Mineral Security: Resource Assurance and Supply Chain Risks | 矿产安全：资源保障与供应链风险

📚 Mineral Security: Resource Assurance and Supply Chain Risks | 矿产安全：资源保障与供应链风险

Minerals are the silent foundation of modern civilisation. From the lithium in our smartphone batteries to the copper wiring in our cities and the rare earth elements powering wind turbines, mineral resources underpin every sector of the global economy. Yet the security of these vital resources—defined as the reliable, uninterrupted supply of minerals at reasonable prices—has become one of the most pressing geopolitical and economic challenges of the 21st century.

矿产是现代文明沉默的基石。从智能手机电池中的锂，到城市中的铜线缆，再到驱动风力涡轮机的稀土元素，矿产资源支撑着全球经济的每一个部门。然而，这些关键资源的安全——即以合理价格可靠、不间断地获得矿产供应——已成为21世纪最紧迫的地缘政治和经济挑战之一。

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1. What Is Mineral Security? | 什么是矿产安全？

Mineral security refers to a nation’s ability to ensure the stable and affordable supply of mineral commodities needed for its economy, national defence, and technological advancement. It encompasses not only the physical availability of minerals but also the resilience of supply chains, the diversity of sourcing options, and the capacity to withstand disruptions ranging from natural disasters to geopolitical conflicts.

矿产安全是指一个国家为其经济、国防和技术进步确保矿产商品稳定且可负担供应的能力。它不仅涵盖矿产的物理可得性，还包括供应链的韧性、采购来源的多样性，以及抵御从自然灾害到地缘政治冲突等各种干扰的能力。

In essence, mineral security is about answering four critical questions: Do we have enough? Can we get it? Can we afford it? And can we sustain access over the long term?

本质上，矿产安全关乎回答四个关键问题：我们的储量足够吗？我们能否获得它？我们能否负担得起？我们能否长期维持获取渠道？

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2. The Critical Minerals Landscape | 关键矿产格局

Not all minerals are created equal in strategic importance. Critical minerals are those that are essential to national security, clean energy transitions, and advanced manufacturing, yet face significant supply chain vulnerabilities. The list varies by country but commonly includes rare earth elements, lithium, cobalt, graphite, gallium, germanium, and platinum group metals.

并非所有矿产都具有同等的战略重要性。关键矿产是指对国家安全、清洁能源转型和先进制造至关重要，却面临重大供应链脆弱性的矿产。各国清单有所不同，但通常包括稀土元素、锂、钴、石墨、镓、锗和铂族金属。

Mineral | 矿产	Primary Uses | 主要用途	Top Producers | 主要生产国
Lithium | 锂	Batteries, electric vehicles | 电池、电动汽车	Australia, Chile, China | 澳大利亚、智利、中国
Cobalt | 钴	Battery cathodes, superalloys | 电池正极、高温合金	DR Congo, Russia, Australia | 刚果（金）、俄罗斯、澳大利亚
Rare Earths | 稀土	Magnets, electronics, defence | 永磁体、电子、国防	China (60-70% of global output) | 中国（占全球产量60%-70%）
Gallium | 镓	Semiconductors, LEDs | 半导体、LED	China (80%+), Germany, Japan | 中国（80%以上）、德国、日本
Graphite | 石墨	Battery anodes, lubricants | 电池负极、润滑剂	China, Mozambique, Brazil | 中国、莫桑比克、巴西

The concentration of production in a handful of countries creates what economists call “geological scarcity meeting geopolitical scarcity”—a mineral may be abundant in the Earth’s crust, yet strategically scarce due to where it is mined and processed.

生产集中在少数国家，造成了经济学家所称的”地质稀缺遇见地缘政治稀缺”——一种矿物在地壳中可能储量丰富，但由于开采和加工地点而具有战略性稀缺。

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3. The Four Dimensions of Supply Chain Risk | 供应链风险的四个维度

Supply chain risk in the mineral sector can be systematically analysed across four interconnected dimensions:

矿产部门的供应链风险可以从四个相互关联的维度进行系统分析：

Geological Risk | 地质风险: The physical availability of mineral deposits. High-grade deposits of critical minerals are increasingly rare, and ore grades are declining globally. The average copper grade has fallen from over 1% in the 1990s to below 0.6% today, meaning more rock must be moved for each tonne of metal recovered.

