed, would produce the greatest utility. Mill distinguishes higher and lower pleasures. Memory: ‘Rules make the most long-run happiness’ – unlike act-utilitarianism, it prevents problematic exceptions. ‘It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.’
规则功利主义（密尔）：按照那些如果普遍遵守就能产生最大效用的规则去行动。密尔区分了高级快乐和低级快乐。记忆：’规则创造最大的长远幸福’——与行为功利主义不同，它防止了有问题的例外。’宁愿做一个不满足的人，也不做一只满足的猪。’
Kantian Deontology: Morality is based on the categorical imperative: act only on maxims that you can will as universal law; treat humanity always as an end, never merely as a means. Mnemonic: ‘Kant’s universal law test: if everyone did it, would it make sense?’. The good will is the only thing good without qualification.
康德义务论：道德基于定言命令：只按照你能同时愿意它成为普遍法则的准则去行动；总是把人当作目的，而绝不仅仅当作手段。助记：’康德的普遍法则测试：如果每个人都这么做，这还能说得通吗？’善良意志是唯一不受条件限制的善的东西。
8. Ethics: Virtue Ethics & Applied Ethics | 伦理学：德性伦理学与应用伦理学
Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics: Morality is about developing good character traits (virtues) by acting as the virtuous person would act, and finding the ‘Golden Mean’ between extremes. Eudaimonia (flourishing) is the final end. Remember: ‘Virtue = habit of choosing the mean’. For courage, the mean is between cowardice and rashness.
亚里士多德德性伦理学：道德在于通过像有德性的人那样行动来培养良好的品格特质（美德），并找到极端之间的’中庸之道’。eudaimonia（幸福/繁荣）是最终目的。记忆：’美德 = 选择中道的习惯’。对于勇敢，中道在怯懦和鲁莽之间。
Abortion and Sanctity of Life: The debate often contrasts the ‘sanctity of life’ view (life is sacred from conception) with personhood criteria (e.g. viability, consciousness). Tooley’s ‘kitten’ argument: if a kitten has more personhood than a foetus, infanticide might be morally permissible. Use the ‘potentiality’ principle: a foetus is a potential person.
堕胎与生命神圣性：辩论常将’生命神圣性’观点（生命从受孕起就是神圣的）与人格标准（如生存力、意识）相对立。图利的’小猫’论证：如果一只小猫比一个胎儿具有更多人格性，那么杀婴在道德上可能是允许的。使用’潜在性’原则：胎儿是潜在的人。
Euthanasia: Active vs Passive: Active euthanasia involves a deliberate act to end life (e.g. lethal injection); passive is withdrawing treatment and letting die. James Rachels argues there is no moral difference between killing and letting die in relevant cases. Mnemonic: ‘Active Acts, Passive Stops’.
安乐死：主动与被动：主动安乐死涉及故意结束生命的行为（如注射致死药物）；被动安乐死是撤除治疗任其死亡。詹姆斯·雷切尔斯主张，在相关案例中，杀死与任其死亡之间没有道德差异。助记：’主动动手，被动停手’。
9. Meta-Ethics: Cognitivism vs Non-Cognitivism | 元伦理学：认知主义与非认知主义
Moral Realism (Naturalism): Moral properties exist and are natural facts (e.g. Mill’s happiness). Ethical naturalism says ‘good’ can be defined in natural terms. Moore’s Open Question Argument challenges this: for any natural definition of good, we can still meaningfully ask ‘Is that really good?’. Think of the ‘open question’ test.
道德实在论（自然主义）：道德属性存在，并且是自然事实（如穆勒的幸福）。伦理自然主义说’善’可以用自然术语定义。摩尔的开放问题论证挑战了这一点：对于善的任何自然定义，我们仍可以有意义地问’这真的是善吗？’。想想’开放问题’测试。
Intuitionism (Moore): Good is a simple, non-natural property known through intuition. ‘Good is good, and that is the end of the matter.’ Memory: ‘You just see it with your moral intuition, like recognising yellow.’
直觉主义（摩尔）：善是一种简单的、非自然的属性，通过直觉而认识。’善就是善，事情到此为止。’记忆：’你用道德直觉直接看到它，就像认出黄色一样。’
Emotivism (Ayer, Stevenson): Moral judgements express emotions or attitudes and aim to influence others; they are not truth-apt (not factual). ‘Boo-hooray’ theory: ‘Murder is wrong’ = ‘Boo! Murder!’ Shortcut: ‘Ethical statements are cheers or jeers.’
情绪主义（艾耶尔、斯蒂文森）：道德判断表达情感或态度，旨在影响他人；它们没有真值（非事实）。’嘘–好哇’理论：’谋杀是错误的’ = ‘嘘！谋杀！’捷径：’伦理陈述是喝彩或嘘声。’
Prescriptivism (Hare): Moral language is universalisable prescription. When I say ‘Stealing is wrong’, I prescribe that one should not steal in any similar situation and am committed to not stealing myself. Remember ‘universal command’: ‘do as I say, and I must do it too.’
