📚 A-Level Edexcel Philosophy: Key Terms & Memory Guide | A-Level Edexcel 哲学：词汇术语速记指南
Mastering key terminology is the foundation of success in Edexcel A-Level Philosophy. This guide presents core concepts across epistemology, ethics, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of mind in structured bilingual pairs, helping you memorise definitions and apply them with confidence in essays and exams.
掌握关键术语是 Edexcel A-Level 哲学成功的基础。本指南以结构化双语对照的方式呈现知识论、伦理学、宗教哲学和心灵哲学的核心概念，帮助你记住定义，并在论文和考试中自信地运用。
1. Epistemology: The Basics | 认识论基础
Propositional Knowledge (Knowledge-that): Knowledge expressed as ‘I know that P’, where P is a proposition. It is the primary focus of the tripartite analysis. Example: knowing that Paris is the capital of France.
命题知识（知道-那）： 以“我知道某命题为真”表达的知识，是三要素分析的核心对象。例如：“我知道巴黎是法国首都”。
Acquaintance Knowledge (Knowledge-of): Direct familiarity with a person, place, or experience, gained through sensory contact. Knowing what a mango tastes like by eating it.
亲知知识（知道-某物）： 通过与对象、地点或经验直接接触而获得的熟悉感。例如：吃过芒果便知其味道。
Ability Knowledge (Knowledge-how): Practical skill or competence, such as knowing how to ride a bicycle. Often highlighted by Gilbert Ryle to distinguish from propositional knowledge.
能力知识（知道-如何）： 实践技能或操作能力，如会骑自行车。赖尔常以此区分命题知识。
JTB (Justified True Belief): The traditional definition: S knows that P iff (i) P is true, (ii) S believes P, and (iii) S is justified in believing P. Plato’s Theaetetus is a key source.
JTB（确证的真信念）： 传统定义：S 知道 P 当且仅当 (i) P 为真，(ii) S 相信 P，(iii) S 有理由或证据支持信念。源头可追溯到柏拉图的《泰阿泰德篇》。
Gettier Problem: Scenarios where JTB are satisfied yet intuitively knowledge is absent, revealing that justification, truth, and belief alone are insufficient. Example: stopped clock cases.
盖梯尔问题： JTB 条件被满足但直觉上仍非知识的反例，表明仅靠确证、真和信念不足以定义知识。经典案例：停摆的钟偶然显示正确时间。
2. A Priori, A Posteriori & the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction | 先验、后验与分析/综合区分
A Priori Knowledge: Knowledge gained independently of sense experience, justified by reason alone. Mathematical truths (2+2=4) and logical deductions are typical examples.
先验知识： 独立于感官经验、仅凭理性就可获得并辩护的知识。如数学真理和逻辑推理。
A Posteriori Knowledge: Knowledge that depends on empirical evidence or sense experience. ‘The cat is on the mat’ can only be known by observing the world.
后验知识： 依赖于经验证据或感官观察的知识。例如“猫在垫子上”必须通过观察才能知道。
Analytic Statement: A proposition true solely by virtue of the meaning of its terms, e.g., ‘All bachelors are unmarried’. The predicate is contained in the subject concept.
分析命题： 仅凭词语意义即为真的命题，如“所有单身汉都是未婚的”。谓词概念包含在主词中。
Synthetic Statement: A proposition whose truth value depends on how the world is, not just the meanings of words. ‘The sky is blue’ is synthetic – experience tells us.
综合命题： 真假依赖世界实际状况而非仅词语意义的命题。如“天空是蓝色的”需要经验验证。
Necessary Truth: A proposition that could not be false in any possible world. Mathematical identities and analytic statements are typically necessary.
必然真理： 在所有可能世界中都为真、不可能为假的命题。数学恒等式和分析命题通常为必然真。
Contingent Truth: A proposition true in the actual world but false in some possible worlds. Most empirical facts are contingent.
偶然真理： 在现实世界为真但在某些可能世界中可以不为真的命题。多数经验事实都是偶然的。
3. Theories of Justification | 确证理论
Foundationalism: The view that some beliefs are basic, self-justifying or non-inferentially justified, and they form the foundation upon which all other beliefs are built. Descartes’ cogito is a classic example.
