📚 A-Level CCEA Philosophy: High-Frequency Exam Topics & Common Pitfalls | A-Level CCEA哲学：高频考点与易错题分析
Mastering CCEA A-Level Philosophy requires more than memorising arguments; it demands precise understanding of where candidates regularly lose marks. This guide examines the topics most frequently tested across AS and A2 units and highlights the subtle mistakes that separate good answers from excellent ones. By revisiting JTB, utilitarianism, the problem of evil, and mind-body dualism through the lens of typical exam pitfalls, you can sharpen your critical analysis and boost your grade.
掌握 CCEA A-Level 哲学不仅需要熟记论证，更需要精准把握考生经常失分的地方。本指南围绕 AS 与 A2 单元中最高频的考点展开，揭示那些将普通答案与高分答案拉开差距的细微错误。通过从典型考试陷阱的角度重新审视 JTB、功利主义、恶的问题以及身心二元论等主题，你可以磨炼批判性分析能力，有效提升成绩。
1. Defining Knowledge: JTB and Gettier Cases | 定义知识：JTB 与盖梯尔案例
Knowledge has traditionally been defined as justified true belief (JTB). A subject S knows that p if and only if p is true, S believes that p, and S is justified in believing that p. This definition appears in virtually every CCEA epistemology question. However, Gettier’s 1963 paper demonstrated cases where someone has a justified true belief yet intuitively lacks knowledge, shaking the traditional account.
传统上，知识被定义为确证的真信念（JTB）。认知主体 S 知道 p，当且仅当 p 为真、S 相信 p 且 S 有理由确证地相信 p。这一定义几乎出现在每一道 CCEA 认识论试题中。然而，盖梯尔在 1963 年的论文中指出，在某些情形中，某人即使拥有确证的真信念，直觉上仍缺乏知识，从而动摇了传统解释。
A classic mistake is to describe a Gettier case without specifying exactly why it defeats JTB. Examiners expect you to show that justification and truth come apart in a lucky way. For instance, in the ‘stopped clock’ case, your belief that it is 3pm is justified by looking at a clock that normally works, and it happens to be true, but the clock stopped 24 hours earlier; so the truth is not connected to your justification. Labelling this ‘accidental truth’ is essential. Many students merely state ‘the belief is true but not knowledge’ without analysing the disconnect.
一个经典错误是描述盖梯尔案例时，没有明确说明它为何击败了 JTB。考官希望你展示确证与真理以一种侥幸的方式分离。例如在“停摆的钟”案例中，你相信现在是下午三点，这一信念因看了一个通常正常运转的钟而得到确证，碰巧此刻确实是三点，但钟在二十四小时前就停了；因此真理与你的确证并无关联。将此标记为“偶然真理”至关重要。许多学生只是说“这个信念为真但不是知识”，却没有分析这种脱节。
When tackling ‘Is JTB sufficient for knowledge?’ always construct at least one robust Gettier-style counterexample and use the phrase ‘epistemic luck’. Also, be prepared to discuss Nozick’s tracking condition or Goldman’s reliabilism as post-Gettier responses. A high-scoring answer contrasts the simplicity of JTB with the complexity of fourth-condition theories, noting that no single alternative has gained universal consensus.
在回答“JTB 是否足以构成知识？”时，一定要至少构建一个有力的盖梯尔式反例，并使用“认知运气”这一术语。此外，准备好讨论诺齐克的追踪条件或戈德曼的可靠主义作为后盖梯尔式的回应。高分答案会将 JTB 的简洁性与第四条件理论的复杂性进行对比，并指出没有任何一种替代理论获得了普遍共识。
2. Reliabilism and Internalism vs Externalism | 可靠主义及内在主义与外在主义
Reliabilism states that a belief is knowledge if it is produced by a reliable cognitive process – one that tends to yield true beliefs. This externalist approach shifts the focus from having conscious access to reasons (internalism) to the actual truth-conduciveness of the belief-forming mechanism. CCEA exam questions often ask you to evaluate whether externalism can solve Gettier problems.
