The Influence of the Supreme Court on the Executive and Parliament | 最高法院对行政机关与议会的影响

📚 The Influence of the Supreme Court on the Executive and Parliament | 最高法院对行政机关与议会的影响

The UK Supreme Court, established in 2009, has become a central actor in the constitution, shaping the boundaries of power between the executive and parliament. Through judicial review, its rulings have reinforced parliamentary sovereignty, constrained ministerial prerogative, and highlighted tensions between the rule of law and political decision-making. This article examines how the Court influences both the executive branch and the Westminster Parliament, exploring landmark cases, constitutional principles, and the limitations of judicial power.

英国最高法院自2009年成立以来，已成为宪法中的核心角色，塑造着行政机关与议会之间的权力边界。通过司法审查，最高法院的裁决强化了议会主权，限制了部长特权的行使，并凸显了法治与政治决策之间的张力。本文考察最高法院如何同时影响行政机关和威斯敏斯特议会，探讨里程碑式的案例、宪法原则以及司法权力的局限。

1. The Constitutional Role of the Supreme Court | 最高法院的宪法角色

The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal for civil cases across the UK and for criminal cases in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. More significantly, it determines whether public bodies, including government ministers, have acted lawfully. Its power of judicial review allows it to interpret legislation and to declare actions of the executive ultra vires — beyond the powers granted by Parliament. This function places the Court squarely at the intersection of law and politics, often requiring it to rule on matters with far‑reaching political consequences.

最高法院是全英民事案件以及英格兰、威尔士和北爱尔兰刑事案件的终审法院。更重要的是，它裁决包括政府部长在内的公共机构是否依法行事。其司法审查权允许法院解释立法，并宣布行政机关的行为属于“越权”——超出议会授予的权力范围。这一职能使法院直接处于法律与政治的交叉点，常常需要就具有深远政治后果的事项作出裁决。

2. Judicial Review and the Ultra Vires Principle | 司法审查与越权原则

At the heart of the Supreme Court’s influence lies the ultra vires doctrine. When a minister or public authority takes a decision without legal authority, or frustrates the purpose of an Act of Parliament, the Court can quash that decision. This restrains the executive from using secondary legislation or prerogative powers in ways that contradict statute. The Court does not substitute its own view of the merits but ensures that the executive remains within the four corners of the law made by Parliament.

最高法院影响力的核心在于“越权”原则。当部长或公共机构在没有法律授权的情况下作出决定，或者违背议会法案的意图时，法院可以撤销该决定。这限制了行政机关通过二级立法或特权权力以与成文法相抵触的方式行事。法院并不代行对实质性优劣的判断，而是确保行政机关始终处在议会制定的法律范围之内。

3. The 2005 Constitutional Reform Act and Judicial Independence | 2005年《宪政改革法》与司法独立

The creation of the Supreme Court by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 ended the anomaly of the highest court sitting within the House of Lords. This physical and institutional separation from Parliament enhanced judicial independence and public perception of impartiality. The Act also reformed the role of the Lord Chancellor, reinforcing the separation of powers. As a result, the Court is now more willing to scrutinise executive action with a confidence that would have been harder to achieve in the old system.

2005年《宪政改革法》创立最高法院，终结了最高终审法院设在上议院内的历史。这一与议会在物理和制度上的分离加强了司法独立，也改善了公众心中对公正性的观感。该法还改革了大法官的职能，强化了权力分立。结果是，如今的最高法院更愿意以自信的姿态审查行政行为，这种自信在旧制度下是难以达成的。

4. The Article 50 Miller Case (2017): Parliament Must Legislate | 《第50条》米勒案（2017年）：议会必须立法

In R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, the Supreme Court ruled by an 8-3 majority that the government could not trigger Article 50 TEU using royal prerogative alone. The Court held that because EU law was a source of domestic rights, removing those rights required an Act of Parliament. This landmark judgment forced the executive to introduce the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill, reaffirming that ministers cannot bypass Parliament on matters of fundamental constitutional change.