基础主义： 存在一些无需其他信念推论支持的基础信念，它们构成整个知识大厦的根基。笛卡尔的“我思”是典型例子。
Coherentism: Beliefs are justified not by foundations but by belonging to a coherent, mutually supportive system. A belief is justified if it fits well within the system.
融贯论： 信念的确证不在于基础，而在于是否与其他信念构成一个一致、相互支持的系统。一个信念若在系统内融贯就算得到辩护。
Reliabilism: A belief is justified if produced by a reliable cognitive process, i.e., one that tends to yield true beliefs. Reliabilism is externalist; the agent need not be aware of the reliability.
可靠主义： 只要信念由一个能可靠产出真信念的认知过程生成，该信念就得到确证。这是外在主义立场，主体毋需意识到过程的可靠性。
Internalism about Justification: The factors that justify a belief must be internally accessible to the subject, such as conscious reasons or evidence.
内在主义确证： 使信念得到辩护的因素必须对主体内在可及，如有意识的理由或证据。
Externalism about Justification: Justification can depend on factors outside the subject’s awareness, such as the actual reliability of the belief-forming process. Reliabilism is a prime example.
外在主义确证： 确证可依赖于主体意识之外的因素，如信念形成过程的实际可靠性。可靠主义是典型的外在主义。
4. Normative Ethical Theories | 规范伦理理论
Deontology (Kantian Ethics): Morality is based on duty and rules, not consequences. The Categorical Imperative commands us to act only on maxims that can be willed as universal laws, and to treat humanity always as an end, never merely as a means.
义务论（康德伦理学）： 道德基于义务与规则，而非后果。定言令式要求只按照可普遍化的准则行动，并把人性永远当作目的，而非仅仅手段。
Utilitarianism: Consequentialist theory that the right action is the one that maximises overall utility or happiness. Bentham’s hedonic calculus and Mill’s higher/lower pleasures are core distinctions.
功利主义： 后果论理论，主张正确行为是最大化总体功用或幸福的行为。边沁的快乐计算和密尔的高级/低级快乐区分是核心内容。
Virtue Ethics (Aristotle): Focuses on character and virtues, not on rules or consequences. Eudaimonia (flourishing) is the ultimate goal, achieved by cultivating virtues as a mean between extremes.
美德伦理学（亚里士多德）： 强调品格与美德，而非规则或后果。至福（eudaimonia）是终极目标，通过培养作为两极之间的中庸美德来实现。
Situation Ethics (Fletcher): Only one moral rule: love (agape). Moral decisions are made according to what best serves love in the specific situation, rejecting absolute rules.
境遇伦理学（弗莱彻）： 唯一道德准则是爱（agape）。在具体境遇中根据最服务于爱的原则来做决定，拒绝绝对律法。
5. Meta-ethics: Cognitivism vs Non-cognitivism | 元伦理学：认知主义与非认知主义
Cognitivism: Moral judgements express beliefs that can be true or false. Naturalism and non-naturalism (intuitionism) are cognitivist theories.
认知主义： 道德判断表达可真可假的信念。自然主义和非自然主义（直觉主义）都是认知主义。
Naturalism (Moral): Moral properties are identical to or reducible to natural properties. Utilitarianism treats ‘good’ as ‘pleasure’, making it a naturalist theory.
（道德）自然主义： 道德属性可等同于或还原为自然属性。功利主义将“善”还原为“快乐”，故是一种自然主义。
Non-naturalism (Moore’s Intuitionism): ‘Good’ is a simple, non-natural property known through intuition. Moore’s Open Question Argument shows that goodness cannot be equated with any natural property.
非自然主义（摩尔的直觉主义）： “善”是一种不可定义的、非自然的简单属性，通过直觉把握。摩尔的开放问题论证表明，善不能等同于任何自然属性。
Error Theory (Mackie): Moral statements aim to describe objective moral facts, but no such facts exist. Therefore, all positive moral judgements are false.
错误理论（麦基）： 道德陈述旨在描述客观道德事实，但这类事实根本不存在。因此所有肯定的道德判断都是假的。
Emotivism (Ayer/Stevenson): Non-cognitivist view that moral utterances express emotions or attitudes and aim to influence others. ‘Stealing is wrong’ means something like ‘Boo, stealing!’