可靠主义认为，如果一个信念由可靠的认知过程（即倾向于产生真信念的过程）所产生，那么它就是知识。这一外在主义进路将焦点从能够意识到的理由（内在主义）转移到了信念形成机制的实际致真性。CCEA 考试题目经常要求你评估外在主义能否解决盖梯尔问题。
A frequent pitfall is treating reliabilism as if it merely requires justification. Students write, ‘If the process is reliable, the belief is justified,’ and stop there. In fact, reliabilism challenges the very necessity of traditional justification. The belief must be caused by a reliable faculty, such as perception or memory, even if the subject cannot articulate how. Misunderstanding this leads to weak criticism, where the candidate argues that reliabilism still demands internal reasons. Instead, focus on the ‘new evil demon’ problem: if a brain-in-a-vat uses the same normally reliable processes but systematically gets false beliefs, reliabilism denies knowledge, yet internally everything seems identical to a normal knower. This is a more precise objection.
一个常见误区是把可靠主义当作依然需要传统确证的理论。学生写道：“如果过程可靠，信念就得到了确证”，然后止步。事实上，可靠主义挑战的正是传统确证的必要性。信念必须由一项可靠的官能（如知觉或记忆）所引起，即使主体无法说明其运作方式。误解这一点会导致薄弱的批评，比如考生会论证可靠主义仍然需要内在理由。相反，应聚焦于“新恶魔”问题：如果缸中之脑运用着同样的正常可靠过程，却系统性地获得假信念，可靠主义就否定了其知识，但从内在视角看一切与正常的知者无异。这才是更精确的反对意见。
When comparing internalism and externalism, avoid the oversimplification that ‘externalism is better because it includes animals and children’. A high-band answer acknowledges the trade-off: internalism preserves a strong link to epistemic responsibility and first-person perspective, while externalism struggles to account for the value of knowing from the inside. Use the CCEA command terms ‘assess’ and ‘examine’ to weigh these competing intuitions.
在比较内在主义与外在主义时，避免过度简化的说法“外在主义更好，因为它涵盖动物和儿童”。高分段答案会承认其中的取舍：内在主义保留了与认知责任及第一人称视角的紧密联系，而外在主义却难以解释从内部视角去认识的价值。运用 CCEA 的指令词“评估”和“审视”来权衡这些相互竞争的直觉。
3. Scepticism: Global and Local | 怀疑论：全局怀疑与局部怀疑
Philosophical scepticism questions whether we can possess any knowledge at all (global scepticism) or merely knowledge in a particular domain (local scepticism). The three-wave structure of Cartesian doubt – illusion, dreaming, evil demon – is a staple of CCEA AS papers. You must be able to explain each wave and the corresponding epistemological response.
哲学怀疑论质疑我们是否能拥有任何知识（全局怀疑），或者仅仅在特定领域拥有知识（局部怀疑）。笛卡尔式的怀疑三波结构——幻觉、梦境、恶魔——是 CCEA AS 试卷的必考内容。你必须能够解释每一波怀疑及其对应的认识论回应。
The most common mistake is treating the dreaming argument as if it simply says ‘life is a dream’. The argument is much more refined: there are no certain marks by which to distinguish waking experience from dreaming, therefore any perceptual belief could be false. Students then often present a weak counter-argument, such as ‘dreams are incoherent’, which Descartes already anticipates. A better line of criticism is to note that the very concept of a dream presupposes a contrast with veridical waking experience, so the sceptic cannot coherently universalise the possibility. This internal critique earns higher marks than dismissive gestures.
最常见的错误是把梦境论证简单当作“人生是个梦”。该论证远比这精致：并不存在确定的标记可以用来区分清醒经验与梦境，因此任何知觉信念都可能是假的。学生随后常常给出一个薄弱的反驳，比如“梦是不连贯的”，而这一反驳其实笛卡尔早已预见。更好的批判路径是指出，“梦”这个概念本身就预设了与真实清醒经验的对比，因此怀疑论者无法连贯地将这种可能性普遍化。这一内在批判比轻蔑的断言更能获得高分。
For global scepticism, many candidates rush to Moore’s ‘Here is a hand’ response without unpacking the logical tension. You must show that Moore implicitly rejects the closure principle: if I know I have hands, then I know I am not a brain-in-a-vat; I know I have hands; therefore I know I am not a brain-in-a-vat. The sceptic will reject the second premise. A nuanced evaluation recognises that Moorean and contextualist approaches do not refute scepticism; they merely shift the burden of proof or lower the standards for knowledge in ordinary contexts.
