Quick Reference Handbook of Philosophical Concepts and Arguments | 哲学概念与论证速查手册

📚 Quick Reference Handbook of Philosophical Concepts and Arguments | 哲学概念与论证速查手册

This quick reference handbook compiles the essential ‘formulae’ of Year 12 Cambridge Philosophy: logical rules, key arguments, core concepts and major theories. Instead of mathematical equations, our discipline offers valid argument forms, definitions of knowledge, ethical frameworks and classic moves in philosophy of religion, mind and politics. Each entry provides a succinct statement you must know, matched with its Chinese counterpart.

这本速查手册汇编了 Year 12 剑桥哲学的基本“公式”:逻辑规则、关键论证、核心概念与主要理论。我们的学科没有数学方程,取而代之的是有效论证形式、知识的定义、伦理框架以及宗教哲学、心灵哲学和政治哲学中的经典推论。每条知识点都以必须掌握的简洁陈述呈现,并配有中文对照。

1. Logic Toolkit: Valid Argument Forms | 逻辑工具箱:有效论证形式

A valid deductive argument guarantees that if the premises are true, the conclusion cannot be false. The following forms are the philosophical equivalents of algebraic identities.

有效的演绎论证保证:如果前提为真,结论不可能为假。下列形式就是哲学中的代数恒等式。

Name / 名称 Form / 形式 Example / 示例
Modus Ponens / 肯定前件

P → Q, P ∴ Q

If it rains, the ground is wet. It rains. Therefore the ground is wet. / 如果下雨,地面湿。下雨了。所以地面湿。
Modus Tollens / 否定后件

P → Q, ¬Q ∴ ¬P

If the battery is charged, the light is on. The light is not on. So the battery is not charged. / 如果电池有电,灯亮。灯不亮。所以电池没电。
Hypothetical Syllogism / 假言三段论

P → Q, Q → R ∴ P → R

If I study, I pass. If I pass, I graduate. So if I study, I graduate. / 如果我学习,我会通过。如果通过,我毕业。所以如果我学习,我毕业。
Disjunctive Syllogism / 选言三段论

P ∨ Q, ¬P ∴ Q

Either it is a cat or a dog. It is not a cat. So it is a dog. / 要么是猫要么是狗。不是猫。所以是狗。
Constructive Dilemma / 构造性二难

P ∨ Q, P → R, Q → S ∴ R ∨ S

Either we leave now or we stay. If we leave, we catch the train. If we stay, we have dinner. So either we catch the train or we have dinner. / 要么现在走要么留下。如果走,赶上火车。如果留下,吃晚饭。所以要么赶上火车要么吃晚饭。

2. Informal Fallacies: Common Errors | 非形式谬误:常见错误

Fallacies are psychologically persuasive but logically flawed moves. Recognising them is a core skill in philosophical analysis.

谬误在心理上具有说服力,但在逻辑上存在缺陷。识别谬误是哲学分析的核心技能。

Fallacy / 谬误 Description / 描述 Quick Formula / 快速公式
Ad Hominem / 人身攻击 Attacking the person instead of the argument. / 攻击人而非论证。 You say X, but you are bad → X is false. / 你说X,但你不好 → X假。
Straw Man / 稻草人 Misrepresenting an argument to make it easier to attack. / 歪曲对方论点以便更容易攻击。 Opponent says p; I treat it as exaggerated q; I refute q and claim p is refuted. / 对方主张p;我将其曲解为夸张的q;我驳倒q,宣称驳倒了p。
Begging the Question / 乞题 The conclusion is assumed in a premise. / 结论已被前提所假定。 Circular: p because p. / 循环:因为p所以p。
False Dilemma / 假两难 Presenting only two options when more exist. / 只给出两个选项,实际上更多。 Either A or B; not A; therefore B — but C is ignored. / 要么A要么B;非A;所以B — 忽略了C。
Post Hoc / 后此谬误 Assuming B was caused by A simply because B followed A. / 仅因B在A之后发生就认为A导致B。 A occurred, then B occurred → A caused B (not necessarily). / A发生了,之后B发生了 → A导致了B(未必)。
Slippery Slope / 滑坡 Claiming a small step will inevitably lead to a chain of undesirable events. / 声称一小步将不可避免地导致一系列不良事件。 If we allow A, then B will happen, then C… and finally disaster Z. / 如果我们允许A,然后B发生,然后C…最后灾难Z。

3. Epistemology: Key Concepts | 认识论:核心概念

The classical tripartite analysis of knowledge and the Gettier problem are the starting points for any AS epistemology paper.