在R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5案中，最高法院以8比3的多数裁定，政府不能仅凭王室特权启动《欧盟条约》第50条。法院认为，由于欧盟法律是国内权利的来源，取消这些权利必须经由议会立法。这一里程碑式的判决迫使行政机关提交《欧盟（退出通知）法案》，重申了大臣在根本性宪法变革问题上不得绕开议会。

5. The Prorogation Case (Miller/Cherry) 2019: A Judicial Check on Executive Power | 休会案（米勒/切里）2019年：司法对行政权力的制约

In R (Miller) v The Prime Minister and Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland [2019] UKSC 41, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Prime Minister’s advice to the Queen to prorogue Parliament for five weeks was unlawful. The Court found that the length and timing of the prorogation had the effect of frustrating or preventing Parliament from carrying out its constitutional functions without reasonable justification. The prorogation was declared void and Parliament resumed sitting. This was a direct and dramatic assertion of judicial authority over the exercise of a prerogative power that had traditionally been considered non‑justiciable.

在R (Miller) v The Prime Minister和Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland [2019] UKSC 41案中，最高法院一致裁定，首相向女王建议议会休会五周的行为违法。法院认为，此次休会的时长和时机导致议会无法正常履行其宪法职能，且缺乏合理理由。休会令被宣布无效，议会恢复议事。这是对传统上被认为不可审查的特权权力进行的直接而戏剧性的司法授权彰显。

6. Impact on Executive Decision‑Making | 对行政决策的影响

The cumulative effect of these judgments has been a more cautious executive. Government lawyers now routinely assess the risk of judicial review before ministers act, and the “lawfulness” test has become a central element of policy formation. The Supreme Court’s willingness to rule against the government in high‑profile cases has also altered the political calculus: ministers know that controversial uses of power may be challenged and potentially struck down, which serves as a behavioural constraint on executive overreach.

上述判决的累积效应促使行政机关变得更加谨慎。如今，政府律师在部长行动之前例行评估司法审查的风险，“合法性”检测已成为政策制定的核心要素。最高法院在高关注度案件中对抗政府的意愿也改变了政治考量：部长们明白，对权力的争议性运用可能会遭到挑战甚至被推翻，这就对行政越权形成了一种行为约束。

7. The Court’s Relationship with Parliamentary Sovereignty | 法院与议会主权的关系

Superficially, the Supreme Court appears to challenge parliamentary sovereignty by striking down executive actions and interpreting statutes in ways that may not have been intended by the legislature. However, the Court consistently justifies its decisions by reference to Parliament’s own sovereignty: it acts to protect the will of Parliament from being undermined by a renegade executive. In the Miller I and prorogation cases, the Court explicitly stated that it was upholding the sovereignty of Parliament, not subverting it.

表面上看，最高法院通过推翻行政行为并以可能并非立法机关本意的方式解释法律，似乎挑战了议会主权。然而，法院始终以议会本身的主权来论证其裁决：它是在保护议会的意志免受失范行政部门的破坏。在米勒I案和休会案中，法院明确表示其维护而非颠覆议会的最高性。

8. Declarations of Incompatibility under the Human Rights Act | 《人权法案》下“不一致宣告”的影响

Under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998, the Supreme Court can issue a declaration of incompatibility if a provision of an Act of Parliament cannot be interpreted compatibly with European Convention rights. Such a declaration does not invalidate the law, but it places political and moral pressure on the executive and Parliament to amend it. In practice, governments have almost always responded by changing the law, underlining the Court’s influence over the legislative agenda without challenging parliamentary sovereignty directly.