地质风险：矿床的物理可用性。关键矿产的高品位矿床日益稀少，全球矿石品位持续下降。平均铜品位已从20世纪90年代的超过1%降至如今的0.6%以下，这意味着每回收一吨金属需要搬运更多矿石。

Geopolitical Risk | 地缘政治风险: The location of mineral deposits and processing facilities in politically unstable regions, or the use of mineral exports as a political lever. Export restrictions on critical minerals have increased nearly fivefold since 2009, according to the International Energy Agency.

地缘政治风险：矿床和加工设施位于政治不稳定地区，或矿产出口被用作政治杠杆。据国际能源署统计，自2009年以来，关键矿产的出口限制增加了近五倍。

Market Risk | 市场风险: The volatility of mineral prices, driven by supply-demand imbalances, speculative trading, and the concentrated market power of dominant producers. Lithium prices, for example, swung by more than 400% between 2021 and 2023.

市场风险：矿产价格的波动性，由供需失衡、投机交易和主导生产商的市场集中力量驱动。例如，锂价在2021年至2023年间波动超过400%。

Operational Risk | 运营风险: The day-to-day vulnerabilities in mining, processing, and transportation—from labour strikes and equipment failures to port congestion and shipping disruptions. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed how fragile these operational links can be.

运营风险：采矿、加工和运输中的日常脆弱环节——从罢工和设备故障到港口拥堵和航运中断。新冠疫情暴露了这些运营环节的脆弱性。

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4. The Concentrated Supply Chain: Processing Bottlenecks | 集中化的供应链：加工瓶颈

One of the most overlooked yet critical vulnerabilities in mineral supply chains lies not in mining, but in processing. While many countries possess mineral reserves, the capacity to refine and process these raw materials into usable industrial inputs is far more concentrated.

矿产供应链中最容易被忽视却又至关重要的脆弱环节不在于采矿，而在于加工。尽管许多国家拥有矿产资源储量，但将这些原材料精炼和加工成可用工业投入品的能力却更为集中。

China’s dominance in processing is striking: it accounts for roughly 90% of global rare earth processing, 60% of lithium refining, 70% of cobalt processing, and 80% of graphite processing. This means that even countries with abundant domestic mines—such as Australia and the United States—must send their raw ores to China for final processing.

中国在加工领域的优势令人瞩目：约占全球稀土加工的90%、锂精炼的60%、钴加工的70%和石墨加工的80%。这意味着即使拥有丰富国内矿藏的国家——如澳大利亚和美国——也必须将原矿送往中国进行最终加工。

This processing bottleneck creates a peculiar situation: a country may have mineral sovereignty at the extraction stage but remain fundamentally dependent at the refinement stage. The strategic implications are enormous, as downstream industries such as battery manufacturing, electronics, and defence rely on processed materials, not raw ores.

这种加工瓶颈造成了一种奇特局面：一个国家可能在开采阶段拥有矿产主权，但在精炼阶段仍然从根本上依赖他人。其战略影响巨大，因为电池制造、电子和国防等下游产业依赖的是加工后的材料，而非原矿。

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5. The Energy Transition: New Demand Pressures | 能源转型：新的需求压力

The shift toward clean energy is fundamentally reshaping mineral demand. A typical electric vehicle battery requires approximately 8 kg of lithium, 14 kg of cobalt, and 35 kg of nickel—materials that would not be needed in a conventional petrol car. Wind turbines and solar panels likewise demand copper, rare earths, and other specialty metals at unprecedented scale.

向清洁能源的转型正从根本上重塑矿产需求。一辆典型电动汽车电池需要约8公斤锂、14公斤钴和35公斤镍——这些材料在传统汽油车中并不需要。风力涡轮机和太阳能电池板同样以前所未有的规模需求铜、稀土和其他特种金属。

The International Energy Agency projects that by 2040, demand for critical minerals under a net-zero scenario will be 4 to 6 times higher than today. Demand for lithium could grow by over 40 times, driven almost entirely by battery storage and electric mobility.