对于全局怀疑，许多考生急于搬出摩尔的“手在此”回应，却没有厘清其中的逻辑张力。你必须说明，摩尔隐然拒绝的是封闭原则：如果我知道我有手，那么就知道自己不是缸中之脑；我知道我有手；因此我知道自己不是缸中之脑。而怀疑论者会拒绝第二个前提。一种精致的评估承认，摩尔式的进路与语境主义进路并没有驳倒怀疑论；它们只是转移了举证责任，或降低了日常语境下的知识标准。
4. Act and Rule Utilitarianism | 行为功利主义与规则功利主义
Utilitarianism is the ethical theory that the right action is the one that maximises overall happiness or utility. CCEA candidates must distinguish clearly between act utilitarianism (AU), which evaluates each individual action by its consequences, and rule utilitarianism (RU), which judges actions by whether they conform to rules whose general acceptance would maximise utility. This distinction is assessed in almost every ethics paper.
功利主义是这样一种伦理理论：正确的行为就是能够最大化总体幸福或效用的行为。CCEA 考生必须清楚区分行为功利主义（AU），它依据每一具体行动的后果来评判该行动，与规则功利主义（RU），它评判行动的标准在于行动是否符合那些一旦被普遍接受就能使效用最大化的规则。这一区分几乎在每份伦理学试卷中都会考察。
A high-frequency error is to claim that AU ‘considers the consequences of rules’ while RU ‘considers the consequences of actions’. These definitions are frequently reversed in student essays. Another pitfall is asserting that RU avoids all counter-intuitive implications. Examiners expect you to recognise that RU can collapse into either AU or a form of rule-worship. For example, if a rule ‘do not lie’ generally maximises happiness, RU still faces the dilemma when a lie would prevent a great harm. If the rule is amended to ‘do not lie except when it prevents great harm’, the rule becomes so fine-grained that it mirrors AU’s case-by-case calculation. This is known as the ‘collapse problem’. Simply praising RU for respecting rights fails to address this internal tension.
一个高频错误是声称行为功利主义“考虑规则的后果”，而规则功利主义“考虑行动的后果”。学生论文中经常把这些定义搞反。另一个陷阱是断言规则功利主义能够避免所有反直觉的后果。考官期望你认识到，规则功利主义可能坍塌为行为功利主义或某种规则崇拜。例如，如果“不说谎”这条规则通常能最大化幸福，规则功利主义面对某个谎言可以防止巨大伤害时，仍会陷入两难。如果将此规则修改为“不要说谎，除非能防止巨大伤害”，规则就会变得如此具体，以致于它映射了行为功利主义的逐案计算。这就是著名的“坍塌问题”。仅仅赞扬规则功利主义尊重权利，而未能处理这一内部张力，是无法拿满分的。
To elevate your answer, link the distinction to Mill’s ‘harm principle’ and his proof of utility. Use the CCEA material on strong and weak rule utilitarianism. Strong RU prohibits any exception to the rules; weak RU allows exceptions in extreme circumstances, which brings it closer to AU. Highlight that the debate is not merely about counting consequences but about the role of moral rules in practical reasoning.
要提升答案层次，可以将这一区分与密尔的“伤害原则”及其对效用的证明联系起来。运用 CCEA 教材中关于强规则功利主义与弱规则功利主义的内容。强规则功利主义禁止对规则作出任何例外；弱规则功利主义允许在极端情况下有例外，这就使其更接近行为功利主义。要突出强调，这一争论不仅仅关乎对后果的计算，更关乎道德规则在实践推理中所扮演的角色。
5. Kantian Deontology: The Categorical Imperative | 康德义务论：定言命令
Kant’s ethics centres on the idea that moral actions must be performed out of duty and in accordance with the categorical imperative. The first formulation, the Formula of Universal Law, demands that you ‘act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’. CCEA exam questions frequently test your ability to apply this formula to specific maxims, and to distinguish contradiction in conception from contradiction in will.
康德的伦理学核心在于，道德行为必须出于义务并符合定言命令。第一公式，也就是普遍法则公式，要求你“只依循那些你同时能够意愿其成为普遍法则的准则去行动”。CCEA 试题经常考察你是否能将这一公式应用于具体的准则，并区分“构想上的矛盾”与“意志中的矛盾”。
A common misunderstanding is to treat the universalisation test as a mere consequence-check: ‘if everyone lied, society would collapse, so lying is wrong.’ This is teleological, not deontological. Kant is concerned with the rational consistency of the maxim as a universal law, not with desirable outcomes. A maxim like ‘I will make false promises when it benefits me’ cannot be conceived as a universal law because the practice of promising would undermine itself. In such cases, a contradiction in conception arises. For a maxim like ‘I will never help others’, although it can be conceived universally, you cannot rationally will it, because you might need help yourself; this is a contradiction in will. Blurring these two types of contradiction loses marks.