情绪主义（艾耶尔/史蒂文森）： 非认知主义观点，认为道德话语只是表达情感或态度并试图影响他人。“偷窃是错的”相当于“呸，偷窃！”。
Prescriptivism (Hare): Moral language prescribes actions; it is universal and overriding. ‘You ought not to lie’ means ‘Do not lie’ and implies this applies to all similar situations.
规约主义（黑尔）： 道德语言规定行为，具有普遍性和压倒性。“你不该说谎”意味着“不要说谎”，并暗示此规定适用于所有类似情形。
6. Arguments for the Existence of God | 上帝存在的论证
Ontological Argument (Anselm): God is defined as ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’. If God exists only in the mind, we could conceive a greater being that exists in reality. Therefore, God must exist in reality. Descartes’ version relies on God possessing all perfections, including existence.
本体论论证（安瑟伦）： 上帝被定义为“不能设想有比之更伟大的存在者”。若只存在于心中，还可设想一个也在现实中存在的更大者，故上帝必然存在。笛卡尔版本基于上帝拥有所有完善属性，包括存在。
Cosmological Argument (Aquinas/Kalam): From observation of cause and effect or contingent beings, we infer a first cause or necessary being. Aquinas’ Third Way argues from contingency; the Kalam version argues for a personal creator from the beginning of the universe.
宇宙论论证（阿奎那/凯拉姆）： 从因果或偶然存在者的观察出发，推出第一因或必然存在者。阿奎那的第三路从偶然性论证；凯拉姆版本从宇宙有开端推出一位位格创造者。
Teleological (Design) Argument (Paley): The complexity and apparent purpose in nature imply an intelligent designer. Paley’s watchmaker analogy: a watch implies a watchmaker, so the universe implies a divine designer.
目的论（设计）论证（佩利）： 自然界的复杂性和表面目的暗示一位理智设计者。佩利的手表类比：手表需要制表匠，因此宇宙需要神圣设计者。
The Problem of Evil: Challenges the existence of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God given the existence of evil. Logical problem: evil’s existence is logically incompatible with God. Evidential problem: the amount and distribution of evil make God’s existence improbable.
恶的问题： 鉴于世间的恶，全能全善的上帝是否可能存在。逻辑恶问题：恶的存在与上帝逻辑上不相容。证据恶问题：恶的数量与分布使得上帝存在极不可能。
Theodicy (Augustine): Evil is not a substance but a privation of good, resulting from the misuse of free will. God is not responsible; the Fall accounts for natural and moral evil. A final judgement restores order.
神正论（奥古斯丁）： 恶不是实体，而是善的缺失，源于自由意志的滥用。上帝不承担责任；堕落解释了自然恶与道德恶，最终审判将恢复秩序。
Theodicy (Irenaeus/Hick): Souls are created immature; evil and suffering help humans grow towards moral and spiritual perfection. This soul-making process ultimately produces a mature, free love of God.
神正论（爱任纽/希克）： 灵魂被造时尚未成熟，恶与苦难帮助人类朝向道德灵性完善成长。这个灵魂塑造过程最终产生对上帝成熟的自由之爱。
7. Religious Language | 宗教语言
Verification Principle (Ayer): A statement is only meaningful if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable. Metaphysical and religious claims are neither, so they are literally meaningless.
可证实原则（艾耶尔）： 一个陈述有意义，当且仅当它是分析的或可经由经验证实的。形而上学与宗教主张两者皆非，故字面上无意义。
Falsification Principle (Flew): For an assertion to be meaningful, there must be some possible state of affairs that would count against it. Religious believers so qualify their claims that nothing could falsify them, rendering them vacuous.
可证伪原则（弗卢）： 要使一个断言有意义，必须存在某些可能事态能够反驳它。宗教信徒不断限定其主张，致使其无法被反驳，因而空无意义。
Via Negativa (Apophatic Way): God is beyond human comprehension, so we can only speak of God by saying what God is not, e.g., God is not limited, not temporal.
否定之路（遮诠法）： 上帝超越人类理解，因此只能通过说上帝不是什么来谈论，如上帝非有限、非时间性。
Analogy (Aquinas): Religious language works through analogy, not univocally (same meaning) or equivocally (totally different meaning). Analogy of attribution: God is the cause of human goodness, so we can predicate ‘good’ analogously. Analogy of proportionality: God’s power is proportionally perfect relative to His nature.