国际能源署预计，到2040年，在净零排放情景下，关键矿产需求将比现在高出4至6倍。锂的需求可能增长40倍以上，这几乎完全由电池储能和电动出行驱动。

This demand surge collides with long project lead times. From initial exploration to first production, a new mine typically takes 10 to 15 years. The mining industry’s historical cycle of boom-and-bust investment does not align well with the urgency of climate targets, creating structural supply-demand gaps that could persist for decades.

这一需求激增与漫长的项目开发周期相冲突。从最初勘探到首次投产，一个新矿山通常需要10至15年。采矿业历史上”繁荣-萧条”的投资周期与气候目标的紧迫性难以匹配，形成了可能持续数十年的结构性供需缺口。

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6. Recycling and Circular Economy as a Buffer | 回收与循环经济作为缓冲

Secondary supply—the recovery of minerals from end-of-life products—offers a partial answer to supply chain vulnerability. Urban mining, as it is sometimes called, can reduce import dependence, lower environmental footprints, and create domestic supply resilience.

二次供应——从报废产品中回收矿产——为供应链脆弱性提供了部分解决方案。城市采矿（有时如此称呼）可以减少进口依赖、降低环境足迹并增强国内供应韧性。

The potential is significant but underdeveloped. Current global recycling rates for critical minerals are low: less than 1% for rare earth elements, about 15% for lithium, and approximately 35% for copper. This represents not only wasted resources but also missed strategic opportunities. If recycled cobalt accounted for 30% of demand by 2030, the European Union could reduce its import reliance by a corresponding margin.

潜力巨大但开发不足。目前全球关键矿产的回收率偏低：稀土元素不足1%，锂约15%，铜约35%。这不仅意味着资源浪费，也意味着战略机遇的错失。如果到2030年再生钴能满足30%的需求，欧盟就可以相应减少其进口依赖。

Yet recycling cannot fully replace primary production. The growth in demand, especially for batteries, far exceeds what recycling can supply in the near term. The circular economy must therefore be seen as a complement—an essential one—but not a substitute for new mining investment.

然而，回收无法完全替代原生生产。需求的增长，尤其是电池领域的需求，远超回收在短期内能够供应的量。因此，循环经济必须被视为补充——是必要的补充——而非新采矿投资的替代品。

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7. Strategic Responses: Policy Instruments | 战略应对：政策工具

Governments worldwide are deploying a range of policy instruments to enhance mineral security. These responses can be grouped into several categories:

世界各国的政府正在部署一系列政策工具来增强矿产安全。这些应对措施可分为以下几类：

• Stockpiling | 战略储备: Building state-controlled reserves of critical minerals, similar to strategic petroleum reserves, to buffer against short-term supply disruptions. China holds strategic reserves of roughly 10 critical minerals; Japan maintains stockpiles of over 30.
• 储备：建立国家控制的关键矿产储备，类似于战略石油储备，以缓冲短期供应中断。中国持有约10种关键矿产的战略储备；日本维持着30多种的库存。
• Trade agreements and diplomacy | 贸易协定与外交: Negotiating bilateral agreements with resource-rich nations, as Japan has done with Australia for lithium and the EU has pursued with Chile for copper and lithium.
• 贸易协定与外交：与资源丰富的国家谈判双边协定，如日本与澳大利亚就锂达成的协议，以及欧盟与智利就铜和锂开展的合作。
• Domestic production incentives | 国内生产激励: Tax credits, subsidies, and streamlined permitting for domestic mining and processing ventures. The US Inflation Reduction Act offers production tax credits for critical mineral extraction and processing.
• 国内生产激励：对国内采矿和加工项目提供税收抵免、补贴和简化审批。美国《通胀削减法案》为关键矿产开采和加工提供生产税收抵免。
• Research and innovation | 研究与创新: Funding into substitution technologies, improved recycling methods, and alternative extraction techniques.
• 研究与创新：资助替代材料技术、改进回收方法和替代提取技术。
• Export controls and strategic leverage | 出口管制与战略杠杆: Using domestic mineral dominance as a diplomatic tool, as demonstrated by China’s 2023 export controls on gallium and germanium.
• 出口管制与战略杠杆：利用本国的矿产优势作为外交工具，如中国2023年对镓和锗实施的出口管制。