一个普遍误解是将普遍化检验仅仅视为对后果的检查：“如果人人都说谎，社会将会崩溃，所以说谎是错误的。”这属于目的论而非义务论。康德关心的是准则作为普遍法则时的理性一致性，而非可取的结果。像“当有利于我时，我将作虚假承诺”这样的准则，无法被构想为普遍法则，因为允诺的实践将自我瓦解。此类情形中出现的便是构想上的矛盾。而对于“我绝不会帮助他人”这样的准则，尽管可以被普遍构想，你却不能理性地意愿它，因为你自身也可能需要帮助；这便是意志中的矛盾。混淆这两种矛盾类型会丢失分数。
Strong responses also connect the Universal Law formulation to the Humanity formulation, showing that deceiving a person treats them merely as a means. CCEA mark schemes reward candidates who discuss the objection that the categorical imperative is too rigid – the example of lying to a would-be murderer – and who probe whether Kant’s prohibition on lying is absolute or can be limited by drawing on his published works rather than common hearsay.
精彩的回答还会将普遍法则公式与人性公式联系起来，指出欺骗一个人就是仅仅将其当作手段。CCEA 的评分方案会奖励那些讨论“定言命令过于僵化”这一反对意见的考生——比如对凶犯说谎的例子——并且能够依据康德的原著而非道听途说来探究康德对说谎的禁止究竟是绝对的，还是可以受限的。
6. Virtue Ethics: Eudaimonia and the Golden Mean | 美德伦理学：幸福与中庸
Virtue ethics shifts the focus from acts and rules to the character of the moral agent. For Aristotle, the ultimate goal is eudaimonia, often translated as flourishing or the good life, achieved by practicing virtues in accordance with reason. Each virtue is a golden mean between two vices, such as courage lying between rashness and cowardice. CCEA questions often require you to explain how virtue ethics makes sense of moral motivation and the role of practical wisdom (phronesis).
美德伦理学将焦点从行为与规则转移到道德行为者的品格上。在亚里士多德看来，人生的终极目标是 eudaimonia，通常译作繁盛或好的生活，通过合乎理性地践行美德而达成。每一种美德都是两个恶习之间的中道，例如勇敢便处于鲁莽与怯懦之间。CCEA 题目经常要求你解释美德伦理学如何说明道德动机，以及实践智慧（phronesis）的作用。
A major error is to treat the doctrine of the mean as a simple arithmetic average. The mean is relative to the individual and the situation; what is moderate for an athlete is not the same as for a child. Students who write ‘courage is the midpoint between rashness and cowardice’ without qualification miss Aristotle’s nuance. Additionally, examiners see many vague statements about ‘good character’ without any mention of the role of practical reason in perceiving what is appropriate. The virtuous person, for Aristotle, has the right desire and the right rational perception working together.
一个重大错误是将中道学说视为简单的算术平均值。中道是相对于个体与情境而言的；对运动员来说是适度的，对儿童就不一定适用。那些不加限定地写出“勇敢是鲁莽与怯懦的中点”的学生，就忽略了亚里士多德的精微之处。此外，考官经常会看到大量关于“良好品格”的模糊表述，却完全没有提到实践理性在洞察何为适当行为时所起的作用。在亚里士多德看来，有德之人拥有正确的欲望与正确的理性洞察，二者协同运作。
Also be aware of the standard objections: the charge of circularity (an act is virtuous if done by a virtuous person, but a virtuous person is one who does virtuous acts) and the problem of clashing virtues. A top-tier answer acknowledges these but also shows that virtue ethics can guide action via v-rules (‘be honest, be kind’) and that it places moral education and moral perception at the centre, offering something both deontology and consequentialism lack. Reference to modern thinkers like Alasdair MacIntyre or Rosalind Hursthouse within CCEA set texts will impress.
同时要了解那些标准的反对意见：循环性指控（一个行为如果出自有德之人便是德性行为，但是有德之人又由做出德性行为来界定），以及美德冲突问题。最高层次的答案会承认这些局限，但同时指出美德伦理学可以通过“德性规则”（“要诚实，要仁慈”）为行动提供指引，并将道德教育与道德知觉置于核心，这是义务论与后果论都欠缺的。引用 CCEA 指定文本中阿拉斯代尔·麦金太尔或罗莎琳德·赫斯特豪斯等现代思想家，会令考官印象深刻。
7. The Problem of Evil: Logical and Evidential | 恶的问题：逻辑问题与证据问题
The problem of evil is the most powerful challenge to the existence of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God. CCEA candidates must distinguish between the logical problem (the alleged contradiction between the existence of God and any evil whatsoever) and the evidential problem (the amount and distribution of evil makes God’s existence improbable). This distinction is frequently the focus of part (a) and part (b) questions.