经典的知识三元分析法和盖梯尔问题是任何AS认识论试卷的出发点。

Tripartite Definition of Knowledge / 知识的三元定义: S knows that p if and only if (i) p is true, (ii) S believes that p, and (iii) S is justified in believing that p. / S知道p,当且仅当 (i) p为真,(ii) S相信p,且 (iii) S有理由相信p。

Gettier Cases / 盖梯尔案例: Situations where the three conditions are met, yet S lacks knowledge because the justification is accidentally true. / 满足三个条件但S仍缺乏知识的情形,因为理由的真仅仅是巧合。

JTB + No False Lemmas / JTB + 无假前提: A proposed fix: S knows that p iff S has a justified true belief that p not inferred from any falsehood. / 一种修正提议:S知道p,当且仅当S有理由的真信念p,且不是从任何假前提推论而来。

Internalism vs Externalism / 内在论与外在论: Internalism holds that justifiers must be cognitively accessible to the subject; externalism allows that the reliability of the belief-forming process can justify even if the subject is unaware of it. / 内在论主张理由必须在认知上对主体可通达;外在论允许信念形成过程的可靠性本身就可以成为理由,即使主体未意识到。


4. Theories of Truth | 真理理论

A quick overview of the main candidates for ‘what makes a proposition true’. Each has a simple formula.

快速纵览关于“什么使一个命题为真”的主要候选理论。每一种都有一个简单公式。

Theory / 理论 Core Claim / 核心主张 Formula / 公式
Correspondence / 符合论 A proposition is true if it corresponds to a fact. / 命题为真当且仅当它与事实相符。

True(p) ↔ ∃f (Fact(f) ∧ Corresponds(p, f))

Coherence / 融贯论 A proposition is true if it coheres with a system of beliefs. / 命题为真当且仅当它与信念系统融贯一致。

True(p) ↔ Coheres(p, System)

Pragmatic / 实用论 Truth is what works in practice or inquiry. / 真理是在实践或探究中有效的东西。

True(p) ↔ Useful(p)

Deflationary / 紧缩论 To say ‘p is true’ is just to assert p. / 说“p为真”就等于断定p。

‘p is true’ ≡ p


5. Ethical Theories: Normative Frameworks | 伦理理论:规范框架

The big three normative ethical theories each offer a decision procedure expressed in characteristic maxims.

三大规范伦理理论各自提供了一个以典型准则表达的决策程序。

Utilitarianism / 功利主义 (Bentham, Mill): An action is right if it produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Formula: Maximise overall utility. / 一个行为是正当的,如果它为最大多数人带来最大幸福。公式:最大化总功利。

Kantian Deontology / 康德义务论: Act only according to that maxim which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. The Categorical Imperative is a test of universalisability. / 只按照你同时愿意它成为一条普遍法则的准则去行动。定言命令是可普遍化检验。

Aristotelian Virtue Ethics / 亚里士多德美德伦理学: An action is right if it is what a virtuous person would do. The doctrine of the mean: virtue is a mean between excess and deficiency. / 行为正当,如果它是一个有德之人会做的事。中道学说:美德是过度与不及之间的中道。


6. Metaethics: Cognitivism vs Non-Cognitivism | 元伦理学:认知主义与非认知主义

Metaethical positions are often summarised by what they say about moral language. Use these ‘translation’ rules.

元伦理学立场常可依据它们对道德语言的看法来概括。使用这些“翻译”规则。

Moral Realism (Cognitivist) / 道德实在论(认知主义): Moral statements express beliefs that aim to describe moral facts. ‘Murder is wrong’ asserts a property of wrongness and can be true or false. / 道德陈述表达信念,旨在描述道德事实。“谋杀是错误的”断言了一个错误属性,可真可假。

Error Theory (Cognitivist) / 错误理论(认知主义): Moral statements are truth-apt but systematically false because no moral properties exist. / 道德陈述有真假值,但系统性地为假,因为道德属性不存在。

Emotivism (Non-Cognitivist) / 情感主义(非认知主义): Moral utterances express emotions, not beliefs. ‘Murder is wrong’ = ‘Boo to murder!’ / 道德话语表达情感,而非信念。“谋杀是错误的” = “谋杀,呸!”