The effectiveness of these tools varies considerably. Stockpiles provide short-term cover but cannot sustain long-term dependence; trade agreements offer diversity but can be fragile; domestic incentives can work but take years to yield supplies.

这些工具的有效性差异显著。储备提供短期覆盖但无法支撑长期依赖；贸易协定提供多样性但可能脆弱；国内激励可以奏效但需要数年才能产生供应。

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8. Case Studies: Lessons from Real-world Disruptions | 案例研究：真实干扰的教训

Understanding mineral security requires examining how supply disruptions have actually played out. Two cases are particularly instructive:

理解矿产安全需要审视供应中断在实际中是如何演变的。两个案例特别具有启发性：

Case One: The 2010 Rare Earth Crisis | 案例一：2010年稀土危机. In 2010, China—then supplying over 95% of global rare earths—imposed export quotas in a territorial dispute with Japan. Prices skyrocketed: dysprosium rose from around $100 per kg to over $3,000 per kg within months. The crisis forced consuming nations to accelerate recycling, seek alternative sources, and fund substitution research. Within five years, new mines in Australia and the US, combined with demand-reducing innovations, had substantially eroded China’s pricing power—though not its market share in processing.

案例一：2010年稀土危机。2010年，在全球稀土供应中超95%的中国因与日本的领土争端实施出口配额。价格飙升：镝在数月内从每公斤约100美元涨至每公斤3000美元以上。这场危机迫使消费国加速回收、寻求替代来源并资助替代研究。五年内，澳大利亚和美国的新矿山加上降低需求的创新，大幅削弱了中国的定价权——但未撼动其在加工环节的市场份额。

Case Two: The 2021-2022 Lithium Boom | 案例二：2021-2022年锂价暴涨. As electric vehicle sales accelerated beyond forecasts, lithium supply lagged dramatically. Prices surged from under $10,000 per tonne in 2020 to over $78,000 per tonne by late 2022. This triggered unprecedented investment in new extraction capacity, but also exposed how quickly demand-side transitions can outpace supply-side responses in the minerals sector.

案例二：2021-2022年锂价暴涨。随着电动汽车销量超出预期地加速增长，锂供应严重滞后。价格从2020年的每吨不到1万美元飙升至2022年底的每吨超过7.8万美元。这引发了对新开采产能的前所未有的投资，但也暴露了需求侧转型在矿产领域超越供给侧响应的速度之快。

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9. Environmental and Ethical Trade-offs | 环境与伦理权衡

Mineral security cannot be pursued at any cost. Mining has significant environmental and social impacts, from deforestation and water pollution to community displacement and human rights concerns. The challenge of the 21st century is to achieve mineral security in a manner that is environmentally sustainable and ethically defensible.

矿产安全不能不计代价地追求。采矿具有重大的环境和社会影响，从森林砍伐和水污染到社区迁移和人权问题。21世纪的挑战是以环境可持续和道德可辩护的方式实现矿产安全。

Deep sea mining—the extraction of polymetallic nodules from the ocean floor—illustrates this tension. The Clarion-Clipperton Zone in the Pacific contains vast deposits of nickel, cobalt, and rare earths that could add meaningful supply diversity. Yet scientific understanding of deep-sea ecosystems remains limited, and concerns about irreversible environmental damage have led to calls for a moratorium.

深海采矿——从海底开采多金属结核——体现了这一张力。太平洋的克拉里昂-克利珀顿区拥有巨大的镍、钴和稀土矿床，可能为供应多元化做出有意义的贡献。然而，对深海生态系统的科学认知仍然有限，对不可逆环境损害的担忧引发了暂停开发的呼吁。

Similarly, cobalt mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been linked to artisanal mining practices involving child labour, raising serious ethical questions for downstream consumers and manufacturers. Supply chain due diligence regulations, such as the EU’s Conflict Minerals Regulation, represent attempts to address these concerns—but they also add compliance costs that can further concentrate supply chains in favour of larger, better-resourced producers.