根据1998年《人权法案》第4条，如果一项议会立法无法被解释为符合《欧洲人权公约》权利，最高法院可作出不一致宣告。这一宣告并不令该法律失效，但对行政机关和议会施加了政治和道义压力，促使修法。在实践中，政府几乎总是通过修改法律来回应，这凸显了最高法院对立法议程的影响力，同时并未直接挑战议会主权。

9. The Joint Committee on Human Rights and Legislative Scrutiny | 人权联合委员会与立法审查

Declarations of incompatibility have strengthened the hand of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, a parliamentary body that scrutinises Bills for human rights compliance. Knowing that a Ministerial statement of compatibility under section 19 of the Human Rights Act may later be tested in court, the committee and parliamentarians pay greater attention to rights‑based arguments. This interactive dynamic between courts and Parliament creates a ‘constitutional dialogue’ that refines legislation.

不一致宣告增强了议会的“人权联合委员会”的影响力，该委员会审查法案是否符合人权。由于知晓部长根据《人权法案》第19条所作的兼容性声明日后可能在法庭上受到检验，该委员会和议员们对人权论证给予了更多关注。法院与议会之间的这种互动创造了“宪法对话”，从而优化立法。

10. Limits on the Supreme Court’s Influence | 最高法院影响力的局限

Despite high‑profile interventions, the Supreme Court’s influence is fundamentally limited. It cannot strike down primary legislation; the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty remains intact. The Court’s rulings can be overridden by a new Act of Parliament, as was threatened after the prorogation judgment. Furthermore, the Court relies on the executive and Parliament to comply with and enforce its judgments. Politically, sustained non‑compliance could provoke a constitutional crisis, but in legal terms, the Court has no army or purse to compel obedience.

尽管有高调的介入，最高法院的影响力从根本上受到限制。它不能推翻一级立法；议会主权原则仍完好无损。法院的裁决可以通过新的议会法案被推翻，休会判决后就曾出现这种威胁。此外，法院依赖行政机关和议会遵守并执行其裁决。在政治上，持续的不遵从可能引发宪法危机，但在法律层面，法院没有军队或财政来强制服从。

11. The European Convention on Human Rights and International Law | 《欧洲人权公约》与国际法因素

The Supreme Court’s approach is also shaped by international law obligations. While the UK is no longer part of the EU legal order, the European Convention on Human Rights still applies. The Court must take account of Strasbourg jurisprudence, which at times pushes UK law‑makers further than they might otherwise go. However, the Court has occasionally resisted expansive interpretations from Strasbourg, preserving a degree of national judicial autonomy, as seen in prisoner voting cases.

最高法院的审理方式也受到国际法义务的影响。尽管英国已不再属于欧盟法律秩序，《欧洲人权公约》依然适用。法院必须考虑斯特拉斯堡的判例，这有时会推动英国立法者超出其原本的意图。但法院偶尔也抵制斯特拉斯堡的扩张性解释，维护一定程度的国内司法自主权，囚犯投票权案件便是一例。

12. Conclusion: A Guardian of the Constitutional Order | 结语：宪政秩序的守护者

The Supreme Court has undeniably influenced the executive by exposing unlawful conduct and forcing governmental accountability. It has reshaped the dynamics between the executive and Parliament, often requiring the latter to assert its sovereignty explicitly. Yet the Court remains a constitutional guardian, not a ruler. Its power ultimately rests on public confidence, the force of its reasoning, and the willingness of the other branches to accept the rule of law. For A‑Level students, understanding this delicate balance is key to grasping the UK’s uncodified constitution.

不可否认，最高法院通过揭露违法行径并要求政府承担责任，对行政机关产生了影响。它重塑了行政机关与议会之间的互动关系，常要求后者明确宣示自身的主权。然而，法院依然是宪政秩序的守护者，而非统治者。其权力最终有赖于公众信任、判理说服力以及其他权力分支接受法治的意愿。对于A‑Level学子而言，理解这一微妙平衡正是把握英国不成为宪法的关键。

Published by TutorHao | UK Government & Politics Revision Series | aleveler.com

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