恶的问题是针对全知、全能、全善的上帝之存在最有力的挑战。CCEA 考生必须区分逻辑问题（上帝的存在与任何恶之间被指称存在的矛盾）与证据问题（恶的数量与分布使上帝的存在变得极不可能）。这一区分经常是分题 (a) 与 (b) 的考查重点。
The greatest pitfall is conflating the two. A candidate might begin by discussing the logical problem but then offer a response such as ‘evil is necessary for soul-making’, which is a theodicy addressing the evidential problem, not a logical defence. Plantinga’s free will defence is properly a response to the logical problem: it demonstrates that it is possible that God could not create a world with free creatures who always do good, because free will necessarily carries the possibility of moral evil. Therefore, God and evil are not logically incompatible. This does not need to explain why God allows horrendous evils, only that a logically possible scenario exists. Students who try to make Plantinga’s defence into an explanation for actual suffering betray a fundamental misunderstanding.
最大的陷阱是将二者混为一谈。考生可能先讨论逻辑问题，然后给出诸如“恶是灵魂塑造所必须的”这样的回应，而这是一个回应证据问题的神正论，不是逻辑辩护。普兰丁格的自由意志辩护恰当地回应的是逻辑问题：它证明，上帝可能无法创造一个其中所有自由受造物都永远行善的世界，因为自由意志必然带有道德之恶的可能性。因此，上帝与恶在逻辑上并不矛盾。这种辩护不需要解释上帝为什么允许可怕的恶存在，只需要指出一种逻辑上可能的状况即可。那些试图把普兰丁格的辩护变成对现实苦难进行解释的学生，暴露出根本性的误解。
When discussing the evidential problem, be specific about Rowe’s fawn or the Holocaust, and link Hick’s soul-making theodicy to the idea of epistemic distance. Examiners look for the ability to test theodicies against the evidential challenge. For instance, does soul-making successfully account for the suffering of animals or infants? Can the free will defence explain natural evil? High-quality essays weigh theodicies and then offer a balanced judgement on whether all evil can be reconciled with theistic belief.
在讨论证据问题时，要具体提及罗伊的小鹿或大屠杀案例，并将希克的灵魂塑造神正论与认知距离的概念联系起来。考官看重学生用证据层面的挑战来检验神正论的能力。例如，灵魂塑造是否能成功解释动物或婴儿的苦难？自由意志辩护能否解释自然恶？高质量的论文会权衡各种神正论，然后就所有恶能否与有神论信仰相调和，给出一个均衡的评判。
8. Cosmological Argument: First Cause and Contingency | 宇宙论论证：第一因与偶然性
The cosmological argument in its various forms argues from the existence of the universe to a transcendent cause. Aquinas’ first three ways – from motion, causation, and contingency – are central to CCEA Philosophy of Religion. You must be able to reconstruct the logical structure of each way and identify the role of infinite regress. The Kalam version, with its focus on temporal beginning, is also a frequent topic.
各种形式的宇宙论论证都从宇宙的存在推论出一个超越性的原因。阿奎那的前三路——运动的论证、因果的论证以及偶然性的论证——是 CCEA 宗教哲学的核心内容。你必须能够重构每一路的逻辑结构，并辨识无限回溯在其中所扮演的角色。聚焦于时间起始的卡拉姆版本也是常见话题。
A widespread error is to state that Aquinas argues the universe had a beginning in time. His first three ways do not depend on a temporal beginning; they aim to show that even if the universe were eternal, it would still require a sustaining first cause, because essentially ordered series of causes exist here and now. Confusing Aquinas’ per se series with a temporal series leads to blunt critiques like ‘scientists say the Big Bang is the first cause’, which miss the metaphysical depth of the argument. Examiners want you to engage with Hume’s and Russell’s objections: the fallacy of composition, the possibility of a brute fact, and the claim that the concept of a necessary being is incoherent.