Prescriptivism (Non-Cognitivist) / 规约主义(非认知主义): Moral utterances are universalisable prescriptions. ‘Murder is wrong’ = ‘Do not murder!’ and applies to all similar situations. / 道德话语是可普遍化的规定。“谋杀是错误的” = “不要谋杀!”并适用于所有类似情境。


7. Arguments for the Existence of God | 上帝存在的论证

The three classical theistic arguments can be presented as concise logical structures.

三种经典的上帝存在论证可以呈现为简明的逻辑结构。

Ontological Argument / 本体论论证 (Anselm, Descartes): God is by definition a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. If God exists only in the mind, we could conceive a greater being that exists in reality. Therefore God must exist in reality. Formula: ‘God = that than which no greater can be conceived’ → Existence is a perfection → God exists. / 上帝被定义为无与伦比者。如果上帝只存在于心中,我们就能设想一个更伟大的也在现实中存在的存在者。因此上帝必然存在于现实中。公式:“上帝 = 无以伦比者” → 存在是完满 → 上帝存在。

Cosmological Argument / 宇宙论论证 (Aquinas, Craig): Every contingent being requires a cause. The universe is contingent. There cannot be an infinite regress of causes. Therefore there is a necessary first cause, God. / 每个偶然存在物都需要一个原因。宇宙是偶然的。不能有无穷回溯的原因。因此存在一个必然的第一因,即上帝。

Teleological (Design) Argument / 目的论(设计)论证 (Paley): The universe exhibits order, complexity and purpose, similar to a watch. A watch requires a watchmaker. Therefore, by analogy, the universe requires an intelligent designer. / 宇宙展现出秩序、复杂性和目的,类似一块钟表。钟表需要钟表匠。因此,通过类比,宇宙需要一位智慧的设计师。


8. The Problem of Evil | 恶的问题

The logical problem of evil is often formulated as an inconsistent triad. The free will defence is the standard reply.

恶的逻辑问题常被表述为不一致三元组。自由意志辩护是标准回应。

Inconsistent Triad / 不一致三元组: The following three propositions cannot all be true: (1) God is omnipotent. (2) God is wholly good. (3) Evil exists. If God is omnipotent and good, he would eliminate evil; since evil exists, such a God does not exist. / 以下三个命题不能全部为真:(1) 上帝全能。(2) 上帝全善。(3) 恶存在。如果上帝全能且全善,他会消除恶;既然恶存在,这样的上帝不存在。

Free Will Defence / 自由意志辩护 (Plantinga): It is logically possible that a wholly good God could not create a world containing moral good without also permitting moral evil, because free creatures must be free to choose evil. Thus the existence of evil does not logically contradict God’s existence. / 逻辑上可能的是,一位全善的上帝不能创造一个包含道德善却不允许道德恶的世界,因为自由的受造物必须能自由地选择恶。因此恶的存在与上帝的存在在逻辑上并不矛盾。


9. Political Philosophy: Key Theories | 政治哲学:关键理论

A-Level political philosophy examines the justification of the state, liberty, and principles of justice. The following are formulaic summaries of core ideas.

A-Level政治哲学考查国家的合法性、自由和正义原则。以下是核心思想的公式化总结。

Social Contract / 社会契约 (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau): Legitimate political authority derives from the consent of the governed. Formula: In the state of nature, individuals face insecurity; they collectively agree to surrender some freedom to a sovereign in exchange for protection and order. / 合法的政治权威来自于被统治者的同意。公式:在自然状态下,个人面临不安全;他们共同同意将部分自由交给主权者以换取保护与秩序。

Harm Principle / 伤害原则 (Mill): The only justification for restricting a person’s liberty is to prevent harm to others. Self-regarding actions are not to be interfered with. / 限制个人自由的唯一正当理据是防止对他人的伤害。只涉己的行为不应被干涉。

Rawls’s Principles of Justice / 罗尔斯的正义原则: Each person has an equal right to the most extensive basic liberties compatible with similar liberties for all. Social and economic inequalities must satisfy the difference principle: they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and attached to offices open to all under fair equality of opportunity. / 每个人都有平等的权利享有最广泛的、与所有人同样的自由相容的基本自由。社会和经济不平等必须满足差异原则:它们应最有利于最不利者,并与在公平的机会平等条件下向所有人开放的职务相联系。


10. Philosophy of Mind: Dualism vs Physicalism | 心灵哲学:二元论与物理主义

Positions in the mind-body debate can be expressed as identity or distinction theses.