类比说（阿奎那）： 宗教语言通过类比工作，既非单义也非全异义。归因类比：上帝是人类善性的原因，故可类比地使用“善”。比例类比：上帝的能力相对于其本性是成比例完美的。
Symbolic Language (Tillich): Religious language uses symbols that participate in the reality to which they point. Unlike mere signs, symbols open up dimensions of reality and soul, conveying deep existential meaning.
象征语言（蒂利希）： 宗教语言使用符号，这些符号参与其所指向的实在。不同于单纯的记号，符号开启实在与心灵的维度，传达深层存在意义。
8. Philosophy of Mind: Dualism & Materialism | 心灵哲学：二元论与唯物主义
Substance Dualism (Descartes): Mind and body are two distinct substances: res cogitans (thinking thing) and res extensa (extended thing). The mind can exist independently of the body. The problem of interaction is a key criticism.
实体二元论（笛卡尔）： 心灵与身体是两种不同实体：思维物与广延物。心灵可以独立于身体存在。交互作用难题是主要批评。
Property Dualism: There is only one substance (physical), but mental properties are non-physical and irreducible. Qualia, the subjective ‘what it is like’ of experience, are often cited as irreducible mental properties.
属性二元论： 只有一种实体（物理实体），但心理属性是非物理的且不可还原。感受质，即经验的主观“像什么”，常被看作不可还原的心理属性。
Philosophical Zombie: A hypothetical being physically identical to a human but lacking conscious experience. If zombies are conceivable, consciousness is not logically supervenient on the physical, challenging physicalism.
哲学僵尸： 假设在物理上与人类完全相同但欠缺意识经验的存在。若僵尸可设想，则意识在逻辑上并不随附于物理，这对物理主义构成挑战。
Type Identity Theory: Mental states are identical to brain states. Pain just is C-fibres firing. This reductive physicalism faces the multiple realizability objection: pain could be realised by different neural states in different species.
类型同一论： 心理状态等同于大脑状态。疼痛就是 C-神经纤维的激发。这种还原的物理主义面临多重可实现性反驳：疼痛可在不同物种通过不同神经状态实现。
Functionalism: Mental states are defined by their functional roles (causal relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states), not by their physical makeup. The mind is like software running on brain hardware.
功能主义： 心理状态由其功能角色（即与输入、输出和其他心理状态的因果联系）定义，而非物理构成。心灵如同运行在大脑硬件上的软件。
9. Free Will & Determinism | 自由意志与决定论
Hard Determinism: All events, including human actions, are causally determined by prior states. Therefore, free will is an illusion, and moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism.
硬决定论： 一切事件包括人类行为都由先在状态因果决定。因此，自由意志是幻觉，道德责任与决定论不相容。
Libertarianism (Free Will): Agents have free will, and determinism is false. Humans possess a special causal power that allows them to originate actions independently of prior causes. This requires some form of indeterminism.
自由意志论： 主体拥有自由意志，决定论为假。人类具有特殊的因果能力，能独立于先在原因发起行动。这需要某种非决定论。
Compatibilism (Soft Determinism): Free will and determinism are compatible. Free actions are those caused by an agent’s own desires and intentions without external coercion, even if those desires are themselves determined.
相容论（软决定论）： 自由意志与决定论相容。自由行动是那些由行动者自身愿望与意图引起、没有外部强制的行动，即便这些愿望本身也是被决定的。
Moral Responsibility and Frankfurt Cases: Harry Frankfurt proposed scenarios where an agent appears morally responsible even if they could not have done otherwise, challenging the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. This supports compatibilism.
道德责任与法兰克福案例： 法兰克福提出一些情境，行动者即使不可能做出不同选择，仍然在道德上负有责任，从而挑战了其他可能性原则，支持相容论。
10. Logic & Argumentation | 逻辑与论证工具
Deductive Argument: An argument where, if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. Validity concerns the form; soundness requires true premises.
演绎论证： 若前提为真，结论必然为真的论证。有效性关涉形式；可靠性则还要求前提为真。
Inductive Argument: The premises provide some
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