一个普遍的错误是说阿奎那论证宇宙在时间上有一个开端。他的前三路并不依赖于一个时间上的开端；它们旨在表明，即便宇宙是永恒的，它仍然需要一个持续支撑其存在的第一因，因为本质上（per se）有序的原因序列就存在于此时此地。将阿奎那的本质上序列与时间上的序列混为一谈，会导致诸如“科学家说大爆炸就是第一因”这样粗糙的批评，而这完全错失了该论证的形而上深度。考官期望你与休谟和罗素的反对意见对话：组合的谬误、原初事实的可能性，以及“必然存在者”这一概念是不融贯的主张。
Top answers also differentiate between the Thomist and Kalam versions. The Kalam argument does explicitly rely on a temporal beginning and modern cosmology. But then it confronts the question of whether that cause must be personal and have the attributes of God. A clear comparative table in your revision notes, and the ability to trace how each version meets or fails to meet Humean objections, will provide the structure for a decisive evaluation.
高水平的答案还会区分托马斯主义的版本与卡拉姆版本。卡拉姆论证确实显式地依赖于时间开端与现代宇宙学。但它随即面对的问题是这个原因是否必须是一个位格且拥有上帝的属性。在你的复习笔记中制作一份清晰的对比表格，并能够梳理出每个版本如何应对或未能应对休谟式的异议，将为决定性的评估提供框架。
9. Teleological Argument: Design and Evolution | 目的论论证：设计论与进化
Arguments from design claim that features of the natural world exhibit purposeful order and complexity that is best explained by an intelligent designer. Paley’s watch analogy and the more modern fine-tuning argument are regularly examined. CCEA candidates need to explain the analogical structure of these arguments and assess the strength of the inference to the best explanation.
设计论证声称，自然界的诸多特征展示了目的性的秩序与复杂性，最佳的解释便是一位智慧设计者。佩利的钟表类比以及更现代的精密调谐论证经常出现在考题中。CCEA 考生需要解释这些论证的类比结构，并评估其“最佳解释推论”的力度。
A typical mistake is claiming that Paley’s watch argument is inductive and therefore weak without engaging with the specifics of the analogy. To score high, unpack exactly how Paley uses the marks of contrivance (the intricate adaptation of means to ends) and argue whether nature truly displays the same kind of purposeful complexity as a watch. Students often simply repeat the phrase ‘the eye is complex’. Instead, explore Hume’s Philo: the watch-universe analogy is weak because the universe is more organic than mechanical, and we have no other universes to compare ours to. Also, do not omit the evolutionary objection; a full analysis must show that Darwinian evolution provides an alternative mechanism for apparent design without need of a designer. The fine-tuning version shifts the debate to cosmological constants and the multiverse hypothesis, which must be explained clearly.
一个典型错误是声称佩利的钟表论证是归纳的因此不成立，而没有深入探讨类比的具体层面。要想获得高分，必须细致阐明佩利如何运用设计标志（手段精巧地适用于目的），并论证自然界是否真的展现出与钟表相同的那类目的性复杂性。学生往往只是重复“眼睛很复杂”这一句。相反，要探讨休谟的斐洛：钟表与宇宙的类比之所以薄弱，是因为宇宙更像一个有机体而非机械装置，而且我们没有别的宇宙来进行比较。此外，不要忽略进化论的反对；完整的分析必须表明，达尔文式的进化提供了一种无需设计者就能解释表面设计的替代机制。精密调谐版本则将争论转移到宇宙学常数与多重宇宙假说上，这需要解释清楚。
To achieve top marks, compare the classical design argument with the anthropic principle and Swinburne’s argument from probability. Demonstrate that the teleological argument, while not a demonstrative proof, can still carry rational weight as part of a cumulative case for theism. Show awareness that CCEA examiners favour answers that recognise the limited but persistent persuasiveness of design reasoning.
要获取最高分，需要将古典设计论证与人择原理及斯温伯恩的概率论证进行比较。要指出，目的论论证虽非一个证明性的证据，但作为有神论累积论证的一部分，它仍然可能持有理性的分量。同时要表明你意识到 CCEA 考官青睐那些既认识到设计推理的局限性，又承认其持久说服力的答案。
10. Mind-Body Dualism: Interaction and Epiphenomenalism | 心灵哲学：二元论、交互作用与副现象论
Cartesian substance dualism holds that mind and body are two distinct substances – mind being essentially thinking and unextended, body being extended and non-thinking. The CCEA specification requires you to examine the arguments for dualism, including the divisibility argument and the
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