同样，刚果民主共和国的钴矿开采被指与涉及童工的手工采矿做法相关，给下游消费者和制造商提出了严峻的伦理问题。供应链尽职调查法规，如欧盟的《冲突矿产条例》，代表了解决这些问题的尝试——但它们也增加了合规成本，可能进一步使供应链偏向规模更大、资源更充足的生产商。

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10. Global Cooperation vs. Strategic Autonomy | 全球合作与战略自主

The geopolitics of critical minerals presents a fundamental dilemma: mineral security cannot be achieved by any single nation alone, yet the prevailing trend is toward unilateralism and strategic autonomy. Each nation’s efforts to secure its own supply chains—through subsidies, export controls, and diplomatic pressure—can, in aggregate, distort markets and intensify competition.

关键矿产的地缘政治呈现出一个根本困境：矿产安全无法由任何单一国家单独实现，但当前的趋势却是单边主义和战略自主。每个国家通过补贴、出口管制和外交施压来确保自身供应链的努力，总体上可能扭曲市场并加剧竞争。

The need for international coordination is clear. Mechanisms for cooperative action include:

国际合作的需求是明确的。合作行动的机制包括：

• Information-sharing on reserves, production capacity, and demand forecasts | 储备、生产能力和需求预测的信息共享；
• Joint investment in exploration and processing, particularly in developing countries with mineral wealth | 在拥有矿产财富的发展中国家进行勘探和加工的联合投资；
• Common standards for environmental and social governance in mining | 采矿中环境和社会治理的共同标准；
• Emergency-response mechanisms for global supply disruptions | 全球供应中断的应急响应机制；
• Multilateral frameworks to discourage beggar-thy-neighbour export restrictions | 阻止以邻为壑的出口限制的多边框架。

International organisations—from the IEA’s Critical Minerals Task Force to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goal 12 on responsible consumption—provide platforms for such cooperation. Whether political will can match institutional capacity remains to be seen.

从IEA的关键矿产工作组到联合国关于负责任消费的可持续发展目标12，国际组织为此类合作提供了平台。政治意愿能否匹配制度能力，仍有待观察。

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11. Conclusion: The Road Ahead | 结论：未来之路

Mineral security is not a technical sidebar issue—it is a defining challenge of our era. The energy transition, digital transformation, and geopolitical realignment all converge on the question of who controls the Earth’s critical materials, at what cost, and under what conditions.

矿产安全不是一个技术性的次要问题——它是我们时代的一个决定性挑战。能源转型、数字化转型和地缘政治重组都汇聚在一个问题上：谁控制着地球的关键材料，以何种成本，在什么条件下。

The road ahead demands a nuanced, multi-faceted approach. Nations must invest in domestic production, diversify international partnerships, accelerate recycling, and pursue substitution—all while maintaining environmental standards and ethical commitments. No single country can claim self-sufficiency in critical minerals; no single policy instrument can guarantee supply chain resilience.

未来之路需要一种细致、多层面的方法。各国必须在保持环境标准和道德承诺的同时，投资于国内生产、多元化国际伙伴关系、加速回收和推动替代。没有任何一个国家能在关键矿产上宣称自给自足；没有任何单一政策工具能保证供应链韧性。

Ultimately, mineral security is a measure of our collective ability to manage complexity—to balance geology with geopolitics, demand with supply, and short-term security with long-term sustainability. The decisions made in the coming decade will shape everything from the viability of clean energy to the contours of global power.

归根结底，矿产安全衡量的是我们集体管理复杂性的能力——平衡地质与地缘政治、需求与供应、短期安全与长期可持续性。未来十年做出的决策将塑造一切，从清洁能源的可行性到全球权力的格局。

Published by TutorHao | Geography Revision Series | aleveler.com

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