A-Level CAIE Philosophy: Unit Test Mock Paper Analysis | A-Level CAIE 哲学：单元测试模拟卷解析

📚 A-Level CAIE Philosophy: Unit Test Mock Paper Analysis | A-Level CAIE 哲学：单元测试模拟卷解析

This mock paper analysis covers eight questions drawn from the four CAIE Philosophy 9696 papers: Epistemology, Ethics, Philosophy of Religion, and Philosophy of Mind. Each answer is broken into core material, evaluation points, and common mistakes so that you can see exactly what examiners expect under timed conditions.

本模拟卷解析涵盖 CAIE 哲学 9696 四份试卷中的八道题：认识论、伦理学、宗教哲学和心灵哲学。每道题的答案分为核心内容、评价要点和常见错误，帮助你在限时条件下准确理解考官的要求。

1. Question 1: Knowledge as Justified True Belief | 题目一：知识即被证成的真信念

Question: ‘Outline the tripartite definition of knowledge and explain one Gettier-style counterexample. [12 marks]’

题目：’概述知识的三重定义，并解释一个盖梯尔式反例。[12分]’

Core answer: Propositional knowledge that p standardly requires three conditions: truth, belief, and justification. For a subject S to know that p, p must be true, S must believe that p, and S must be justified in believing that p. This is often abbreviated as JTB.

核心答案：命题性知识 ‘知道 p’ 通常要求三个条件：真、信念和证成。主体 S 要知道 p，必须满足：p 为真，S 相信 p，并且 S 有理由相信 p。这通常简写为 JTB。

Gettier counterexample: Smith has strong evidence that Jones owns a Ford. Smith then validly infers the disjunction ‘Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.’ It turns out that Jones does not own a Ford, but Brown is in Barcelona. The disjunction is true, Smith believes it, and his inference gives him justification, yet the belief is not knowledge because it rests on a false premise.

盖梯尔反例：史密斯有强证据表明琼斯拥有一辆福特车。他由此有效推出选言命题 ‘琼斯拥有福特或布朗在巴塞罗那’。结果琼斯并没有福特，但布朗恰好在巴塞罗那。该选言命题为真，史密斯相信它，并且他的推理给予他证成，但这个信念不是知识，因为它依赖一个错误前提。

Common mistake: Candidates often assert that Gettier shows belief is unnecessary, or they confuse truth with certainty. The real target is the joint sufficiency of the three JTB conditions, not any single necessary condition.

常见错误：考生常断言盖梯尔表明信念不必要，或者混淆真理与确定性。盖梯尔真正攻击的是 JTB 三个条件共同构成充分条件这一主张，而不是任何一个必要条件。

2. Question 2: Direct Realism and the Argument from Illusion | 题目二：直接实在论与幻觉论证

Question: ‘Explain the argument from illusion against direct realism. [12 marks]’

题目：’解释反对直接实在论的幻觉论证。[12分]’

Core answer: Direct realism holds that in perception we are immediately aware of mind-independent physical objects. The stick in water appears bent, but the stick is straight. If the direct object of perception were the physical stick, we would perceive it as it is. Since we perceive something bent, the direct object cannot be the straight physical stick. We must therefore be aware of a mental sense-datum or appearance.

核心答案：直接实在论认为，在知觉中我们直接意识到的是独立于心灵的物理对象。水中的棍子看起来是弯的，但棍子实际上是直的。如果知觉的直接对象是物理棍子，我们就会按照它的真实状态来知觉它。既然我们知觉到某个弯曲的东西，直接对象就不可能是那根直的物理棍子。因此，我们必须意识到一个心理的感觉材料或表象。

Key move: Because illusory perception is subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perception, the same analysis must apply to veridical cases. If the direct object in illusion is a sense-datum, then the direct object in veridical perception is also a sense-datum, not the physical object itself.

关键推理：由于幻觉知觉与真实知觉在主观上无法区分，同样的分析必须适用于真实知觉。如果幻觉中的直接对象是感觉材料，那么真实知觉中的直接对象也是感觉材料，而不是物理对象本身。

Common error: Students often describe the stick as ‘actually bent’ or treat the argument as proving that physical objects do not exist. The argument aims only to show that the direct object is not the physical object; it does not by itself

Published by TutorHao | A-Level 哲学 Revision Series | aleveler.com

更多咨询请联系16621398022（同微信）