规定主义（黑尔）：道德语言是可普遍化的指令。当我说’偷窃是错误的’，我就是在指令任何类似情况下都不应偷窃，并且我自己也承诺不偷窃。记忆’普遍命令’：’照我说的做，并且我也必须这么做。’
10. Philosophy of Religion: Theistic Arguments | 宗教哲学：有神论论证
Ontological Argument (Anselm, Plantinga): Defines God as ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’; a being that exists in reality is greater than one merely in the mind, so God must exist. Gaunilo’s ‘perfect island’ parody. Mnemonic: ‘Think of the greatest pizza – if it lacks existence, it’s not the greatest, so it must exist in reality (but only for God).’
本体论论证（安瑟伦，普兰丁格）：将上帝定义为’无法设想比之更伟大的东西’；一个在现实中存在的存在者比只在心灵中的存在者更伟大，所以上帝必然存在。高尼罗的’完美之岛’模仿反驳。助记：’想想最完美的披萨——如果它缺少存在，就不是最完美的，因此它必然在现实中存在（但仅对上帝有效）。’
Cosmological Argument (Aquinas, Craig): From the existence of contingent things, we infer a necessary being (God). Aquinas’s first three ways: motion, causation, contingency. Kalam: everything that begins to exist has a cause; the universe began; therefore God. Memory: ‘Domino chain of causes must have a first unmoved mover.’
宇宙论论证（阿奎那，克雷格）：从偶然事物的存在，推出一个必然的存在者（上帝）。阿奎那的前三路：运动、因果、偶然性。卡拉姆：一切开始存在的东西都有原因；宇宙开始存在；所以有上帝。记忆：’原因的骨牌链必须有一个不被推动的第一推动者。’
Problem of Evil (Logical & Evidential): If God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good, why is there evil? Logical problem claims inconsistency; the evidential problem says the amount and distribution of evil make God’s existence improbable. Theodicies: free will defence, soul-making (Hick). Quick phrase: ‘Either God can’t stop evil (then not omnipotent), won’t (then not good), or doesn’t know (not omniscient).’
恶的问题（逻辑与证据）：如果上帝全能、全知、全善，为什么会有恶？逻辑问题声称不一致；证据问题说恶的数量和分布使得上帝存在不太可能。神义论：自由意志辩护、灵魂塑造（希克）。速记：’要么上帝无法阻止恶（那么非全能），要么不愿（那么非全善），要么不知道（非全知）。’
11. Moral Responsibility and Theories of Punishment | 道德责任与惩罚理论
Retributivism: Punishment is justified because the offender deserves to suffer in proportion to the crime. ‘An eye for an eye’ – backward-looking. The lex talionis principle. Memory: ‘Revenge with a moral stamp.’
报应论：惩罚的正当性在于罪犯根据罪行应当遭受相应的痛苦。’以眼还眼’——向后看的。同态复仇原则。记忆：’带有道德印记的复仇。’
Deterrence (Utilitarian): Punishment is justified by its future benefits: discouraging the criminal (specific deterrence) and others (general deterrence) from committing offences. Forward-looking. Think: ‘Punish to teach a lesson.’
威慑（功利主义）：惩罚的正当性在于其未来收益：阻止罪犯（特殊威慑）和其他人（一般威慑）实施犯罪行为。向前看的。想象：’惩罚是为了上一课。’
Reform (Rehabilitation): Aim is to change the criminal’s character so they can reintegrate into society. Treats crime like a disease. Memory: ‘repair the criminal, not just punish.’
改造（复归）：目标是改变罪犯的品格，使他们能重新融入社会。把犯罪当作疾病来治疗。记忆：’修复罪犯，而不只是惩罚。’
12. Exam Memory Techniques and Glossary Application | 考试记忆技巧与术语应用
Flashcard Method with Dual Coding: For each term, create a card where one side has the term and a simple sketch or diagram, the other side the definition and the ‘memory link’. For example, for ‘Cartesian Doubt’, draw a brain with a broom sweeping out beliefs. Dual coding reinforces retention.
带双重编码的闪卡法：对于每个术语，制作一张卡片，一面写术语并画一个简单的草图或图表，另一面写定义和’记忆联结’。例如，对于’笛卡尔式怀疑’，画一个大脑，一把扫帚正在扫除信念。双重编码增强记忆保持。
Acronyms and Narrative Chains: Group terms into a memorable story. For the JTB+G analysis, the story: ‘John Tries Believing (JTB) but Getyer (Gettier) cases show it’s not enough, so we need Reliable Internal/External Foundational Coherent (replace with actual terms).’ Create your own mad sentence.
首字母缩略与叙事链：将术语串成一个有记忆点的故事。对于JTB+G分析，故事：’约翰试着相信（JTB）但盖梯尔（Gettier）案例表明这还不够，所以我们需要可靠的内在/外在基础融贯……’创造你自己的疯狂句子。
Active Recall with Term Maps: Draw a concept map linking terms: e.g. Knowledge → JTB → Gettier → Reliabilism → Foundationalism. Test yourself by covering parts. The visual hierarchy helps you see how arguments build on one another.
利用术语图进行主动回忆：画一张概念图，把术语连接起来：例如知识 → JTB → 盖梯尔 → 可靠主义 → 基础主义。遮住部分内容测试自己。视觉层级有助于你看到论证是如何彼此建基的。
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