📚 Differing Objectives of a Firm | 企业的不同目标
In standard microeconomic theory, the firm is often modelled as a single decision-maker that aims to maximise profit. However, real firms are complex organisations in which ownership and control may be separated, managers may pursue their own goals, and stakeholders such as workers, customers and governments can influence decisions. This article examines the differing objectives a firm may adopt and the conditions that define each objective.
在标准微观经济理论中，企业通常被模型化为一个以利润最大化为目标的单一决策者。然而，现实中的企业是复杂的组织，所有权和控制权可能分离，管理者可能追求自身目标，工人、消费者和政府等利益相关者也会影响决策。本文分析企业可能采取的不同目标以及每种目标所对应的条件。
1. The Traditional Profit-Maximising Firm | 传统的利润最大化企业
The neoclassical theory of the firm assumes that owners want to maximise profit, defined as total revenue minus total cost. Profit maximisation occurs at the output where marginal cost equals marginal revenue, provided marginal cost cuts marginal revenue from below. At this output, the firm earns the greatest possible positive difference between total revenue and total cost.
新古典企业理论假设所有者希望最大化利润，利润定义为总收益减去总成本。利润最大化出现在边际成本等于边际收益的产量处，并且边际成本从下方穿过边际收益。在该产量下，企业获得总收益与总成本之间最大的正差额。
Profit maximisation: MC = MR
利润最大化条件：边际成本 = 边际收益
When average revenue is above average total cost at this output, the firm earns supernormal profit. In perfect competition, supernormal profit is competed away in the long run, but in imperfect markets it can persist because of barriers to entry. Profit maximisation remains a useful benchmark, but it assumes perfect information and no separation of ownership and control.
当该产量下的平均收益高于平均总成本时，企业获得超额利润。在完全竞争中，超额利润长期会被竞争消除；但在不完全市场中，由于进入壁垒，超额利润可以持续存在。利润最大化仍然是一个有用的基准，但它假设信息完全且所有权与控制权没有分离。
2. Why Firms May Abandon Pure Profit Maximisation | 企业为何可能放弃纯利润最大化
In practice, shareholders do not run large companies on a day-to-day basis. Professional managers make pricing and output decisions, and their personal objectives may differ from those of shareholders. This separation of ownership from control creates a principal-agent problem in which the owners (principals) cannot perfectly monitor the managers (agents).
实际上，股东并不日常经营大型公司。专业管理者作出定价和产量决策，他们的个人目标可能与股东目标不同。所有权与控制权的分离产生委托代理问题，所有者（委托人）无法完美监督管理者（代理人）。
Managers may prefer a quiet life, larger offices, more staff, lower risk or higher revenue because their salaries and status often depend on the size of the firm rather than on pure profit. Information asymmetries and organisational complexity allow these objectives to survive, at least in the short run.
管理者可能偏好安逸的生活、更大的办公室、更多员工、较低风险或更高收益，因为他们的薪酬和地位通常取决于公司规模而非纯利润。信息不对称和组织复杂性使这些目标至少在短期内得以维持。
3. Revenue Maximisation | 收益最大化
William Baumol suggested that managers often aim to maximise total revenue rather than profit. Revenue is easier to measure than profit, and managers’ pay, power and prestige are frequently linked to sales revenue. A revenue-maximising firm produces where marginal revenue equals zero, because total revenue is at its maximum when the last unit sold adds nothing to revenue.
威廉·鲍莫尔提出，管理者通常追求总收益最大化而非利润最大化。收益比利润更容易衡量，并且管理者的薪酬、权力和声望通常与销售收入挂钩。收益最大化企业会在边际收益等于零处生产，因为当最后一单位产品对收益没有贡献时，总收益达到最大。
Revenue maximisation: MR = 0
收益最大化条件：边际收益 = 0
Compared with profit maximisation, revenue maximisation leads to a higher output and a lower price, as long as the firm still covers its costs. In a diagram, the revenue-maximising output is to the right of the profit-maximising output where MC equals MR. This can benefit consumers through greater quantity and lower prices, but it reduces the firm’s pure profit.
与利润最大化相比，收益最大化导致更高产量和更低价格，只要企业仍能覆盖成本。在图形中，收益最大化产量位于利润最大化产量（MC 等于 MR）的右侧。这可以通过更大产量和更低价格使消费者受益，但会减少企业的纯利润。
4. Sales Maximisation
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