心身问题中的立场可以表达为同一性或区别性论题。

Substance Dualism / 实体二元论 (Descartes): The mind is a non-physical substance distinct from the body. Argument from conceivability: I can clearly and distinctly conceive myself existing without a body; therefore mind and body are distinct. / 心灵是与身体不同的非物理实体。可设想性论证:我可以清晰分明地设想自己无身体而存在;因此心灵与身体不同。

Mind-Brain Identity Theory / 心脑同一论: Mental states are numerically identical to brain states. Type identity: each type of mental state is identical to a type of physical state (e.g., pain = C-fibre firing). / 心理状态在数字上等同于大脑状态。类型同一论:每种类型的心理状态都同一于一种类型的物理状态(例如,疼痛 = C纤维放电)。

Functionalism / 功能主义: Mental states are defined by their causal roles — the sensory inputs, other mental states, and behavioural outputs they connect. The same functional state can be realised by different physical substrates (multiple realisability). / 心理状态由其因果角色定义——它们所连接的感官输入、其他心理状态和行为输出。同一个功能状态可由不同的物理基底实现(多重可实现性)。


11. Free Will and Determinism | 自由意志与决定论

The classic positions are defined by whether they accept determinism and whether free will is compatible with it.

经典立场由它们是否接受决定论以及自由意志是否与之相容来界定。

Hard Determinism / 强决定论: Determinism is true; free will is incompatible with determinism; therefore we lack free will. Formula: Determinism ∧ Incompatibilism → No free will. / 决定论为真;自由意志与决定论不相容;因此我们没有自由意志。公式:决定论 ∧ 不相容主义 → 无自由意志。

Libertarianism (Metaphysical) / 自由意志论(形而上学): Free will requires indeterminism; some events, such as agent-caused choices, are not determined. We have free will. / 自由意志需要非决定论;某些事件,如主体引发的选择,不是被决定的。我们有自由意志。

Compatibilism (Soft Determinism) / 相容论(温和决定论): Free will is compatible with determinism. An action is free if it flows from the agent’s own desires and intentions without external coercion, even if those desires themselves are determined. / 自由意志与决定论相容。一个行为是自由的,如果它出自行动者自己的欲望和意图且无外在强制,即使那些欲望本身是被决定的。


12. Key Definitional Flashcard Table | 关键定义速记表

A final sweep of concepts likely to appear as short-answer questions. Each entry gives you the term and its one-sentence definition.

最后快速扫描可能以简答题出现的概念。每个条目给出术语及其单句定义。

Term / 术语 Definition / 定义
A Priori / 先验 Knowledge justified independently of experience. / 独立于经验而得到辩护的知识。
A Posteriori / 后验 Knowledge justified by experience. / 由经验辩护的知识。
Analytic / 分析 A statement true in virtue of meaning (e.g., ‘All bachelors are unmarried’). / 仅凭意义即为真的陈述(如“所有单身汉都是未婚的”)。
Synthetic / 综合 A statement true in virtue of how the world is (e.g., ‘The cat is on the mat’). / 凭借世界如何而为真的陈述(如“猫在垫子上”)。
Ockham’s Razor / 奥卡姆剃刀 Entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. / 若无必要,勿增实体。
Scepticism / 怀疑论 The view that we lack knowledge in some domain. / 认为我们在某个领域缺乏知识的观点。
Empiricism / 经验论 The view that all knowledge ultimately comes from sense experience. / 认为所有知识最终都来自感觉经验的观点。
Rationalism / 唯理论 The view that reason is a source of substantial knowledge independent of experience. / 认为理性是独立于经验的实质知识来源的观点。

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